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Abstract 
Inattention is a symptom related to several mental health disorders, most notably 
ADHD. Recent work has suggested that a) inattention is a symptom worth studying in 
it’s own right regardless of co-occurring pathology, b) it persists beyond childhood 
and may be more relevant to adults than the other ADHD symptoms (hyperactivity 
and impulsivity), and c) it is dimensional so investigation of it should consider the full 
spectrum of symptom expression. The approach of this thesis is based on these points. 
A preliminary study addressed the prevalence of inattention. Findings validated the 
approach of the thesis and suggested that inattention is highly prevalent in a general 
population sample of adults (over 30% when broadly defined), more so than 
hyperactivity-impulsivity. Across four further studies we used behavioural and 
pupillometry measures to investigate the cognitive underpinnings of inattention with a 
view to differentiating it from hyperactivity and impulsivity. Research suggests a role 
for executive functions (EFs) and self-regulatory processes in ADHD, although there 
is conflicting theory on what aspects of these relate to which symptoms. Various EF 
and self-regulatory components, with consideration for “hot” and “cool” cognitive 
distinctions, were tested in relation to ADHD symptoms using a model based on an 
interpretation of the literature. Findings across studies were mixed, but make several 
notable contributions to literature in this area. Firstly we demonstrated a unique and 
robust relationship between inattention and working memory. Secondly, we show 
strong evidence against a relationship between inattention and norepinephrine activity 
as indexed by changes in pupil diameter. There were also notable distinctions between 
inattention and the other symptoms of ADHD across the research. We discuss how 
these findings relate to theory on “hot” and “cool” cognition, along with their 
application to both general population and clinical groups.  
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Thesis Structure 
This thesis conforms to an “article format” whereby the experimental chapters 
(Chapters 2 – 6) are included as discrete articles written in a style appropriate for 
publication in peer-reviewed journals. The first and seventh chapters present an 
overview and discussion for the entire thesis, and a preface is included at the 
beginning of each chapter to clarify how each article contributes to the overall aims of 
the thesis. 
 The articles included in this thesis are at various stages of the 
publication/review process (see page v). The main text of each chapter is presented as 
an exact replication of that prepared for submission meaning repetition between 
chapters is inevitable, particularly in the introductory sections. Figures and tables are 
numbered within each chapter, a key to these can be seen on pages vii – x. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Inattention is one of the three core symptoms of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD), a childhood-onset neurodevelopmental disorder. It is characterised by a lack of 
attention to detail often resulting in seemingly careless mistakes, difficulty sustaining 
prolonged attention to a task, daydreaming, being easily distracted by external stimuli as 
well as internal thought, problems with organisation and planning, and a tendency to 
embark on new activities before finishing previous ones. The remaining two core 
symptoms are hyperactivity and impulsivity, externalising symptoms sometimes grouped 
together which are characterised by excessive energy levels, impatience, and disruptive, 
often inappropriate behaviour with a lack of regard for social rules. It is possible to have 
inattention without the other two symptoms, and for this reason there are several sub-types 
of ADHD. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th edition (DSM-5) 
lists three; the combined type where individuals meet criteria for both inattention and 
hyperactivity-impulsivity (ADHD-C), the predominantly inattentive type where 
individuals meet criteria for inattention only (ADHD-I), and the predominantly 
hyperactive-impulsive type (ADHD-HI) where only hyperactive-impulsive criteria are met. 
To avoid confusion, diagnosis of pure inattention will herein be abbreviated to PIT (i.e. 
predominantly inattentive type, as per Barkley, 2001) so as not to confuse it with a disorder 
that includes symptoms of hyperactivity-impulsivity.  
 
Inattention as a Symptom of other Disorders 
Although the majority of research on inattention uses samples of participants with ADHD, 
it is not a symptom exclusive to this disorder. All symptoms of ADHD are common in 
children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), although the reverse (ASD symptoms 
being found in ADHD) is not true (Mayes, Calhoun, Mayes, & Molitoris, 2012; Sinzig, 
Walter, & Doepfner, 2009). Neuroimaging research has found a negative relationship 
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between inattentive symptoms and grey matter volume in the same brain area for both 
ADHD and ASD (Brieber et al. 2007). Interestingly, Sinzig et al. found that children with 
ASD and co-morbid ADHD could be categorised as either inattentive or hyperactive, and 
suggested different underlying neurochemical systems for each. Impaired attention is also 
typically found in schizophrenia (Egeland et al., 2003). Egeland (2010) found that on a 
variety of tests of attention, subjects with schizophrenia and ADHD were equally impaired. 
Karatekin and Asarnow (1998) found similarities in working memory (WM) impairment 
between subjects with schizophrenia and ADHD. This is of particular interest as 
inattention is thought to be related specifically to WM impairments (to be discussed in 
more detail later). Inattention may also contribute to the severity of some eating disorders 
including bulimia nervosa (Seitz et al., 2013). It has been suggested that inattention may be 
particularly prevalent in those eating disorders characterised by a binge-purge cycle 
(Yates, Lund, Johnson, Mitchell, & McKee, 2009). Sufferers of eating disorders are also 
typically thought to have self-regulatory deficits (Goodsitt, 1983; Marchi & Cohen, 1990), 
and there is reason to believe this may be related to inattention and WM (to be discussed in 
more detail later).  
 
Limitations of Inattention Research 
There are several limitations to much of the existing research on inattention. Firstly the 
majority of findings are from clinical samples of male children. ADHD is (or was) most 
commonly diagnosed in males, and the most common diagnosis was ADHD-C (Lahey et 
al, 1994). This is now thought to be a poor reflection of prevalence, as girls are less likely 
to have their disorder identified than males, possibly because they are more likely to have 
the inattentive sub-type, which has less obvious symptoms (Bradshaw, 2001; Collingwood, 
2010; Froehlich et al., 2007). This has meant that overall there is considerably less research 
on PIT than there is on ADHD-C. This is unfortunate, as other work has suggested that PIT 
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may be at least as prevalent if not more so than ADHD-C (Gaub & Carlson, 1997; 
Wolraich, Hannah, Pinnock, Baumgaertel, & Brown, 1996). In many cases, samples of 
ADHD participants are referred to with no specification as to subtype at all. It is not 
possible to draw conclusions specifically about inattention in these cases. It is also difficult 
to draw conclusions about inattention in adults from research with children. For many 
years ADHD was thought to be a disorder exclusive to childhood, and has only recently 
been recognised as existing in adults. 
 
Inattention in Adults 
The latest version of the DSM, released in 2014, was the first to provide specific ADHD 
diagnostic criteria for adults. Longitudinal follow-up studies suggest that ADHD persists 
into adulthood in around 60% of cases (Elliott, 2002), and that up to 6% of adults may 
have ADHD (Wender, Wolf, & Wasserstein, 2001). These figures could be even higher 
when we consider that the diagnostic criteria developed for children and used until 
recently, has been deemed by many as unsuitable for application to adult populations, and 
may have resulted in under-diagnosis (Murphy & Barkley, 1996).  
Recent research has started to explore the disorder in adults, but it remains that most 
of the literature on ADHD uses samples of children. It is difficult to generalise findings 
from this research to adults, as the disorder’s manifestation appears to differ from that in 
children. Research suggests that symptoms of hyperactivity and impulsivity diminish with 
age, while inattention persists (Biederman, Mick & Faraone, 2000). It is therefore not 
surprising that the majority of adults diagnosed with ADHD present with prominent 
inattention (Millstein, Wilens, Biederman, & Spencer, 1997); the most common 
complaints being cognitive (e.g. difficulty concentrating, forgetfulness), and self-
regulatory (e.g. problems with organisation and planning, poor discipline), and none 
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implying hyperactivity (Wolf & Wasserstein, 2001). This suggests there should be more of 
a research focus on inattention in adults.  
 
Dissociations between PIT & ADHD 
In recent years PIT has come to be thought of by many as qualitatively different from 
ADHD-C, and should perhaps be considered a disorder in its own right with distinct 
aetiology, symptoms, comorbidities, and cognitive profile (Barkley, 1997, 2001; Diamond, 
2005; Milich, Balentine, & Lynam, 2001). Research has found possible differences 
between ADHD and PIT in several domains, which strongly supports the use of clear sub-
type and/or symptom division in future work. 
Cognitive and behavioural. Children with PIT often show symptoms of a related, 
but separate disorder; sluggish cognitive tempo (SCT; Hartman Willcutt, Rhee, & 
Pennington, 2004; Wahlstedt & Bohlin, 2010), including sluggishness, drowsiness, 
daydreaming, and hypoactivity. These symptoms are less often seen in children with either 
ADHD-C or ADHD-HI (Hartman, Willcutt, Rhee, & Pennington, 2004). There are also 
thought to be differences in personality dimensions, with decreased self-directedness and 
increased harm avoidance seen in those with PIT but not in those with ADHD-C or 
ADHD-HI (Salgado et al., 2009). Those with ADHD-C are also more likely to be extrovert 
than those with PIT, although both groups score higher on neuroticism than controls 
(Parker, Majeski, & Collin, 2004). Both groups have been shown to have difficulties with 
social behaviour, but in different areas. Children with ADHD-C are more aggressive, and 
display emotional dysregulation, while children with PIT are more socially passive, and 
show deficits in social knowledge (Wheeler Maedgen & Carlson, 2000). Social problems 
related to ADHD mean these children are more likely to be expelled or suspended from 
school (Weiss Worling, & Wasdell, 2003). Children with ADHD appear to have more 
problems falling asleep than those with PIT (although this is also related to medication), 
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but those with PIT have increased daytime sleepiness (Mayes et al. 2009). Children with 
PIT seem to have an increased tendency towards internalizing disorders (such as 
depression and anxiety), or at least show an absence of externalizing disorders compared to 
children with ADHD (Gaub & Carlson, 1997; Weiss, Worling, & Wasdell, 2003), although 
this is disputed by findings from Power, Costigan, Eiraldi, & Leff (2004) who found no 
group differences for these variables.  
Genetic. It has been suggested that PIT and ADHD symptoms may be a result of 
different genetic polymorphisms. Several studies have found that polymorphisms at the 
dopamine transporter gene DAT1 are associated with ADHD (Barr et al. 2001; Brookes et 
al. 2006; Cook et al. 1995; Cornish et al. 2005; Hawi et al. 2003). DAT1 is the primary 
protein responsible for the reuptake of dopamine. It has been linked specifically with 
hyperactive-impulsive symptoms but not inattention (Gizer et al. 2008; Waldman et al. 
1998 cf. Franke et al. 2010). In contrast, research has found polymorphism of the DRD4 
gene (which acts on D4 dopamine receptors) is more strongly linked to PIT than ADHD 
(McCracken et al. 2000; Rowe et al. 1998).  
Neurostructural. Diamond (2005) suggests that the striatum is the primary site for 
neurobiological dysfunction in ADHD. Several studies have found caudate abnormalities 
in participants with ADHD (Castellanos et al. 1994; Hynd et al. 1993; Mataro, Garcia-
Sanchez, Junque, Estevez-Gonzalez, & Pujol, 1997), although it is noted that in one study 
such abnormalities were found to be more pronounced with increased inattentive 
symptoms (Schrimsher, Billingsley, Jackson, & Moore, 2002), and also that abnormalities 
are not consistent across studies. Other research has shown that children with ADHD have 
different patterns of fronto-striatal activity while performing an inhibitory control task 
compared to controls (Durston et al. 2003). It has also been suggested that perinatal 
damage to the striatum may increase the risk of developing ADHD (Toft, 1999). In line 
with a striatal role in ADHD, DAT1 is abundant in this area (Kung, Kim, Kung, Meegalla, 
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Piossl, & Lee, 1996; Nirenberg, Vaughan, Uhl, Kuhar, & Pickel, 1996). Research by 
Jucaite, Fernell, Halldin, and Farde (2005) showed a significant negative relationship 
between the degree of hyperactivity and DAT1 binding in the striatum, and DAT1 has 
been shown to preferentially influence caudate volume in participants with ADHD 
(Durston et al. 2005).  
The primary neurostructure of dysfunction in PIT on the other hand is, according to 
Diamond, the prefrontal cortex (PFC). The PFC is the area of the brain thought to be 
responsible for executive function. The primary motivator of this is the idea of “control”, 
including attentional control, thought to be lacking in PIT. Given the limited research on 
PIT, this inference comes mainly from associative findings. D4 dopamine receptors, which 
as already discussed are linked to PIT, are found in the PFC, and not in the striatum 
(Meador-Woodruff, Damask, Wang, Haroutunian, Davis, & Watson, 1996). Furthermore, 
variations in the gene of this receptor (DRD4) have been shown to modulate activation of 
the PFC during working memory tasks (Herrmann, Walter, Screppel, Ehlis, Pauli, & Lesch 
et al., 2007), which is pertinent for reasons that will be discussed fully later. DRD4 has 
also been associated with cortical thinning in regions including the inferior PFC (Shaw, 
Gornick, Lerch, Addington, Seal, & Greenstein et al., 2007), as well as reduced prefrontal 
grey matter volume (Durston et al. 2005). 
Response to drug treatment. One of the most well known treatments for ADHD is 
methylphenidate (also known as Ritalin). This stimulant acts by blocking DAT and 
norepinephrine (NE) transporters leading to increased concentrations of these 
neurotransmitters being active in the brain. Research by Barkley, DuPaul, and McMurray 
(1991) suggested that children with ADHD respond well to methylphenidate treatment and 
do best on a moderate to high dose. Children with PIT on the other hand were more likely 
to be judged as having no clinical response, or as responding most positively to a low dose 
of medication. Such low doses are thought to preferentially release NE (Kuczenski & 
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Segal, 2001; Ishimatsu, Kidani, Tsuda, & Akasu, 2002), and produce enhanced activation 
of this neurotransmitter in the PFC relative to subcortical regions (Berridge, Devilbliss, 
Andrzewski, Arnsten, Kelley, Schmeichel et al., 2006). Activation of NE is thought to 
modulate attention and has therefore been implicated in PIT. Accordingly in a meta-
analysis, atomoxetine, a NE reuptake inhibitor, was shown to produce greater reductions in 
symptoms along with a reduced chance of adverse reactions in people with PIT compared 
to those with hyperactivity-impulsivity (Cheng, Chen, Ko, & Ng, 2007). Also, in 
accordance with neurostructural theories on ADHD/PIT, this drug has been shown to 
increase neurotransmitters in the PFC, but not the striatum, whilst methylphenidate 
increases DA in the latter (Bymaster, Katner, Nelson, Hemrick-Luecke, Threlkeld, 
Heligenstein et al. 2002). 
Interestingly, other substances such as nicotine and cocaine have been shown to act 
on DAT in a similar way to methylphenidate, and to produce similar behavioural results 
(Bizaro, Patel, Murtagh, & Stolerman, 2004; Krause, Dressel, Krause, Kung, & Tatsch, 
2002; Levin, Conners, Silva, Canu, & March, 2001; Rush & Baker, 2001; Volkow, Wang, 
Fowler, Fischman, & Foltin, 1999; Yano & Steiner, 2007). Research suggests that a history 
of ADHD in cocaine abusers is not uncommon, and that its use may be driven by the need 
to relieve hyperactivity, and not inattention (Carroll, & Rounsaville, 1993; Saules, 
Pomerleau, & Schubiner, 2003). Similarly, smoking is thought to be more commonly used 
to self-medicate symptoms of ADHD as oppose to PIT (Covey, Manubay, Jiang, Nortick, 
& Palumbo, 2008; Rukstalis, Jepson, Patterson, & Lerman, 2005). However, it must be 
noted that there is also plenty of research suggesting smoking (i.e. nicotine) is used to 
relieve symptoms of inattention, although perhaps differently to the way it used to relieve 
hyperactivity (Fuemmeler, Kollins, & McClernon, 2007; Lerman, Audrain, Tercyak, Bush, 
& Crystal-Manser, Rose, et al., 2001; Ohlmeier, Peters, Kordon, Seifert, Wildt & Wiese et 
al., 2007; Rodriguez, Tercyak, & Audrain-McGovern, 2008). 
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Inattention as a Continuous Trait 
Recent research and subsequent debate has led many experts to a shift in approach from a 
categorical, to a dimensional view of ADHD (Barkley & Murphy, 2006). It is suggested 
that the disorder is better regarded as being at the extreme end of normal expression within 
the general population, as opposed to being qualitatively different with a distinct pattern of 
causes. Confirmatory factor analysis has shown a bi-factor model of ADHD, with a general 
factor and specific factors for inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity, to be the best fit 
for the available data (Martel, Von Eye, & Nigg, 2010). It has thus been suggested that the 
commonly used ADHD category could be replaced by these three dimensions, whereby 
individuals would be described by their ratings on each (Coghill & Sonuga-Barke, 2012). 
Latent class analyses supports this idea and has found separate, continuously distributed 
dimensions for purely inattentive and combined subtypes (Hudziak, Heath, Madden, 
Reich, Bucholz, & Slutske, 1998; Lubke, Hudziak, Derks, van Bijsterveldt & Boomsma, 
2009; Neuman et al., 1999). Findings from research using taxometric analysis were also 
consistent with a dimensional rather than taxonomic structure (Frazier, Youngstrom, & 
Naugle, 2007; Haslam, Williams, Prior, Haslam, Graetz, & Sawyer, 2006; Marcus & 
Barry, 2011), and fMRI research also supports the idea of a continuum (Schrimsher, 
Billingsley, Jackson, & Moore, 2002). Research looking at unaffected family members of 
patients with ADHD provides further evidence for a genetic component to the disorder, 
and for a continuum of ADHD traits (Crosbie, Arnold, Swanson, Dupuis, Shan, & Goodlae 
et al., 2013; Hudziak et al. 1998). A meta-analysis on genetic and environmental influences 
found clear differences between inattentive and hyperactive-impulsive symptoms, and 
concluded that looking at these as behavioural dimensions rather than diagnostic subtype 
categories is more useful for identifying differences between the two (Nikolas & Burt, 
2010). 
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Knowing whether ADHD is a discrete category or a continuous trait is important for 
developing causal models, and a dimensional structure is consistent with the multiple 
pathway models of ADHD currently thought to best represent the disorder (e.g. Nigg, 
Goldsmith & Sachek, 2004; Sonuga-Barke, 2005; Sonuga-Barke & Fairchild, 2012). 
However, it is also important from a sampling perspective. If ADHD symptoms exist on a 
continuum, then symptoms will occur at sub-clinical levels within the general population. 
Faraone and Biederman (2005) found prevalence rates for adult ADHD went up 
considerably when those meeting criteria for sub-threshold diagnosis were included in 
analysis. This suggests it is possible, and necessary, to research a wider spectrum of 
symptom expression. Benefits of using a non-clinical sample include a break-away from 
medicated, paediatric populations which allows investigation of symptoms of ADHD 
independent of developmental delays, general cognitive dysfunction, or history of 
medication use (Cocchi et al., 2012), along with the increased relevance of findings to 
family members of people with ADHD and to a wider population generally. Research 
utilizing such samples is beginning to take off and has had some fruitful results, for 
example looking at ADHD symptoms and big five personality characteristics (Parker, 
Majeski, & Collin, 2004), heritability of symptoms (Boomsma, Saviouk, Hottenga, Distel, 
De Moor, & Vink et al. 2010), cognitive performance (Crosbie et al. 2013; Herrmann, 
Saathoff, Schreppel, Ehlis, Scheuerpflug, & Pauli et al. 2009; Kuntsi, Wood, Van Der 
Meere, & Asherson, 2009), smoking abstinence (Ashare & Hawk, 2012), and neural 
systems for reward (Stark, Bauer, Merz, Zimmermanm Reuter, & Plichta et al. 2011).  
Such research has often used self-report measures of ADHD symptoms based on 
DSM criteria i.e. the Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (ASRS; Adler, Kessler, & Spencer, 
2003), the Strengths and Weaknesses of ADHD Symptoms and Normal Behaviour Scale 
(SWAN; Swanson, Schuck, Mann, Carlson, Hartman, & Sergeant et al. 2001) or the 
Barkley Adult ADHD Rating Scale (BAARS-IV; Barkley, 2011). These measures allow 
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participants to be grouped into subtypes analogous to those used in diagnosis via DSM 
criteria. For adults this states that patients have at least 5 of the symptoms listed on either 
or both of the 9 symptom lists for inattention, and hyperactivity-impulsivity. Researchers 
can lower the threshold of diagnosis in order to include participants with sub-clinical traits. 
Another measure, the Connors Adult ADHD Rating Scale (CAARS; see Appendix A) is a 
broad-spectrum scale with subscales for inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity, self-
concept, and an ADHD index. The broad scale of this measure lends itself well to 
correlational research.  
 
Cognitive Underpinnings of Inattention 
There is a vast body of literature looking at the relationship between all three symptoms of 
ADHD and executive functions (EFs). EF is a multidimensional construct, but can 
generally be thought of as cognitive processes that guide goal-related behaviour (Banich, 
2009). Intrinsic to this idea is the concept of control, hence these processes are thought to 
primarily fall within the remit of the PFC (Alvarez & Emory, 2006). There is debate in the 
literature as to how separable EF's are. In this thesis the view is taken that EF consists of 
both unity and diversity of function (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & 
Wager, 2000) such as demonstrated in Diamond’s (2013) model (Figure 1). This model 
shows the relationship between the three core EFs examined by Miyake et al. and is shown 
to be clearly separable, but moderately correlated with each other. The model also 
highlights the potential role of self-regulation in EFs, which will be looked at more closely 
later. The following is a brief overview of each EF and their proposed relationships with 
each other, followed by a review of evidence for their relationship with inattention and 
ADHD. The EF of focus for this thesis is working memory (WM), and is described in 
detail. However, the close-knit relationship between all three EFs necessitates that all of 
them are covered here. 
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 Cognitive flexibility. This component of executive functioning has produced some 
disagreement in the literature concerning operational definition. Miyake et al. (2000) limit 
it to shifting back and forth between multiple tasks, operations, or mental sets, and refer to 
it simply as “set shifting”. By this definition it involves disengaging  
 
 
Figure 1. Executive functions and related terms as per Diamond (2013). 
 
from an irrelevant task set in order to actively engage in a relevant one. This is a cognitive 
switch not to be mistaken for being synonymous with switching visual attention, or making 
voluntary eye movements. Ability is demonstrated in the “plus-minus task” (Jerslid, 1927), 
where participants are presented with lists of two-digit numbers that are to be operated on 
by either adding or subtracting 3. The task assesses their ability to switch between these 
operations. Tests such as the “Wisconsin card sorting task” and the “trail making test” have 
also been used to tap this domain, however they are often used as more general EF tasks 
thought to assess planning and problem solving ability.  
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Others have suggested that set shifting is just one part of a wider concept of more 
general mental flexibility, and that a broader definition is needed to fully explain it. Spiro 
(1988) suggested the core component of cognitive flexibility was the ability to selectively 
use available knowledge in order to adapt and fit the needs of particular situations. For this 
to be effective, a person would need to have both a sufficient knowledge base, as well as a 
flexible approach to thinking. This more abstract understanding of cognitive flexibility is 
harder to assess objectively. Self-report measures have been used to assess what could be 
thought of as a personality variable, and aim to gauge a persons’ a) awareness that in any 
given situation there are options and alternatives available, b) willingness to be flexible 
and adapt to the situation, and c) self-efficacy in being flexible (Martin & Rubin, 1995; 
Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). Both definitions agree on the idea of simultaneous 
processing of multiple alternatives, be they conceptual (ideas, thoughts etc.), or externally 
presented stimuli such as those in set shifting tasks. 
 Inhibitory control. Inhibitory control involves being able to control ones thoughts, 
behaviours and/or emotions in order to override a strong internal or external drive, and to 
instead behave or think in a way that is more appropriate or suited to the situation. For 
example, it allows us to refrain from acting on impulse, or through habit. It is a key part of 
what allows us to choose how to behave, as opposed to being ruled by our impulses. It 
covers a wide range of processes, and for this reason many believe it is best split into 
several related concepts (Dempster, 1993; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Harnishfeger, 1995; 
Nigg, 2000). Friedman and Miyake describe three variations; prepotent response 
inhibition, resistance to distractor interference, and resistance to proactive interference 
(PI).  
A response becomes prepotent when it is associated with immediate reinforcement 
and is therefore automatically elicited upon presentation of certain cues/stimuli. Prepotent 
response inhibition is the ability to deliberately suppress such habitual responses. The 
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“Stop-Signal” task (Logan, 1994) is often used to asses this type of inhibition; participants 
build up a prepotent response to categorise words in a certain way, and then attempt to 
suppress that response on hearing an auditory signal. 
Resistance to distractor interference is the ability to selectively inhibit processing of 
distracting or irrelevant information. This is commonly associated with focused or 
selective attention. It is often assessed using the “Eriksen flanker task” (Eriksen & Eriksen, 
1974) in which participants identify a target letter that is presented either alone or with 
non-target letters flanking it. Another commonly used paradigm to test this is the Stroop 
task (Stroop, 1935) where colour words are presented either congruently (i.e. the word 
“red” written in red font colour), or incongruently (i.e. the word “red” written in font 
colour yellow). Reaction times are significantly and reliably reduced in incongruent 
conditions due to the interference arising from competing information.  
Proactive interference occurs when information that has previously been remembered 
interferes with memory for new information. Resistance to PI is the ability to resist such 
memory intrusions. It differs from resistance to distractor interference in that distracting 
information is presented prior to, rather than simultaneously with target information, and is 
information that was previously relevant. The “AB-AC-AD task” (Rosen & Engle, 1998) 
demonstrates this ability; participants learn a list of cue-target word pairs, and then a new 
list of targets that are paired to the same cues. Upon recall they have to suppress responses 
that were cued to the original targets. 
 Working memory. Working memory (WM) has been defined in several ways. All 
agree that it has a limited capacity, and requires holding information in mind in an active, 
easily retrievable form, but that it is distinct from short-term memory. The seminal model 
of Baddely & Hitch (1974; see fig 2) defined WM as holding information in mind 
combined with performing another operation. For example, the “backward digit span” task 
designed to test working memory in this way, requires participants to remember a 
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sequence of digits and to manipulate this information by turning the sequence around in 
order to produce it verbally in the opposite order. It need not be the information to be 
remembered that has to be processed to constitute a working memory task. For example, 
the “Operation Span” task requires participants to remember words while carrying out 
mental arithmetic. Another model of WM defines it as the ability to hold information in 
mind whilst blocking or inhibiting counter-productive information (Conway & Engle, 
1994; Kane & Engle, 2000, 2002).  
The multi-component model of Baddeley & Hitch proposes that a ‘central executive’ 
is responsible for directing attention to relevant information, and suppressing irrelevant 
information. Often described as a single unit, the central executive is probably better 
thought of as a system emergent from an alliance of executive processes (overlap between 
executive functions will be discussed in more detail later). It coordinates the use of two 
“slave systems”; the phonological loop (verbal WM), and the visuospatial sketchpad 
(visuospatial WM). The phonological loop stores and rehearses verbal and acoustic 
information by continuous articulation of its contents, thus creating a rehearsal loop. It is 
the most well developed component of the model, and is reflected most clearly in the 
“forward digit span” task where a sequence of digits must be repeated back immediately in 
the same order as presented. The visuospatial sketchpad can be further broken down into 
spatial and visual subsystems, the former dealing for example with location, and the latter 
with shape, colour, and texture. It can be used for constructing and manipulating visual 
images, and for the representation of mental maps. 
In 2000, Baddeley extended the model to include a fourth component; the episodic 
buffer. He described this as a limited-capacity temporary-storage system that is capable of 
integrating information from a variety of sources. It serves as an interface between a range 
of systems, including long term memory (LTM). Each system has its own set of codes; the 
buffer is thought to use a common, multi-dimensional code (like a master key) in order to 
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interact with all of them. Like the slave systems it is controlled by the central executive, 
which is able to retrieve information from it for the purposes of reflection, manipulation 
and modification. The attention of the central executive is directed consciously, meaning 
that it can influence the content of the buffer by determining what sources of information 
are in focus. 
Mechanisms of working memory are thought to operate primarily within the PFC 
(Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003; Funahashi & Kubota, 1994; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Kane & 
Engle, 2002; Miller, Erickson, & Desimone, 1996). Note that this is the structure that 
Diamond (2005) proposed is implicated in PIT. Several key neurotransmitters are thought 
to underpin WM including DA (Rossetti & Carboni, 2005; Stern, 2009) and NE 
(Chamberlain, Muller, Blackwell, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2006; Rossetti, & Carboni, 2005). 
Findings from Rossetti and Carboni (2005) suggest that DA and NE have different roles in 
facilitating WM; DA is primarily associated with reward expectancy, and NE is key in the 
active maintenance of goal-relevant information.  
 There is a wealth of tasks measuring different aspects of WM including the 
backward digit span, operation span, and reading span task all of which were designed 
from the perspective of Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) model of WM. All these tasks 
involve remembering a string of stimuli (i.e. words or number) whilst undertaking some 
kind of secondary processing, or under conditions of interference. Several tasks developed 
by Duncan et al. (1996; 2008) purport to assess the episodic buffer component of WM by 
inducing a type of performance failure called “goal neglect”. These tasks differ from the 
traditional span tasks in that they require representations in WM to be maintained over the 
course of the task rather than being refreshed in each trial.  
 Relationships between the three EFs. The close relationship between WM and 
inhibitory control is such that some researchers would not describe them as separate 
components. In their two-factor model of executive control, Engle and Kane (2004) 
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suggest that WM and inhibitory control share the same limited capacity resource. 
Increasing demand on one affects ability to do the other. Others suggest that inhibition is a 
behavioural product of WM. In other words, it is the effect of bias towards or amplification 
of task-relevant information in WM that reduces interference (Egner & Hirsch, 2005; 
Miller & Cohen, 2001; Munakata, Herd, Chatham, Depue, Banich, & O’Reilly, 2011). In 
Diamond’s model the term WM is used in it’s purest form, to mean holding information in 
mind and working with it. WM and inhibitory control are separate, but support one another 
(although conversely the arrows in her model imply a unidirectional relationship). Firstly, 
WM supports inhibitory control by holding our goals in mind. Without this we would not 
know what information was relevant or appropriate, and what information we should 
inhibit. By focusing on information held in mind, we increase the likelihood that this will 
influence our behaviour and therefore limit the likelihood of an inhibitory error. In other 
words WM acts like a reminder of what we should be focusing on, making us more likely 
to inhibit what we should not be focusing on. Secondly, inhibitory control supports WM by 
removing irrelevant or inappropriate distractions, both internally and in our external 
environment. This increases the likelihood of focus being kept on goals held in WM, and 
limits the likelihood of mind wandering. Since WM is a limited-capacity resource, we need 
to keep it from becoming cluttered with irrelevant information. This includes information 
that was previously relevant (i.e. through resistance to proactive interference).  
In Diamond’s model cognitive flexibility is described as being a product of WM and 
inhibitory control. However, other than evidence suggesting this EF develops later in the 
life-span than the other two (Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006; Garon, 
Bryson, & Smith, 2008), this assertion is not well supported. It does make sense intuitively 
that set shifting would be reliant on WM and inhibitory control (information for each set 
needs to be held in mind, and information from irrelevant sets need to be inhibited), but it 
is more difficult to marry them with the more abstract components of cognitive flexibility 
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such as openness of thought. 
Executive Functions, Self-Regulatory Processes, and “Hot and Cool” Cognition  
The executive functions described above are often regarded as “cool” cognitive processes. 
Tasks used to tap these EFs do not involve reward or cost; there is no requirement to assess 
gains and losses when making decisions. In contrast to this a second line of inquiry 
considers the role of “hot” cognition. This type of EF is required for tasks that entail 
judgments based on utility, or when the affective appraisal of stimuli is involved, and is 
considered to fall within the remit of the medial prefrontal cortex (particularly 
orbitofrontal; Diamond, 2013). Zelazo and Muller (2002) describe these top-down control 
processes as operating in motivationally and emotionally salient contexts; such as those 
unlikely to occur in a laboratory setting without specific design considerations. The notion 
being that motivationally salient situations demand different top-down processes to those 
without an affective element (Zelazo & Carlson, 2012).  
 A related, but somewhat overlapping, body of literature concerns self-regulatory 
processes. Broadly defined, self-regulation can be thought of as cognition and behaviours 
that serve a purpose toward one’s goal representations. Carver and Scheier (2004) describe 
a commonly accepted view of the term as below: 
“When we use the term self-regulation, we intend to convey the sense of purposive 
processes, the sense that self-corrective adjustments are taking place as needed to stay on 
track for the purpose being served (whether this entails overriding another impulse or 
simply reacting to perturbations from other sources), and the sense that the corrective 
adjustments originate within the person. These points converge with the view that 
behaviour is a continual process of moving toward (and sometimes away from) goal 
representations.” (In Vohs & Baumeister, 2011, p. 3). 
 Self-regulatory processes can be thought of as comprising several interlinking 
facets including cognitive effort, cognitive control, and optimal goal directed behaviour. 
They are neither strictly “cool” nor “hot” in regards to cognition.  
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 Cognitive Control. This can be defined as the collection of processes that allows 
the human cognitive system “to configure itself for the performance of specific tasks 
through appropriate adjustments in perceptual selection, response biasing, and the online 
maintenance of contextual information” (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001 
p.1). This is strongly related to the “cool” EF concept of inhibitory control, and is assessed 
in psychological research using tasks from this literature such as Stop-Signal, and Stroop. 
It is related to processes of “self-control” (the ability to regulate emotions, thoughts and 
behaviour in the face of temptations and impulses that conflict with our goals), which falls 
within the remit of “hot” cognition.  
 Cognitive effort. This can be thought of as allocation of resources to a task or 
decision. It is heavily influenced by cognitive load along with a myriad of other factors; 
some “cool” such as task difficulty and knowledge availability, and some “hot” such as 
motivation and curiosity (Longo & Barrett, 2010). Effort can be assessed in several ways; 
reaction time tasks that utilise variations in load can gauge the effort required for different 
conditions, and self-report measures can assess “effortful control”, the willingness to 
engage in an effortful task (Rothbart & Bates, 1998). Frederick (2005) developed a 
measure useful in assessing cognitive effort, which has its roots in the heuristics and biases 
literature of Tversky and Kahneman (1974). The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) requires 
that participants override an immediate and incorrect response elicited by the nature of the 
questions, in order to arrive at the correct answer.  
 Optimal goal directed behaviour. This refers to behaviours toward maximisation 
of utility in-line with goal representations. This involves the evaluation of costs and 
rewards in order to identify strategies that will most efficiently achieve one’s goals. 
Whether this facet of self-regulation would be related to “hot” or “cool” cognition would 
depend largely on the nature of the goals in question, and whether there was affect and 
motivation intrinsic to them. Tasks used to assess this usually involve some kind of 
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strategy in order to assess the utility of decisions made such as the Iowa Gambling task 
(Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994), and usually involve cost and reward 
evaluation making them “hot” in nature. Another task specifically designed to assess this is 
the diminishing utility task (DUT), which provides a behavioural measure of the trade-off 
between “exploiting” known sources of reward and “exploring” for other potentially 
rewarding opportunities (see below for more detail). The activity of NE is thought to be 
influential in this facet of self-regulation, due to its role in adjusting gain modulation in 
appropriate neural circuits related to utility assessment (see below for more detail). 
 
 It is difficult to see immediately how self-regulatory processes are different from 
EFs as previously defined (cognitive processes that guide goal related behaviour) certainly 
with regard to “cool” cognition, there seems to be considerable overlap. Despite this, 
historically the literatures on EFs and self-regulatory processes have been treated 
separately. The term self-regulation has been used primarily in the context of social issues 
(i.e. Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996), while EF has been studied in relation to cognition. 
However, it is argued that the two fields would benefit greatly from each other’s insights 
and expertise (Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012). Diamond (2013) includes self-
regulation in her EF model (see fig 1), and sees inhibitory control as the primary core EF 
related to it. However, she describes it only in relation to the self-control aspect of self-
regulation, and does not justify its relevance to other self-regulatory processes. She also 
describes a reciprocal relationship between WM and inhibitory control (which is not 
represented in her model), but neglects to talk about whether/how this EF is implicated in 
self-regulation. A more comprehensive review is provided by Hofmann et al. (2012), who 
suggest that EF problems underlie issues with self-regulation, and furthermore postulate 
that training of EFs could potentially improve poor self-regulation. Particular attention is 
given to the facilitation of self-regulation through WM, which the authors attribute to three 
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factors; active representation, executive attention, and goal shielding. Active representation 
of goal-relevant information in WM refers to the need for goal information to be stored in 
a readily retrievable form. Such goal-relevant information would typically include a mental 
representation of the desired end-state, as well as the means by which to get there. Active 
representations of goal information are essential as a reference point for self-regulatory 
processes. When representations are kept fresh and accessible over time, goals are able to 
bias the top-down control of behaviour (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Executive attention is 
required to direct and re-direct attention back to goal-relevant information so that it can 
maintain this bias. Studies suggest that the central executive component of WM supports 
proactive forms of self-regulation by enabling individuals to resist having their attention 
drawn by distracting stimuli (Friese, Bargas-Avila, Hofmann, & Wiers, 2010; Hofmann et 
al. 2008). This “spotlight” control of executive attention is suggested to be the primary 
mechanism by which goals are “shielded” from irrelevant stimuli (Hofmann et al. 2012). 
Goal shielding is seen as a by-product of sustained attention to a goal or task. This view is 
supported by research suggesting that a “global shielding mechanism” prevents interfering 
information from being processed (Dreisbach & Haider, 2009). To the keen eyed this may 
sound very much like the inhibitory control mechanisms described earlier. Indeed 
Hofmann et al. (2012) also describe the role of active inhibition (as oppose to the passive 
inhibition achieved through executive attention) in facilitating self-regulation, i.e. through 
suppression of unwanted thoughts and emotional reactions. However they also note that 
active inhibition may be inferior to passive inhibition in achieving successful self-
regulation due to its competing demand for resources (Wegner, 1994). Finally, Hofmann et 
al (2012) acknowledge a role for cognitive flexibility in self-regulation although there is 
little supporting evidence with regard to this. They suggest that task-switching ability may 
facilitate evaluations of utility and thus the exploit/explore trade-off discussed previously, 
by enabling “means shifting”; the pursual of alternative methods to achieve a goal, and 
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“goal shifting”; the disengagement of a current goal in favour of a new one. 
 The tone of the work presented by both Diamond and Hofmann et al. leans 
towards the same directional relationship between EFs and self-regulatory processes (i.e. 
EFs underlie self-regulation). This position may have its roots in the work of Miyake et al. 
(2000) who note that their choice of the three core EFs, while not arbitrary, served a 
practical purpose in making EF classification less chaotic; they are viewed as relatively 
basic in comparison to “higher level concepts” (which could include self-regulation). 
However, there is an argument that self-regulatory processes underlie general executive 
function. Specifically that NE activity (associated with self-regulation as mentioned above) 
facilitates WM by acting on the PFC (Arnsten & Li, 2005; Oades et al. 2005; Rosseti & 
Carboni, 2005). Findings from studies using drugs that act on NE to look at the effects on 
WM are mixed, but a link between the two has been reported (Chamberlain, Muller, 
Blackwell, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2006). 
With consideration for the arguments presented here, this thesis primarily takes the 
stance presented by Diamond, and Hoffman et al. that self-regulatory processes are sub-
processes of general EFs. In this view “hot” and “cool” cognition is relevant to both 
general EFs and self-regulatory processes. This is represented diagrammatically in figure 2 
and can be summarised as follows; general executive functions are primarily “cool” 
processes, while “hot” cognition refers largely to self-regulatory sub-processes of these. 
However, self-regulatory processes are not exclusively “hot”, and general executive 
functions are seen as facilitating both “hot” and “cool” self-regulatory processes. Self-
regulatory processes overlay both “hot” and “cool” cognition in the model, but we make no 
prediction as to what portion of “hot” cognition relates to self-regulation; this is not well 
defined in the literature. We also note that there is something of a gap in the literature with 
regard to “hot” cognition generally, and it could be that there is more overlap between the 
two “temperatures” than the model gives credit for; it is based on an interpretation of the 
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literature reviewed above, but is not intended to be definitive. It provides a means of 
testing the concepts included in relation to ADHD symptoms, the rationale for which is 
provided by the literature reviewed below.     
 
Figure 2. A schematic of the relationships between “hot” and “cool” cognition, general executive functions 
(working memory, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility), and self-regulatory processes based on the 
views put forward by Hofmann et al. (2012), and Miyake et al. (2000). General executive functions are 
primarily “cool” processes, while “hot” cognition refers largely to self-regulatory sub-processes of these. 
However, self-regulatory processes are not exclusively “hot”, and general executive functions are seen as 
being related to both “hot” and “cool” self-regulatory processes, although the direction of this relationship is 
unclear. 
 
ADHD Symptoms and General Executive Functions 
Research on ADHD symptoms and EFs comes in several forms; studies that use general 
EF tasks (such as the Tower of London test) that cover more than one EF, versus studies 
that use tasks designed to target specific EFs; studies that consider the different ADHD 
symptoms versus those that refer to ADHD generally; and child/adolescent versus adult 
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research. The primary concern for this thesis is research using specific EF tasks that 
accounts for ADHD subtypes or looks at symptoms dimensionally, using samples of 
adults. However, it is necessary to consider literature from the other categories, as some of 
this work is seminal in the field for informing theory and methodology. Perhaps the most 
influential of these is Barkley’s (1997) article “behavioural inhibition, sustained attention, 
and executive functions: constructing a unified theory of ADHD”. Barkley suggests that 
the symptoms associated with ADHD result from a core deficit in behavioural inhibition. 
This impairment results in the improper functioning of a variety of intermediate EFs which 
have a direct effect on behaviour. In Barkley’s model behavioural inhibition facilitates the 
performance of four EFs; working memory, internalization of speech, self-regulation of 
affect-motivation-arousal, and reconstitution. These directly influence the motor system 
guiding goal-directed behaviour, as does behavioural inhibition itself. Barkley’s model is 
reasonably well supported in literature, although there are several criticisms (Willcutt, 
Doyle, Nigg, Faraone, & Pennington, 2005).  Importantly Barkley states his model applies 
only to the predominantly hyperactive-impulsive and combined subtypes of ADHD, not 
the inattentive subtype, and supports the notion of inattention as a qualitatively different 
disorder. Diamond (2005) has suggested that symptoms of inattention are uniquely related 
to impairments in WM, and that performance on both verbal and visuospatial tasks will be 
noticeably affected in individuals with the predominantly inattentive subtype of ADHD. A 
strong relationship between inattention and WM is somewhat intuitive when we consider 
that the central executive component of WM, and cognitive processes of attention are 
considered by some as isomorphic. For example, Engle (2002) describes his view of WM 
capacity as “the ability to control attention to maintain information in an active, quickly 
retrievable state” (p. 20). He suggests that WM is not just about storing a limited number 
of items or chunks of information, but about using attention to maintain or supress 
information. Literature looking at WM and inattention specifically is fairly limited, but 
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what there is tends to support Diamond’s view. In a clinical sample of children, 
Martinussen & Tannock (2006) found performance on measures of both verbal and 
visuospatial WM were related to symptoms of inattention, and not to symptoms of 
hyperactivity-impulsivity. Further supporting evidence comes from the finding that 
computer training that improved WM performance also produced a reduction in parent-
rated symptoms of inattention (Klingberg et al. 2005). In a non-clinical sample Gathercole 
et al. (2008) found that children with low WM scored highly for inattentive symptoms and 
were highly distractible. Research with adult participants has had similar findings (Gansler 
et al. 1998; Kim, 2004), although there are limitations to these studies (see Chapter 4).  
 
ADHD Symptoms and “Hot” vs. “Cool” Cognition  
ADHD has traditionally been considered a disorder of “cool” EFs, but it has been proposed 
that there is a dissociation between the core symptoms; inattention is associated with 
deficits in “cool” cognition, while symptoms of hyperactivity-impulsivity are associated 
with “hot” cognition (Castellanos, Sonuga-Barke, Milham, & Tannock, 2006).  
 Two of the most prominent theories relating to “hot” cognition in ADHD are the 
Delay Aversion model, and the Cognitive-Energetic model. The delay aversion model 
(Sonuga-Barke, 2002) works on the hypothesis that atypical expressions of behaviour in 
ADHD are driven not by dysfunctional cognition, but by an atypical yet functional 
underlying motivational style. Quite simply behaviour is driven to avoid or escape delay, 
often at the cost of acceptable social etiquette. Symptoms of ADHD are seen as the 
functional expression of this. There is a wealth of evidence showing that children with 
ADHD prefer small immediate rewards over large delayed ones in a variety of 
circumstances (Pauli-Pott & Becker, 2011). In line with the hot/cool hyperactivity-
impulsivity-inattention distinction, the focus of this model is on explaining hyperactivity-
impulsivity. However, findings from Paloyelis, Asherson, and Kuntsi (2009), using a 
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dimensional approach, suggested that inattention was unique in predicting a preference for 
small immediate rewards. We are unaware of any research looking at delay aversion in 
adults with ADHD symptoms. This is probably in part due to the need for any paradigm 
designed to test it to be highly sensitive, as adults would be likely to override external 
expression of delay aversion in an experimental situation. The cognitive-energetic model 
(CEM, Sergeant, 2000) was also developed with hyperactivity-impulsivity in mind, and 
works on the premise that while there may be certain aspects of inhibitory control that are 
deficient in ADHD, this is also dependent on the energetic state of the subject. The state 
level of Sergeant’s model encompasses three energetic pools. These are “effort” which 
refers to the necessary energy required to meet task demands and is highly affected by 
cognitive load, “arousal” which is defined as phasic responding time-locked to stimulus 
processing and is influenced by salience and novelty, and “activation” which refers to tonic 
changes in physiological activity associated with readiness to respond. 
 The latter two pools of the CEM map directly onto the proposed action of the 
locus-coeruleus norepinephrine (LC-NE) system. The LC synthesises and distributes NE 
through numerous projections throughout the brain, and, as previously mentioned, NE, and 
the neural circuitry it acts on, has been linked preferentially to symptoms of inattention. 
The most comprehensive explanation of LC-NE function is provided by Aston-Jones and 
Cohen (2005), who describe how it moderates attention through adaptive gain to optimize 
reward-seeking behaviours. The adaptive gain theory (AGT) refines traditional theories of 
LC-NE function, to describe the specific mechanisms by which the system produces 
changes in arousal. This view of LC-NE function highlights it’s role in optimizing task 
performance through two overlapping modes of activity; tonic and phasic. LC phasic mode 
is associated with bursts of activity in relation to task-related decision processes and 
indicates high levels of engagement. LC tonic mode baseline activity is elevated and 
phasic bursts are absent indicating distractibility. Optimal performance is thought to occur 
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with moderate baseline activity (neither too high nor too low), coupled with phasic bursts. 
Aston-Jones and Cohen propose that the LC-NE system is responsible for online 
evaluations of utility (i.e. the costs and benefits associated with task-related decisions) 
provided by input from frontal structures. When utility is low, changes in LC tonic mode 
facilitate disengagement from the current task in order to explore alternative sources of 
rewards. This is known as the exploit/explore trade-off mentioned above in relation to the 
“optimal goal directed behaviour” facet of self-regulation. At a neural level this is achieved 
by the modulating NE release at cortical targets, regulating the gain (responsivity) of 
processing in cortical circuits responsible for task performance. This adjustment between 
modes in accordance with utility serves to optimize rewards associated with task 
performance. Several researchers have predicted dysfunctional LC-NE activity in ADHD 
(Aston-Jones, Rajkowski, & Cohen, 2000; Howells, Stein, & Russell, 2012; Ressler & 
Nemeroff, 2001); specifically, that ADHD would be associated with an overly tonic mode 
of activity coupled with infrequent phasic bursts. This is supported by the finding that the 
cognition enhancing effects of low doses of methylphenidate probably involve modest 
alterations in LC discharge (Devilbiss & Berridge, 2006). I am unaware of any work that 
has investigated LC-NE function in participants with ADHD symptoms. This may be due 
to the fact that measuring LC-NE activity would involve expensive, complicated, and 
invasive procedures (i.e. intra-cellular recording). However, evidence supporting the use of 
pupillometry as a proxy for LC-NE activity has been mounting since a relationship 
between the two was first identified by Koss (1986). This has been shown using direct 
neuronal recordings from monkeys while they performed a target detection task (Joshi, Li, 
Kalwani, & Gold, 2016; Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Aston-Jones, 1993). Larger baseline pupil 
diameters reflected LC tonic mode and task disengagement, while smaller baseline pupil 
diameters reflected LC phasic mode and engagement with the task. Task evoked pupillary 
dilations are thought to be indicative of an LC phasic response to salient stimulus 
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(Einhauser, Stout, Koch, & Carter, 2008). It is suggested that the LC has projections within 
the neural circuitry that also controls the muscles of the iris, meaning that activity in the 
LC-NE system is reflected via an externally observable pupil response (Laeng, Sirois, and 
Gredeback, 2012). This makes pupillometry an ideal tool for investigating LC-NE activity 
in ADHD non-invasively.  
 
Summary and Aims 
The literature reviewed identifies inattention as potentially being the primary symptom of 
ADHD relevant to adults. Taking into account research suggesting ADHD symptoms 
should be treated as dimensional, investigation of this symptom will be relevant to both 
clinical and community populations. These inferences are addressed in Chapter 2 of the 
thesis, which is a study conducted to assess prevalence of ADHD symptoms in a 
community sample. The sample was specifically chosen to represent a population similar 
to that planned for recruitment in subsequent research. The research in Chapters 3-6 was 
driven by the five theoretical approaches described in detail above; 1) that the core EF 
principally and uniquely related to inattention is WM, 2) the proposed relationship between 
EFs and self-regulatory processes, 3) the potential for a relationship between ADHD 
symptoms and self-regulatory processes, 4) distinctions between “hot” and “cool” 
cognition, and 5) theory relating to a hot/cool – hyperactivity-impulsivity/inattention 
distinction. In Chapter 7 we discuss how the findings collectively support/refute the EF 
relationships proposed in the Venn diagram above (Figure 2). The main aim of this thesis 
was to look at the relationships between components of the model with ADHD symptoms, 
but also, as a secondary aim, to attempt to clarify the relationships between the facets of 
cognition themselves. 
 Sample sizes for the research in each of the Chapters reflect the approach and 
method of analysis used. The prevalence research in Chapter 2 naturally required a large 
 28 
sample size (555) in order for findings to be generalizable. Sample sizes of similar research 
in the field vary dramatically but are generally above 400. Chapters 3-5 use regression 
analysis with the three ADHD symptoms (CAARS t-scores) and IQ as predictors. Using 
the recommended figures for probability and power (as per Cohen, 1992; .05 and .8 
respectively) this requires a minimum sample size of 84, which we adhered to across the 
three Chapters. The complexity of the research in Chapter 6 determined that a smaller 
sample size be used. Participants (55) were selected for experimental groups based on 
DSM ADHD criteria. 
 Note that while the focus of the thesis is inattention, the approach to it is based on 
DSM criteria and measurement. It was therefore practical to include and investigate all 
three symptoms of ADHD in the research, with the aim of demonstrating distinctions 
between them.  
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Chapter 2: Prevalence of DSM-5 Inattentive Symptoms in a Community Sample 
As previously noted (see Chapter 1), there is a good argument for researching a wider 
range of ADHD symptom expression than that refined to categorisation through DSM 
thresholds. The research in this chapter is influenced mainly by the work of Faraone and 
Biederman (2005) who found prevalence rates for adult ADHD went up significantly when 
those meeting criteria for sub-threshold diagnosis were included in analysis. However, the 
research looked at ADHD as a whole, and did not tell us about the prevalence of 
inattention as a distinct dimension. A further problem with the study was that its diagnostic 
criteria created the potential for inaccurate diagnosis. The work presented here addresses 
two main research questions. Firstly, regardless of co-existence with other ADHD 
symptoms, how prevalent is non-clinical inattention in the general population of adults 
who have not had a previous diagnosis of ADHD? Secondly, is inattention the most 
prevalent of the ADHD symptoms in this population?  
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Abstract 
Research suggests that of the three core attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 
symptoms, inattention may be the most relevant to adults. The present study reports on the 
prevalence of DSM-5 ADHD symptoms, as well as symptoms meeting a lowered threshold 
in a community sample of 555 university students (aged 18-35). Participants completed a 
self-report rating scale of DSM-5 ADHD items, which was used to assess symptoms both 
categorically and dimensionally. Overall ADHD prevalence was 15.32% for DSM-5 
defined symptoms. Although we found no difference in prevalence between the purely 
inattentive and combined subtypes, results showed that inattention was the most prevalent 
symptom in the sample. Symptoms were more prevalent in males than females when 
DSM-5 criteria were applied, but no gender differences were observed when symptoms 
were scored using a scale. Findings highlight the pervasiveness of inattention in adults and 
support the idea that this symptom is highly relevant to the general population.    
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Prevalence of DSM-5 Inattentive Symptoms in a Community Sample 
It is estimated that attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) extends into adulthood 
in around 60-70% of cases (Biederman, Mick, & Faraone, 2000; Elliot, 2002; Kessler et al. 
2005). In these cases, it is reported that symptoms of hyperactivity and impulsivity decline 
at a higher rate and at an earlier age, whilst symptoms of inattention are more persistent 
(Biderman et al., 2000; Helligenstein, Conyers, Berns, & Smith, 1998).  It is not surprising 
then that in clinically referred adults with ADHD, inattentive symptoms were the most 
prominent (Millstein, Wilens, Biederman, & Spencer (1997), and that adults seeking 
evaluation for ADHD frequently complain of cognitive and self-regulatory problems (such 
as difficulty concentrating, poor organization, and forgetfulness), but not those implying 
hyperactivity (Wolf  & Wasserstein, 2001). These findings suggest that inattention 
dominates the experience of ADHD in adulthood.  
 
 DSM-5 criteria state that adults must rate positively for at least 5 items from either 
or both of the inattention, and hyperactivity-impulsivity (HI) symptom lists (previous 
editions i.e. DSM-IV, DSM-III, required 6). This allows categorisation into one of three 
ADHD sub-types; predominantly inattentive (ADHD-I, where criteria for inattention is met 
and criteria for HI is not met), predominantly hyperactive-impulsive (ADHD-HI, where the 
opposite is true), and combined type (ADHD-C, where criteria for both are met). Although 
diagnosis of ADHD is still based on these categorical criteria, it is generally accepted that 
symptoms are dimensional, and exist along a continuum with clinical cases being at the 
extreme end of normal expression, meaning that less severe symptoms are present within 
the general population. Prevalence rates for ADHD in adults go up significantly when 
participants meeting criteria for a broader definition of the disorder are included in analysis 
(Faraone & Biederman, 2005; Helligenstein et al., 1998).  
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Research often uses DSM categorisation for estimating prevalence, with which 
there are two issues. Firstly, ADHD sub-types are not symptoms, they are diagnoses based 
on symptoms, so categorisation only tells us about the presence of a disorder, not a 
symptom. This of course is fine if we just want to know about the prevalence of the 
disorder, but if we want to look at the prevalence of a symptom i.e. inattention, it needs to 
be as a distinct dimension, not in relation to it’s co-existence with HI.  
Secondly, the current criteria can result in misleading diagnosis. For example, 
according to DSM-5 criteria someone who rates positively for 5 inattention items, and 4 HI 
items, would be categorised as ADHD-I even though they are only just below the threshold 
for ADHD-C. If they had been assessed prior to the release of DSM-5 (2013) they would 
have been considered sub-threshold for diagnosis even for ADHD-I. This may be less of an 
issue in clinical diagnosis that involves thorough assessment and consideration before 
diagnosis, but in prevalence studies where brief interviews or questionnaires are used to 
rate symptoms, it presents a problem. Milich, Balentine, and Lynam (2001) suggest that 
inconsistencies in the literature may be partly explained by heterogeneity between ADHD 
subtypes caused by sub-threshold diagnosis. This can be circumvented by categorising 
“sub-threshold” participants; these participants are then not included in estimates of sub-
type prevalence.  
There are in fact four ways to score/categorise self-report ratings of DSM ADHD 
items. Item counts score the number of items rated positively (i.e. rated as often or very 
often) for the inattention and HI lists separately, along with the combined total for both. 
These scores are used to derive diagnostic categories (as detailed above), as well as to 
determine symptom presence, where participants are deemed to show evidence of 
inattention, HI, or both based on DSM item cut-offs (i.e. it is possible for participants to 
fall into all three groups). Summary scores are calculated as the total of the ratings for each 
item (items are rated from 0-3) for inattention and HI lists separately, along with the 
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combined total of both, giving a maximum of 27 for the 9 items in each symptom list (see 
Method section for more detail on scoring procedures). A cut-off (of SD +1.5) can be 
applied to the item counts and summary scores as an indication of potential diagnostic 
threshold. The item counts, symptom presence, and summary scores methods can all be 
used to look at dimensional symptom prevalence. To get a comprehensive picture of 
prevalence, it is useful to use all four methods as they can produce marked differences in 
the observed prevalence and character of a disorder (Helligenstein et al., 1998).  
Unfortunately, consistent methodology is lacking in the literature, and as such 
estimates of prevalence vary quite substantially across studies. Overall prevalence of 
ADHD in adults is thought to be between 1.0 and 7.3% (de Zwaan et al. 2012). Contrary to 
what we might expect, several studies have found the ADHD subtype with the highest 
prevalence in community samples to be ADHD-HI (Murphy & Barkley, 1996; DuPaul et 
al., 2001). However, notably these studies only report data trends, and do not test the 
significance of differences between proportions (i.e. using McNemar’s test). We are not 
aware of any findings pertaining to the prevalence of inattention or HI as independent 
symptoms. Although there are studies that have looked at summary scores and item counts 
to explore group differences such as age and gender (Helligenstein et al., 1998; Murphy & 
Barkley, 1996), their analysis does not extend to answer the general questions of how 
prevalent the symptoms are, and which, if either, is more prevalent.  
 In children ADHD is often thought to be more common in boys, but this may be a 
poor reflection of the truth. Some research has suggested there may be differences in the 
way ADHD manifests according to gender. It is thought that boys are more prone to the 
externalizing symptoms hyperactivity and impulsivity and girls are more likely to have 
internalizing symptoms (Gershon & Gershon, 2002), which are less likely to be picked up 
resulting in underestimations of prevalence. Findings from research with adults do not 
present a strong case for gender differences. Faraone & Biederman (2005) found overall 
 34 
prevalence of ADHD was greater in males than females, but only when broad definition of 
symptoms was used. Using the summary scores method Murphy and Barkley (1996) found 
that males had higher scores for HI (although the authors note the difference was slight), 
but no differences in inattention or combined scores for self-reports of current ADHD 
symptoms. They also found no gender differences when looking at item counts. 
Helligenstein et al. (1998) found no gender differences in either summary scores or item 
counts, and DuPaul et al. (2001) found no gender differences in ADHD subtype using 
diagnostic categories, or in item counts.  
 
The aim of the present research was to provide information on the prevalence of 
ADHD symptoms in adults using revised DSM-5 criteria. We used both broad and narrow 
definitions of ADHD to estimate prevalence, as well as comprehensive scoring methods 
that allowed us to look at the symptoms uniquely as well as in traditional diagnostic 
format.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
555 men (N = 202) and women (N = 353) aged 18-35 (M = 21.19, SD = 4.12) were 
screened for self-reported symptoms of ADHD. All participants were students at 
Bournemouth University, and were recruited in several ways; through the Bournemouth 
University Psychology undergraduate experiment participation scheme, through 
advertisements at Bournemouth University and on social media sites, and through 
opportunity sampling by the researcher. Participants came from a variety of courses within 
the school of Science and Technology including Psychology, Archeology, Forensic 
Science, Environmental Sciences, Geography, and Industrial Design. 
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Procedures 
Screening for ADHD symptoms was completed using a questionnaire based on the Adult 
ADHD Rating Scale-IV (Barkley, 2011), but adapted to reflect DSM-5 criteria (see 
Appendix B). The scale contains the 18 items (9 for inattention, 9 for hyperactivity-
impulsivity) from the DSM-5 criteria for ADHD with each item answered on a 4-point 
scale (from 0-3; not at all, sometimes, often and very often). As per DSM criteria, items 
were taken to be indicative of a symptom if they were rated often or very often (2 or 3); 
this is referred to as a positive rating. 
Participants were asked to read each question carefully and consider to what extent 
they had experienced each item description over the last 6 months. They completed the 
questionnaire either in paper or electronic format. 
In order to be comprehensive, and to comment on the validity of the methods and 
the measure as a whole, analysis was carried out using all four scoring methods: 
1) Item counts. This refers to the number of items rated positively, and produces 
three scores. One for each of the subscales (out of 9), and one for the overall questionnaire 
(out of 18).  
2) Diagnostic criteria. Diagnostic groups are derived from the item counts. 
Participants were categorised as one of the three ADHD subtypes (ADHD-C, ADHD-I, or 
ADHD-HI), or as either sub-threshold, or control. As previously mentioned, the DSM-5 
threshold for symptom presence in adults is a score of 5 items or more rated positively 
from either or both of the inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity subscales (referred to 
as narrow definition.) For this study we also looked at scores of 4 items or more for a 
broader representation of ADHD symptoms (referred to as broad definition; Helligenstein 
et al. suggest that cutoff scores of 4 are sufficient to identify symptoms in college 
students). A score of 2 items or less was taken to indicate no presence. Scores of 3 were 
treated as sub-threshold for broad-definition. Scores of 3 or 4 were treated as sub-threshold 
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for narrow definition. For example, by these criteria for narrow definition participants were 
grouped as ADHD-C if they had at least 5 positively rated items on both sub-scales, as 
ADHD-I if they had at least 5 positively rated items on the inattention sub-scale and no 
more than 2 on the hyperactivity-impulsivity sub-scale, and the reverse for ADHD-HI. 
Participants with positive ratings for no more than 2 items on both scales were categorised 
as control. Participants were categorised as sub-threshold for one of the ADHD diagnoses 
if they had 3 (broad) or 3-4 (narrow) positively rated items on either or both of the sub-
scales. This method of categorisation means that diagnosis is made in relation to the 
presence or absence or co-occurring symptoms. 
3) Symptom presence. In contrast to the above, this method of categorisation 
identifies symptom presence regardless of co-occurring symptoms. Participants rate as 
positive for inattention if they have at least 4 (broad) or 5 (narrow) positively rated items 
on the inattention sub-scale. This is regardless of whether they also rate positively on the 
hyperactivity-impulsivity sub-scale.  
4) Summary scores. These are summations of the item scores calculated separately 
for each subscale (out of 27), and for the overall questionnaire (out of 54).   
 
Results 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient assessed the internal consistency of item ratings. For the 18 
DSM-5 combined ADHD items Cronbach’s alpha was .889.  When computed after 
deleting one item at a time results showed no one item strongly influenced the reliability of 
the total score. The alphas were .856 for the 9 inattention items, and .816 for the 9 
hyperactivity items.  
Pearson chi-square test was used to compare gender groups on nominal variables, 
and the McNemar test was used for within-subjects comparisons of nominal variables. 
Bonferroni adjustments were applied in the case of multiple comparisons.  
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Distribution of ADHD-like Traits 
Histograms representing distributions of summary scores for inattention and hyperactivity-
impulsivity sub-scales, and overall ADHD are shown in figure 1. Along with skewness 
values they suggest a skewed distribution for all three, with more people scoring at the 
lower end of the scale.  
 
Sample Characteristics 
Diagnostic criteria. Figure 2 shows how each member of the sample was 
categorised according to ADHD groups for both broad (i.e. 4 or more positively rated 
items) and narrow (i.e. 5 or more positively rated items) definitions. Close to half of the 
participants (44.9%) showed no signs of ADHD symptoms (i.e. rated no more than two 
items as “often” or “very often” on each 9-item DSM subscale). The broad definition 
categorised a quarter (25%) of participants as “sub-threshold” (i.e. 3 positively rated items) 
meaning their scores were not strong enough to indicate symptom presence, but not weak 
enough for them to be categorised as being without symptoms. This increased to 39.8% 
with narrow definition (i.e. 3-4 positively rated items).  
As would be expected, the broad definition produced a higher prevalence of ADHD (any 
sub-type) than the equivalent narrow definition (30.9% vs. 15.32%, X2 = 80.012, p < 
.0001; see fig. 3). Within this, ADHD-C and ADHD-I were equally common for both 
broad (14.05% vs. 12.43% X2 = .435, p < .509), and narrow (5.59% vs. 8.65%, X2 = 3.241, 
p < .072) definitions. They were also more common than ADHD-HI for both broad 
(14.05% vs. 3.36% X2 = 33.153, p < .0001; 12.43% vs. 3.36% X2 = 25.888, p < .0001), 
and narrow (5.59% vs. 1.08% X2 =15.568, p < .0001; 8.65% vs. 1.08% X2 = 31.130, p < 
.0001) definitions 
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Figure 1. Histograms representing distributions for (a) total summary scores, (b) summary scores for the inattention subscale, and (c) summary scores for the hyperactivity-
impulsivity subscale 
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Figure 2. Whole sample category characteristics: percentage of sample in each category for both broad and narrow definition 
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Figure 3. Percentage of sample falling into ADHD diagnostic categories for both broad and narrow definitions 
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 Item counts. Table 1 shows the percentage of people that rated items positively 
for each symptom. For example, 10.19% of the sample rated 4 out of 9 inattention items 
positively, and 30.86% of the sample rated 4 or more inattention items positively. Average 
item counts for inattention were higher than for HI (t = 6.507, p < .0001).  
 
Table 1 
Number of items scored above threshold for the sample 
No. of 
items  Inattention Cumulative 
Hyperactivity-
Impulsivity Cumulative 
0 20.06% 100.00% 25.01% 100.00% 
1 18.83% 79.94% 25.31% 75.99% 
2 16.36% 61.11% 12.96% 49.69% 
3 13.89% 44.75% 14.81% 36.73% 
4 10.19% 30.86% 9.57% 21.91% 
5 8.95% 20.67% 3.70% 12.35% 
6 5.23% 11.72% 4.63% 8.64% 
7 3.40% 6.49% 1.85% 4.01% 
8 2.47% 3.09% 0.62% 2.16% 
9 0.62% 0.62% 1.54% 1.54 
 
 Symptom presence. For overall symptom presence, the broad definition produced 
a higher prevalence of symptoms than the narrow definition (39.64% vs. 27.93% X2 = 
80.012, p < .0001). Within this, inattention was more prevalent than HI for both broadly 
(32.07% vs. 21.62% X2 = 22.88, p < .0001), and narrowly (21.62% vs. 11.89% X2 = 
22.653, p < .0001) defined symptoms. 
Summary scores. Table 2 shows the average summary scores for each scale, along 
with the +1.5 SD cut-off, and the percentage of people scoring equal to or above this. 
Summary scores for inattention were higher than those for HI (t(554) = 10.822, p < .0001). 
More people scored at or above the +1.5 SD cut-off on inattention than HI (X2 = 66.540, p 
< .0001). There was a greater proportion of people scoring higher than the cut-off on both 
inattention and HI than for the overall scale (X2 = 225.435, p < .0001; X2 = 240.744, p < 
.0001, respectively). 
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Table 2.  
    Means, standard deviations, deviance thresholds (+1.5 SD), and percentage of sample 
over threshold for summary scores 
Scale Mean SD +1.5 SD % +1.5 SD 
Total 18.08 9 32.3 39 
Inattention 10.07 5.16 17.81 52 
Hyperactivity-
Impulsivity 8 4.9 15.35 43 
 
Gender Differences 
Diagnostic criteria. Overall prevalence of broadly defined ADHD (any sub-type) 
was higher for males than for females (X2 = 15.125, p < .0001; see fig 4). This was also 
true for narrow definition (X2 = 8.733, p < .0001). Within this, prevalence of broadly 
defined ADHD-I and ADHD-C was higher in males (X2 = 5.646, p = .017; X2 = 10.248, p 
= .001 respectively). The same was true for narrowly defined ADHD-I (X2 = 7.168, p = 
.007), however there were no gender differences in prevalence of ADHD-C when narrowly 
defined (X2 = 3.284, p = .07). There was no gender differences in prevalence for ADHD-
HI for either the broad or narrow definitions (X2 = .367, p = .545; X2 = 1.020, p = .313 
respectively).]  
Item counts. T-tests showed there were no significant gender differences in item 
counts for either inattention [t(553) = -1.300, p = .194], hyperactivity-impulsivity [t(553) = -
1.295, p = .196], or the combined scale [t(553) = -1.487, p = .138; see table 3]. There were 
also no gender differences observed in the proportions scoring over the +1.5 SD cut-off for 
inattention (X2 = .106, p = .745), hyperactivity-impulsivity (X2 = 2.472, p = .116), or the 
combined scale (X2 = 1.102, p = .294. 
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Figure 4. Percentage of sample falling into ADHD diagnostic categories for both broad and narrow definitions across gend
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Symptom presence. Prevalence of both inattentive and hyperactive-impulsive 
symptoms were higher in males than females when broadly defined (42.1% vs. 26.3%, X2 
= 14.599, p < .0001; 26.7% vs. 18.7%, X2 = 4.896, p = .027 respectively). This was also 
true for narrowly defined inattentive symptoms (28.7% vs. 17.6%, X2 = 9.424, p = .002), 
but not for narrowly defined hyperactive-impulsive symptoms where there was no gender 
difference (14.4% vs. 10.5%, X2 = 1.841, p = .175). 
Summary scores. T-tests showed there were no significant gender differences in 
summary scores for either inattention [t(553) = -.189, p = .850], hyperactivity-impulsivity 
[t(553) = -1.085, p = .278], or the combined scale [t(553) = -.669, p = .485; see table 4]. 
There were also no gender differences observed in the proportions scoring over the +1.5 
SD cut-off for inattention (X2 = 1.521, p = .42), hyperactivity-impulsivity (X2 = 3.116, p = 
.168), or the combined scale (X2 = 4.015, p = .105). 
 
Table 4.  
      
Means and standard deviations for summary scores across genders 
 Males Females 
Scale Mean SD % +1.5 SD Mean SD % +1.5 SD 
Inattention 10.12 5.46 11.4 10.04 4.99 8.2 
Hyperactivity-
Impulsivity 8.3 5.29 10.4 7.83 4.67 6.2 
Combined 18.43 9.6 9.9 17.88 8.64 5.4 
 
Table 3.  
      
Means and standard deviations for item counts across genders 
 Males Females 
Scale Mean SD % +1.5 SD Mean SD % +1.5 SD 
Inattention 2.83 2.49 9.9 2.55 2.44 9.1 
Hyperactivity-
Impulsivity 2.18 2.05 9.9 1.95 2 6.2 
Combined 5.02 3.92 10.9 4.5 3.91 8.2 
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Table 5. 
  Percentage of positive ratings for each item 
Item Inattention Hyperactivity-Impulsivity 
1 26.5% 54.1% 
2 36.9% 4.3% 
3 18.6% 18.9% 
4 20.7% 25.2% 
5 25.4% 28.3% 
6 42.9% 22.5% 
7 15.1% 15.7% 
8 55.3% 22% 
9 23.8% 12.6% 
 
Item endorsement 
We also examined the rate of endorsement for each of the 18 DSM-5 ADHD items (see 
Table 5). The item most commonly rated positively on the inattention sub-scale was 
number 8; “have you been distracted by activity or noise around you?”. The item least 
endorsed on this sub-scale was number 7; “ have you lost things necessary for tasks or 
activities?”. The item most commonly rated positively on the hyperactivity-impulsivity 
sub-scale was number 1; “have you fidgeted with hands or feet, or squirmed in your seat?”. 
The item least endorsed on this sub-scale was number 2; “have you left your seat in 
situations where you were expected to remain seated?”. 
 
Discussion 
Overall Prevalence 
Prevalence of ADHD when narrowly defined was 15.32%. This may seem high compared 
to previous estimates, but makes sense in light of the lowered threshold for DSM-5. It is 
more realistic to compare this figure to the broad estimate of prevalence made by Faraone 
and Biederman (2005), where criteria were broadened from DSM-IV giving a figure of 
16.4%. Even taking into account that this figure is probably at the higher end of what 
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might be expected from clinician diagnosis, it still suggests that ADHD is quite common in 
adulthood. Our broad definition of ADHD nearly doubles prevalence to 30.9%, suggesting 
that lower level forms of the sub-types of ADHD could be present in up to a third of the 
general population. 
 We found no difference in prevalence between the subtypes ADHD-I and ADHD-C 
for either broad or narrow definitions. However, both these subtypes were significantly 
more prevalent than ADHD-HI for both broad and narrow definitions. This is in contrast to 
previous findings that suggested ADHD-HI was the most prevalent subtype (DuPaul et al. 
2001; Murphy & Barkley, 1996). However, we note that only data trends were reported in 
these studies. For broad diagnosis (most comparable to our narrow diagnosis), Faraone and 
Biederman’s results are in line with our own. This is also consistent with findings from 
clinical samples; a meta-analysis of the prevalence of DSM-IV ADHD found ADHD-I to 
be most the common sub-type in adults, and that prevalence of ADHD-HI diminishes with 
age past pre-school (Willcutt, 2012).  
 For overall symptom presence, regardless of co-occurrence, inattention was more 
prevalent than hyperactivity-impulsivity when both broadly and narrowly defined.  
Scores for both our dimensional measures (item counts and summary scores), were higher 
for inattention than HI. There were also significantly more people scoring above the + 1.5 
SD cutoff thought to represent a clinical threshold, for inattention than HI on summary 
scores. However, there were no differences between inattention and HI in the proportions 
scoring above the threshold on item counts. We have no frame of reference to compare 
these findings; although Murphy and Barkley (1996) look at summary scores and item 
counts, they do not report equivalent analysis of their data. 
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Gender Effects 
Findings for gender effects were mixed. For both broad and narrow definitions, overall 
prevalence of ADHD was higher in males than in females. Once again our findings are line 
with the broadly defined prevalence of ADHD found by Faraone and Biederman (2005). 
They found no gender differences in narrowly defined ADHD prevalence. This supports 
the idea that previous DSM thresholds were too high for adult populations, as suggested by 
Murphy and Barkley (1996). For subtypes, both broadly and narrowly defined ADHD-I 
was more prevalent in males than in females. Broadly defined ADHD-C was also more 
prevalent in males, and although not significant the trend was in this direction for narrowly 
defined ADHD-C also. There were no gender differences in ADHD-HI for either broad or 
narrow definitions, however we note that a very small number of people fell into the 
sample for this analysis (3.6% for broad, 1.1% for narrow). When categorised by symptom 
presence both inattention and HI were more prevalent in males than females when broadly 
defined, but this was only true of inattention when narrowly defined. However, when 
symptoms were assessed on a scale, using both item counts and summary scores, no 
gender differences were evident. This suggests that only when ADHD symptoms are 
categorised using DSM criteria are gender differences apparent; implying that males would 
be more likely to be given a diagnosis. This fits with the findings from clinical populations 
that show ADHD diagnosis is more prevalent in males (Willcutt, 2012).  
 
Item Endorsement 
Like Murphy and Barkley (1996), we looked at the rate of endorsement (as “Often” or 
“Very Often”) for each DSM ADHD item. They suggest that a guideline to determine 
whether an item is developmentally inappropriate is that it should be endorsed by no more 
than 10% of the population, and note that their data showed many items (12 out of 18) to 
be over this. In the current work only one item from the list (“have you left your seat in 
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meetings or other situations where your are expected to remain seated?”) was endorsed by 
less than 10% of the sample. Whether this reflects an over-estimation of self-reported 
symptoms, or the sheer pervasiveness of ADHD symptoms is unclear. In addition, our data 
suggests an overall much higher rate of item endorsement than that reported by Murphy 
and Barkley (1996). We can only speculate that this may be due to differences in sample 
characteristics such as age range (Murphy & Barkley included older adults), or occupation 
(our sample was exclusively students). 
 
Limitations 
As with other work on ADHD prevalence, our findings are limited in their relevance to the 
population represented by our sample. Given the research suggesting a relationship 
between ADHD and academic attainment (Kuriyan et al. 2013), it may be reasonable to 
suspect that university students would be less likely to have ADHD symptoms simply by 
the nature of them having made it as far as university. However, although they differ on a 
number of features including educational attainment, previous work suggests that 
prevalence of ADHD in university students is generally comparable to other adult samples. 
Estimates of prevalence of DSM-IV ADHD in university students are between 2-4% 
(DuPaul et al. 2001; Helligenstein et al. 1998; Weyandt, Linterman, & Rice, 1995). For the 
inattentive subtype Helligenstein et al. (1998) found a prevalence rate of 2.2%. In a sample 
of adults renewing their drivers licences Murphy and Barkley (1996) reported a figure of 
2.3% for the same subtype. We also note Murphy and Barkley found that scores varied as a 
function of location (urban vs. sub-urban), and that our sample was collected from an 
affluent, primarily middle-class area. That said, overall, our findings corroborate those of 
the two studies with methodologies most similar to our own (Murphy & Barkley, 1996; 
Faraone & Biederman, 2005), whilst having different sample characteristics.  
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We also stress, as others have, that results should be considered in light of the self-
report nature of data collection, and that this is no substitute for clinical assessment. 
However we note that Richards, Rosen, and Ramirez (1999) conclude that students with a 
clinical diagnosis of ADHD have very similar psychological functioning to students with 
self-reported ADHD. Regardless, it was not our primary aim to estimate prevalence of 
clinical cases, but to estimate the prevalence of the symptoms of ADHD regardless of 
diagnosis or co-morbidity.  
Conclusion 
Our findings highlight the prevalence of ADHD symptoms in the general population, but 
in particular they highlight the pervasiveness of inattention, and support the idea that 
inattention is the defining symptom of ADHD in adults. Our data suggest clear gender 
differences in categorisation of symptoms, in that males are more likely to meet both 
DSM-5 (narrow) and broadly defined thresholds.
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Chapter 3: The Relationship Between Core Symptoms of ADHD and Reasoning in a 
Non-Clinical sample 
The experiment in this chapter makes use of a quick, easy to administer, and readily 
available task, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005). The task is used to 
assess higher level EFs, such as complex reasoning and problem solving, as well as to tap 
into the cognitive effort component of self-regulation. This simple study was intended as a 
starting point for looking the relationship between ADHD symptoms and self-regulatory 
processes. 
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Abstract 
Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) symptoms are frequently linked to 
executive function deficits. There is reason to believe that these deficits may give rise to 
problems with complex reasoning and problem solving. 86 men (N = 45) and women (N = 
41) completed a self-report measure to assess ADHD symptoms, along with a complex 
reasoning task; the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). IQ was also tested due to its 
covariance with reasoning ability. Analysis suggested that all three symptoms of ADHD 
(inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity) are negatively related to performance on the 
CRT, however only inattention significantly contributed to a model that predicted CRT 
performance. Of the three core symptoms of ADHD, inattention is most important for 
reasoning ability. Results are discussed in reference to an executive function model of 
ADHD, with particular emphasis on the role of working memory in inattention. 
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The Relationship Between Core Symptoms of ADHD and Reasoning  
in a Non-Clinical Sample 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a childhood-onset 
neurodevelopmental disorder with core symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, and 
impulsivity. These primary symptoms vary in degree between sufferers of the disorder, 
which has led to division of ADHD into three subgroups: the combined type (ADHD-C), 
the predominantly inattentive type (PIT), and the predominantly hyperactive-impulsive 
type (ADHD-HI).  
It is estimated that symptoms of ADHD persist into adulthood in around 60% of cases 
(Kessler et al., 2006), and that up to 6% of adults may have ADHD (Murphy & Barkley, 
1996; Wender, Wolf, & Wasserstein, 2001). The most prominent symptom of adult ADHD 
appears to be inattention, with the majority of adults having either the predominantly 
inattentive or combined subtype (Millstein, Wilens, Biederman, & Spencer, 1997). Interest 
in adult ADHD and its correlates has been growing over the last decade. However little is 
known about it relative to its childhood manifestation.   
Recently, research has supported a shift in approach, from a categorical to a 
dimensional view of ADHD. Symptoms can therefore be described as existing along a 
continuum, where, for example, people with clinically diagnosed inattentive subtype (PIT) 
are at the extreme end (Levy, Hay, McStephen, Wood, & Waldman, 1997; Lubke, 
Hudziak, Derks, van Bijsterveldt, & Boomsma, 2009). This means the use of a non-clinical 
sample will be beneficial for analysis of the full range of symptom severity, and for 
understanding the nature of symptoms within the general population. Furthermore, the 
benefits of using a non-clinical sample include a break-away from medicated, paediatric 
populations which allows investigation of symptoms of ADHD independent of 
developmental delays, general cognitive dysfunction, or history of medication use (Cocchi 
et al., 2012).  
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 ADHD has been linked to all three core executive functions (EFs); Working 
Memory (WM), Inhibitory Control, and Cognitive Flexibility (Willcutt, Doyle, Nigg, 
Faraone, & Pennington, 2005). Barkley’s (1997) theory of ADHD cited inhibitory control 
as the core deficit for the disorder; however this was stated to be specific only to the 
ADHD-C and predominantly hyperactive-impulsive (ADHD-HI) subtypes. Recent 
arguments have put forward working memory as the core deficit in PIT (Diamond, 2005). 
Evidence suggests that both ADHD-C and PIT have problems with inhibitory control 
(although there are differences in types of errors) but only PIT has specific problems with 
WM (Carr, Henderson, & Nigg, 2010; Huang-Pollock, Mikami, Pfiffner, & McBurnett, 
2007; Johnstone & Clarke, 2009; Martinussen & Tannock, 2006).  
Diamond (2013) lists the three core EFs, along with self-regulatory processes, as part of 
a system that facilitates complex reasoning and problem solving. Based on Diamond’s 
model, impairments in all or just one of the core EFs would lead to poorer performance on 
reasoning tasks. ADHD is regularly cited as being linked to difficulties with complex 
reasoning and problem solving, however, we are aware of very few studies that have 
investigated these higher-level abilities in ADHD directly (Harrier & DeOrnellas, 2005; 
Tamm & Juranek, 2012). Indeed, Tamm & Juranek reported poorer performance on a 
reasoning task in the ADHD group. A question remains, however, as to which core 
symptom of ADHD is more likely to lead to poorer reasoning. Harrier and DeOrnellas 
found that only PIT and ADHD-C groups had difficulty on a planning and reasoning task, 
while ADHD-HI children showed no difficulty compared to controls suggesting that 
inattention may drive the relationship between ADHD and reasoning. 
The aim of the present study was to identify which of the symptoms of ADHD is related 
to performance on a recently established reasoning task; the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT; originally discussed by Kahneman and Frederick, 2002, and later developed by 
Frederick, 2005). The test has its heritage in tasks from the heuristics and biases literature 
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of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) who identified a number of heuristics (roughly described 
as general rules of thumb), reliance upon which causes predictable biases or systematic 
errors in reasoning and judgment. Although consisting only of three-items, the CRT was 
found to strongly predict performance on these earlier tasks (Hoppe & Kusterer, 2011; 
Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011), and other assessments of reasoning ability (Hoppe & 
Kusterer, 2011; Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009) making it a reliable and easy to 
administer test. In the CRT, participants must coordinate the demands of both 
comprehension and the manipulation of information, meaning they are constrained by the 
limited resources of working memory. However, the task is also designed to elicit an 
immediate and incorrect first response that must be inhibited in order to be successful. 
Whilst originally thought to be a measure of cognitive effort (Frederick, 2005), recent 
work suggests that working memory capacity is the strongest predictor of performance on 
the CRT (Stupple , Gale, & Richmond, 2013). Importantly, the CRT is purported to 
measure a dimension that is separable from that which is assessed in general IQ tests. Of 
the limited literature that has looked into ADHD and reasoning abilities, the majority of 
tasks used are subsets from IQ tests. 
It is possible that all three symptoms of ADHD will be related to CRT performance. 
Impulsivity would seem the most likely candidate, firstly because of the impulsive 
heuristic response the CRT elicits. Secondly, the inhibition hypothesis of ADHD has 
already been linked to effort in the context of the cognitive-energetic model (Sergeant, 
2000). However a link between working memory capacity and CRT performance has 
already been established (Stupple et al., 2013). Given this, along with the suggestion that 
WM is the key EF deficient in PIT, we predict that inattention is likely to be a major factor 
influencing performance on the CRT. 
The current study investigated the relationship between core ADHD symptoms in a 
non-clinical population and performance on the CRT. We expected that one or more 
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symptoms of ADHD would be related to, and predict poor performance on, the CRT. 
However, based on the relationship that both inattention and CRT performance have to 
working memory, it was predicted that the core symptom of inattention would have the 
greatest predictive power.  Such a finding would suggest that inattention is the most 
important factor in potential reasoning deficits in ADHD and that inattention might play a 
role in reasoning deficits, beyond IQ, in the general population. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety participants were recruited for this research. Four participants who disclosed a 
diagnosis of ADHD were excluded as the sample was intended to represent the general 
population. This left a sample of 86 men (N = 45) and women (N = 41) aged 18-74 years 
(M = 23.97, SD = 10.22), who were recruited largely through opportunity sampling. All 
participants gave written informed consent to participate in the research, which was 
approved by Bournemouth University Ethics Committee.  
Materials 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). From Frederick (2005). The test is composed of 
three items as follows: 
(a) A bat and ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost?  
(b) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets?  
(c) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover 
half the lake?   
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In order to answer correctly it is necessary to suppress and/or evaluate the quick intuitive 
answer that immediately comes to mind (Frederick, 2005). The solution to the bat and ball 
problem is 5 pence, to the widget problem is 5 minutes, and to the lily pad problem is 47 
days.  
Weschler’s Test of Adult Reading (WTAR). To assess cognitive ability, an 
intelligence quotient was obtained from the WTAR, which shares normative data sets with 
the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and the Weschler Memory Scale (WMS).  
Connors Adult ADHD Rating Scale–Self-Report: Short Version (CAARS-S:S). The 
CAARS-S:S (Connors et al., 1999) is a 26 item self-report measure designed to assess 
current ADHD symptoms in adults. Items are rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale, where 0 
= not at all and 3 = very much. The measure contains 5 factor-derived subscales; A: 
inattention/memory problems, B: hyperactivity/restlessness, C: impulsivity/emotional 
lability, D: problems with self-concept and E: an ADHD index comprised of items from 
the other subscales. Scores of 56 or above are described as “elevated”, and indicates that 
further investigation (i.e. full clinical assessment) may be warranted.  
Procedure 
Each participant was individually administered each test item (test administration order 
was counterbalanced to control for order effects).  
 
Results 
On the CAARS questionnaire 27.91% of participants had elevated symptoms (i.e. a t-score 
of 56 or above) on the composite subscale for ADHD. For individual symptoms; 45.35% 
of participants had elevated scores for inattention, 20.93% had elevated scores for 
hyperactivity, and 15.12% had elevated scores for impulsivity. 
Correlations showed WTAR IQ did not have a significant relationship with CRT scores 
(see Table 1). Of the CAARS questionnaire, only one subset showed a significant 
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relationship with WTAR IQ, this was Impulsivity (see Table 1.) Reflecting the difficulty of 
the CRT, over half of participants (58.1%) failed to get a single correct answer, and only 
12.8% got all three questions correct. CAARS subsets for inattention, hyperactivity, and 
impulsivity were significantly and negatively correlated with CRT scores (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. 
         Correlations between WTAR IQ, CAARS subsets, and Cognitive Reflection Test 
    Pearson Correlations 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.IQ 110.77 12.83 -       
2.Inattention 56.74 11.43 -0.017 -      
3.Hyperactivity 50.61 9.91 -0.153 .548** -     
4. Impulsivity 49.36 10.09 -0.214 .461** .612** -    
5. Self-
Concept 53.75 11.05 0.107 .514** .353** .414** - 
  
6. Composite 53.61 11.01 -0.90 .731** .731** .747** .688** -  
7. CRT 0.84 1.12 0.148 -.368** 
-
.279** 
-
.246** -0.146 
-
.337** - 
*p < .05, **p < .001 
                
 
To assess the relative input of each ADHD symptom on CRT score, hierarchical 
regression was carried out with WTAR IQ included as a covariate1. Incidentally, IQ did 
not explain a significant amount of variance [(F(1,84) = 2.313, p = .174]. Inattention was 
the only of the three symptoms to make a significant contribution to the model (see Table 
2.) Neither hyperactivity nor impulsivity explained a significant amount of variance once 
inattention had been accounted for, therefore the best model did not include them [F(2,83) 
= 8.217, p = .001]. No further investigation was carried out on CAARS subset E, as this 
composite measure was accounted for by the other subsets.  
 
 
 
                                                
1Post-publication regression was repeated using the format followed in Chapter 4 (with 
inattention added as the final variable), and did not alter the findings. See appendix C. 
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Table 2.  
	 	 	 	 	 	Summary of regression for IQ, hyperactivity, impulsivity and inattention on CRT 
scores. 
Variable b SEb β t R2 
F for 
change 
in R2 
Step 1     0.023 2.066 
WTAR IQ 0.013 0.009 0.151 1.437   
Step 2     0.164 14.680** 
WTAR IQ 0.012 0.009 0.141 1.436   
Inattention -0.035 0.009 -0.376 -3.831**   
Step 3     0.169 0.478 
WTAR IQ 0.011 0.009 0.13 1.303   
Inattention -0.03 0.011 -0.327 -2.712**   
Hyperactivity -0.009 0.013 -0.084 -0.691   
Step 4     0.17 0.159 
WTAR IQ 0.011 0.009 0.122 1.203   
Inattention -0.029 0.012 -0.316 -2.541** 
  Hyperactivity -0.007 0.015 -0.061 -0.444 
  Impulsivity -0.006 0.014 -0.052 -0.399     
**p < .01 
       
 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to relate the core ADHD symptoms to performance on a 
measure of reasoning ability. The results suggest that all three symptoms were related to 
performance on the cognitive reflection test. However, only inattention made a significant 
contribution to a model that predicted CRT performance. Participants with higher scores 
on the subset for inattention were less likely to be successful on the task. This suggests that 
even non-clinical symptoms of inattention can affect the tendency to engage in effortful 
cognition.   
There are several explanations for the relationship between inattention and CRT 
performance. Stupple et al. (2013) found working memory to be a strong predictor of CRT 
performance and describe it as being essential to success on the task. This executive 
function has also recently been put forward as the core deficit in PIT (Diamond, 2005). 
The limited literature on the relationship between inattention and WM in children tends to 
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support Diamond’s view (Klingberg et al. 2005; Lui & Tannock, 2007; Martinussen & 
Tannock, 2006; Wåhlstedt & Bohlin, 2010), and a study looking at groups with pure 
hyperacivity-impulsivity and pure inattention in adults, found only those with inattention 
had a deficit in WM compared to controls (Gansler et al. 1998). We suggest it is likely that 
working memory deficits associated with even non-clinical inattention, affect the ability to 
solve the complex reasoning problems of the CRT, however this is an area for further 
work.  
Secondly, the CRT was originally created for the assessment of cognitive effort, and to 
identify those with a ‘miserly’ approach to cognition. While it would be inappropriate to 
describe people with inattentive symptoms as ‘miserly’, they may be less able to apply the 
necessary effort for the task, due to self-regulatory and motivational problems. Deficient 
self-regulation is associated with ADHD and is thought to be a result of EF problems 
(Barkley, 2001; 2004). Working memory in particular is thought to be essential for 
successful self-regulation (Hofmann, Friese, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2011), and it is 
suggested self-regulation is strongly linked with attentional control (Fonagy & Target, 
2002; Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2005). In light of this it is understandable that those with 
inattentive symptoms would be most likely to have difficulty with the CRT.   
The successful use of a non-clinical sample in this research supports the dimensional 
view of ADHD symptoms, in that members of the general population report having 
symptoms (often low levels) of ADHD. Over a third of participants scored above average 
on the composite measure for ADHD (a T-score of above 56 on the CAARS), not 
necessarily indicating a need for clinical intervention, but suggesting reasonable 
prevalence of symptoms in the general population. Interestingly the most prominent 
symptom in the general population appears to be inattention, with over half of participants 
scoring above average (but not necessarily at a clinical level) T-scores on the CAARS for 
this subset.  
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Symptoms of inattention appear to predict success on the Cognitive Reflection Test, 
which suggests people with these symptoms may have difficulty with reasoning and 
problem solving. This is likely explained by the close relationship between attentional 
control, working memory, and self-regulation. However, further research is required to 
better understand the nature of this relationship in adults.
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Chapter 4: Inattention, Working Memory and Goal Neglect in a Community Sample 
Given the theorised relationship between working memory and self-regulation (Hoffman et 
al., 2012), and between working memory and inattention (Diamond, 2005), this chapter 
investigated the relationship between various measures of working memory and 
inattention. Across two experiments both traditional and novel tests of WM are used, and 
the predictive value of each of the core ADHD symptoms to performance on these is 
assessed using regression.  
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Abstract 
Executive function deficits have been linked to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD), but it has been theorised that the symptom inattention is specifically related to 
problems with complex verbal working memory. Using the Conners Adult ADHD rating 
scale, adults aged 18-35 were assessed for ADHD symptoms, and completed tasks 
designed to tap verbal and spatial aspects of WM (Experiment 1). Results showed that high 
inattention predicted poor performance on both simple and complex verbal working 
memory measures. Results relating to spatial working memory were inconclusive. In a 
follow up experiment based on the theory that those with inattention have problems 
receiving verbal instructions, a measure of goal neglect assessing integration of 
information into a task model in working memory was employed (Experiment 2). Results 
showed that high inattention uniquely predicted performance on this task, representing the 
first reported association between inattention and the phenomenon of goal neglect. The 
results from both experiments lend support to the WM theory of inattention. 
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Inattention, Working Memory and Goal Neglect in a Community Sample 
Inattention is one of three core symptoms characterising attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD); a childhood onset, neurodevelopmental disorder. It is characterised by 
an inability to focus, high levels of distractibility, forgetfulness, and poor organisation and 
planning. The two other symptoms associated with ADHD, hyperactivity and impulsivity, 
are characterised by excessive energy levels, impatience, and disruptive, often 
inappropriate behaviour, with a lack of regard for social rules. The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th edition (American Psychiatric Society, 2013) 
lists three presentations of ADHD; the combined type where individuals meet criteria for 
both inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity (ADHD-C), the predominantly inattentive 
type where individuals only meet criteria for inattention (ADHD-I), and the predominantly 
hyperactive-impulsive type (ADHD-HI) where only hyperactive-impulsive criteria are met.  
 Most of the existing work on this disorder focuses on participants with combined 
symptoms, and some of the work makes no reference to subtype at all. It is not possible to 
draw conclusions specifically about inattention in these cases. This is important, as several 
authors have argued that ADHD-I is likely qualitatively different from ADHD-C, and 
should perhaps be considered a disorder in its own right with distinct aetiology, symptoms, 
comorbidities, and cognitive profile (Barkley, 1997, 2001; Diamond, 2005; Milich, 
Balentine, & Lynam, 2001). Furthermore, describing pure inattention as ADHD-I is 
something of a misnomer because of the implied hyperactivity. Therefore in this work 
diagnosis of the predominantly inattentive type (PIT) will be referred to as such in order to 
avoid confusion (as in Barkley, 2001). Furthermore, although most commonly associated 
with ADHD, inattention is not specific to it, and is also a symptom of other disorders such 
as Autism Spectrum Disorder (Mayes, Calhoun, Mayes, & Molitoris, 2012) schizophrenia 
(Egeland et al. 2003), and some eating disorders (Seitz et al. 2013), warranting further 
investigation of this symptom/disorder as an independent entity.  
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Inattention in Adulthood 
For many years ADHD was thought to be a disorder exclusive to childhood, and has only 
recently been recognised as existing in adults. The latest version of the DSM, released in 
2014, was the first to provide specific diagnostic criteria for adults. Longitudinal follow-up 
studies suggest that ADHD persists into adulthood in around 60% of cases (Elliott, 2002), 
and that up to 6% of adults may have ADHD (Wender, Wolf, & Wasserstein, 2001). These 
figures could be even higher when we consider that the diagnostic criteria developed for 
children has been deemed by many as unsuitable for application to adult populations, and 
may have resulted in under-diagnosis (Murphy & Barkley, 1996). It is difficult to 
generalise findings from child research to adults, as the disorder’s manifestation appears to 
differ. Research suggests that symptoms of hyperactivity and impulsivity diminish with 
age, while inattention persists (Biederman, Mick & Faraone, 2000). It is therefore not 
surprising that the majority of adults diagnosed with ADHD present with PIT (Millstein, 
Wilens, Biederman, & Spencer, 1997); the most common complaints being cognitive (e.g. 
difficulty concentrating, forgetfulness), and self-regulatory (e.g. problems with 
organisation and planning, poor discipline), none implying hyperactivity (Wolf & 
Wasserstein, 2001). 
 
Inattention in the General population 
Recent research and subsequent debate has led many experts to a shift in approach, from a 
categorical, to a dimensional view of ADHD symptoms (Barkley & Murphy, 2006). It is 
suggested that they are better regarded as being at the extreme end of normal expression 
within the general population. This is supported by the prevalence of symptoms in 
community samples (Alloway, Elliott, & Holmes, 2010; Faraone & Biederman, 2005). 
With this in mind, the aim of this research is to explore inattention as a symptom in its own 
right, as it appears within the general population, rather than one as part of a disorder. As 
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the majority of work on inattention falls within the ADHD literature, this is necessarily the 
main frame of reference. However, inattention is the primary focus of this work. 
 
Inattention and Working Memory 
Much of the research on ADHD has focused on neuropsychological deficits.  This 
literature has established a reliable link between ADHD and executive functions (EFs) in 
children (Doyle, 2005; Willcutt, Doyle, Nigg, Faraone & Pennington, 2005), and in adults 
both clinically, and in community samples, and EF’s (Alderson, Kasper, Hudec, & Patros, 
2013; Boonstra, Oosterlaan, Sergeant, & Buitelaar, 2005; Hervey, Epstein, & Curry, 2004; 
Woods, Lovejoy, & Ball, 2002 cf. Johnson et al. 2001; Schoechlin & Engle, 2005). 
However, this research is largely relevant only to those with hyperactivity-impulsivity 
(HI). Indeed, Barkley’s (1997) influential EF model of ADHD is intended to describe only 
those with ADHD-C, not PIT. There is however, reason to believe that there may be 
differences in neuropsychological profile between subtypes (Chhabildas, Pennington, & 
Willcutt, 2001; Nigg, Blaskey, Huang-Pollock, & Rappley, 2002; Schmitz et al. 2002). 
Diamond (2005) posits that the defining EF impairment in PIT is in working memory 
(WM), and that deficits in this particular EF are associated with inattention alone; not 
hyperactivity or impulsivity. She suggests that complex-span tasks i.e. those that require 
working with information under high interference conditions, will be most sensitive to the 
WM problems experienced with inattention.  
Working memory (WM) has been defined in several ways. All agree that it has a 
limited capacity, and requires holding information in mind in an active, easily retrievable 
form, and that it is distinct from short-term memory. Baddely and Hitch (1974) defined 
WM as holding information in mind combined with some kind of ongoing mental activity. 
This can mean manipulating the information being held, or performing an entirely separate 
but simultaneous operation. Another model of WM defines it as the ability to hold 
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information in mind whilst blocking or inhibiting counter-productive information (Conway 
& Engle, 1994; Kane & Engle, 2000, 2002). The WM model of Baddeley and Hitch has 
three components; the central executive, the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological 
loop. The central executive is responsible for coordinating attention, and has the use of two 
“slave systems” for the storage of verbal (phonological loop) and visual/spatial 
(visuospatial sketchpad) information. Moreover, Baddeley (2000) proposed a further slave 
system called the Episodic Buffer whose role was to integrate phonological, visual and 
spatial information and has recently been associated with the phenomenon of goal neglect 
(Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996). In many ways the central executive 
of WM, and attention, are overlapping constructs; indeed it is sometimes referred to as 
executive attention. Deficits in WM associated with inattention are therefore thought to be 
related to this component of the model.  
The literature on WM and inattention in children in both clinical and community 
samples tends to support Diamond’s view (Klingberg et al. 2005; Lui & Tannock, 2007; 
Martinussen & Tannock, 2006). A study that looked at differences in WM performance 
between the subtypes ADHD-C and PIT in adults, found only weak evidence that PIT may 
be related to greater impairment (Schweitzer, Hanford, & Medoff, 2006). However without 
an ADHD-HI group to compare to, it is difficult to ascertain the role of inattention in any 
impairment, as both groups performed significantly poorer than normal controls. A study 
comparing ADHD-HI and PIT groups of adults found only the participants with PIT had a 
deficit in WM compared to controls, however group sizes were notably small (Gansler et 
al. 1998).  In a non-clinical sample of adults, Kim (2004) found inattention was predicted 
by verbal WM performance. Other research on non-clinical inattention in adults has found 
inattention to be the only symptom of ADHD to predict performance on a reasoning task 
strongly correlated with WM (the Cognitive Reflection Test; Elisa & Parris, 2015, see 
Chapter 3; Stupple, Gale, & Richmond, 2013). 
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 There is also the question of whether the impairment is with a specific type of WM. 
Diamond writes that verbal presentation of material places a particularly high demand on 
WM, and that children with PIT often have superior spatial skills. This would suggest that 
the key problem may be with verbal WM. However, research testing combined-type or 
ADHD samples of children and adults without mention of subtypes has produced mixed 
findings. Several studies have found an impairment in spatial WM (Dowson, et al. 2004; 
Westerberg, Hirvikoski, Forssberg, & Klingberg, 2004). Others have found specific 
impairments in verbal WM (Marchetta, Hurks, Krabbendam, & Jolles, 2008; Seidman, 
Biederman, Weber, Hatch, & Faraone, 1998). Two meta-analyses found impairments 
across both types of working memory (Kasper, Alderson, & Hudec, 2012; Martinussen, 
Hayden, Hogg-Johnson and Tannock, 2005; see also McInnes, Humphries, Hogg-Johnson, 
& Tannock, 2003).  In a non-clinical sample of children, Lui and Tannock (2007) found 
composite WM including verbal and spatial measures predicted parent-rated inattention 
(but not hyperactivity-impulsivity).  The mixed findings and lack of consideration for 
ADHD subtypes in some of these studies makes them difficult to interpret for present 
purposes.   
 
 The present research was designed to test Diamond’s hypothesis that inattention, 
but not hyperactivity or impulsivity, would be associated with impairments in performance 
on a complex, but not a simple, verbal WM task. Given the putative dimensional nature of 
inattention and other ADHD symptoms, we tested a community sample of adults. We are 
not aware of any prior research that has looked at complex vs. simple WM tasks in relation 
to either clinical or non-clinical ADHD symptoms. Furthermore, we employed a variety of 
tests of WM capacity. Experiment 1 employed traditionally used measures of WM 
capacity, specifically the Backward Digit Span task and the Operation Span (OSPAN) task 
(Turner & Engle, 1989) to represent both simple and complex-span varieties, respectively. 
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We predicted that inattention but not hyperactivity or impulsivity would explain unique 
variance on the OSPAN task, but that a relationship may not be evident between 
inattention and performance on the backward digit span task. Although the literature does 
not lead to a strong prediction, in line with Diamond’s point on the importance of verbally 
presented material, we expected that inattention may not explain variance in a spatial WM 
task. The Corsi blocks task (Corsi, 1973) was used to assess spatial WM span. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-five males (N = 30) and females (N = 65) aged 18-35 years (M = 21.46, SD = 4.19) 
were recruited for this research, largely through opportunity sampling. The majority of 
participants were psychology students from Bournemouth University, who collected 
course credits for their time. None of the participants had an existing ADHD diagnosis. All 
participants gave written informed consent to participate in the research, which was 
approved by Bournemouth University Ethics Committee. 
 
Materials 
ADHD symptoms. Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scale–Self-Report: Short Version 
(CAARS-S:S; Conners et al., 1999). This is a 26 item self-report measure designed to 
assess current ADHD symptoms in adults. Items are rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale, 
where 0 = not at all and 3 = very much. The measure contains 4 factor-derived subscales; 
A: inattention/memory problems, B: hyperactivity/restlessness, C: impulsivity/emotional 
lability, D: problems with self-concept, as well as E: an ADHD index comprised of items 
from the other subscales. For each subscale, a T-Score is derived. Guidelines suggest that a 
T-score of 45-55 is average for adults (using data from a normative sample). Scores range 
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from 29-90. A T-score of above 65 is considered to be indicative of clinically elevated 
symptoms. 
Working memory span tasks.  Backward Digit Span (BDS). This is a test of verbal 
working memory, and requires participants to maintain information online while mentally 
manipulating that same information. Participants were presented with series of digits 
spoken verbally by the experimenter. After presentation of each series, participants were 
instructed to verbally repeat the numbers back to the experimenter in the opposite order to 
presentation. Series consisted of 2 to 8 digits with two trials for each length. Testing 
stopped after both items of a trial were failed or all trials were completed. One point was 
awarded for each correct trial, giving a maximum possible score of 14.  
Operation Span (OSPAN; Turner & Engle, 1989). This task also tests verbal working 
memory, and requires participants to hold information online while intermittently 
processing unrelated information. Participants were shown a series of operation-word 
strings (ranging from two to six in length) presented on a computer. . These consisted of 
simultaneously presented mathematical equations, and unrelated words to be recalled, for 
example: 
(9/3) + 2 = 5 ? Beach 
Participants were instructed to read the equation and indicate by key press whether the 
answer presented was correct or not. Operation-word strings were presented for 5000ms 
each regardless of key press. After answering, they were told to then read the word aloud. 
This continued until the end of the set at which point participants were asked to recall and 
type in all the words from that set. Three sets of each length were presented, and appeared 
in an unpredictable order so that the number of words to recall was unknown until recall.  
A partial-credit unit scoring (where each item is scored as a proportion of correctly 
recalled elements per item, regardless of item size) method was used for this test as 
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recommended by Conway, Kane, Bunting, Hambrick, Wilhelm and Engle, (2005), and 
Redick and Lindsey (2013). This gave scores that ranged from 0-100.  
Backwards Corsi Blocks (Corsi, 1973).  This version of the traditional measure of 
visuospatial working memory was taken from the Psychology Experiment Building 
Language (PEBL) battery of tests. Participants viewed a series of blocks lighting up on 
screen and were required to reproduce the order they were lit in by mouse click on the 
correct blocks. Each trial began with a “READY” screen presented for 500ms. This was 
followed by the block presentation; each block in the trial lit up for 500ms. The next screen 
showed all the blocks and required participants to click the order from the previous screen 
and then click done. A screen showing “correct” or “incorrect” was then presented for 
500ms. Series were 2 to 8 blocks in length with two trials for each length. Testing stopped 
after both items of a trial were failed or all trials were completed. One point was awarded 
for each correct trial, giving a maximum possible score of 14.  
Intelligence quotient (IQ).  A shortened version of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI-II) was administered. This consisted of vocabulary and matrix 
reasoning subsets so that a score for both crystallized (Gc) and fluid intelligence (Gf) was 
obtained. From this measure a t-score for each relevant subscale (Gf & Gc) is calculated, 
and an approximate overall IQ score is obtained from an age-matched set of scores.   
 
Procedure 
Each participant was individually administered each test item alone, in a quiet testing 
room. Test administration order was counterbalanced.   
 
Data Analysis 
Relationships between variables were firstly analysed using correlation. To assess the 
unique predictive value of inattention on the two verbal WM tasks as per Diamond’s 
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hypothesis, hierarchical regressions were carried out. For both, working memory scores 
served as the criterion, and ADHD symptoms (along with IQ for control purposes) were 
added as the predictors. This was to enable us to look at the variance accounted for by 
inattention when hyperactivity and impulsivity were already in the model rather than to 
imply any direction in the relationship.  
Bayes Factors (B) were used to assess the strength of evidence in support of hypotheses 
where the p value indicated no significant result. These were calculated using the 
procedures outlined in Dienes (2014). Proposed cut-offs for acceptance of a hypothesis 
(Jeffreys, 1998), states a B above 3 as providing substantial support for the alternative 
hypothesis, whilst below 1/3 provides substantial support for the null hypothesis. A B that 
falls between 1/3 and 3 deems the data insensitive as to whether the alternative or null 
hypothesis should be accepted. We modelled the predictions of the theory of an absence of 
evidence for a relationship with a half-normal whose mean and standard deviation values 
were for the variable inattention in the backward digit span analysis. BH(0, X) refers to the 
Bayes Factors testing each hypothesis, where ‘H’ indicates a half-normal distribution, and 
‘X’ the predicted standard deviation of this half-normal, against a null hypothesis of no 
difference. 
 
Results 
On the CAARS questionnaire 24.21% of participants had elevated symptoms (i.e. a t-score 
of 60 or above) on the composite subscale for ADHD. For individual symptoms; 32.63% 
of participants had elevated scores for inattention, 15.79% had elevated scores for 
hyperactivity, and 12.63% had elevated scores for impulsivity. Means, standard deviations, 
and ranges for each subscale are presented in Table 1.Means, standard deviations, and 
ranges for each WM test are presented in Table 2.  
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 Correlations (see Table 3) showed fluid intelligence (Gf) score was related to 
performance on backward digit span score (p = .007), and Corsi blocks score (p < .001), 
but not OSPAN score (p = .193). Neither aspect of IQ was related to any of the ADHD 
subscales (ps > .05). The accuracy scores on the OSPAN task were positively correlated 
with the average scores for memory on the same task (r = .316, p = .002), which is typical 
for this task. Scores on the two verbal working memory tasks were positively correlated 
with each other (p < .001), but neither was correlated with performance on the Corsi blocks 
task (ps > .05). 
 
Table 1 
Mean scores, standard deviation, and range for each 
CAARS:S:S subscale 
 
Mean SD Range 
Inattention 54.07 10.68 35-77 
Hyperactivity 49.67 10.61 29-78 
Impulsivity 47.85 8.65 34-74 
ADHD Index 51.44 10.53 31-80 
 
Table 2 
Mean scores, standard deviation, and range for each WM test 
 
Mean SD Range 
Backward Digit Span 8.83 2.23 5-14 
Operation Span 83.59 10.64 52.13-98.97 
Corsi Blocks 9.02 1.9 4-14 
 
A significant negative relationship was found between scores for inattention and 
performance on the two tasks assessing verbal WM; backward digit span (p = .001), and 
OSPAN (p = .017), but not for the spatial span task. Contrary to predictions, significant 
negative relationships were also found between scores for impulsivity, and performance on 
the backward digit span (p = .024), and Corsi blocks (p = .024) tasks. No relationships 
were found between hyperactivity and any of the WM tasks (ps > .05). 
As expected, IQ was a significant contributor to variance in backward digit span score 
(p = .028, see table 4). Bayes values suggested that hyperactivity made no contribution to 
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the model (p = .225, BH(0, .25)  = 0.28), while data for impulsivity were insensitive (p = .104, 
BH(0, .25)  = 1.03). Only inattention explained a significant amount of variance in backward 
digit span scores when all other variables were accounted for (p < .001).  
Analysis for the OSPAN task was conducted in the same way (see table 5). In contrast 
to the findings for backward digit span, analysis suggested that data for IQ were insensitive 
[F(1,93) = .069, p = .793, R2 = .001, BH(0, .25)  = 0.47], as was the case for the ADHD 
symptoms hyperactivity and impulsivity (p = .401, BH(0, .25)  = 0.86; p = .427, BH(0, .25)  = 
1.28 respectively). The inclusion of inattention did improve the model, although p is just 
shy of significance. However, the B suggests that there is evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis (p = .064, BH(0, .25)  = 4.66), and so it is interpreted as significant. 
Although correlations suggested inattention might not be a good predictor of Corsi blocks 
performance (and that perhaps impulsivity might be), regression was carried out in the 
same manner for this working memory task (see table 6). This enabled us to make direct 
comparisons regarding the variables across all three WM tasks. IQ was a good predictor (p 
< .001), as was impulsivity (p = .045).  Analysis suggested that hyperactivity made no 
contribution to variance on this task (p = .337, BH(0, .25) = 0.17). The data for inattention 
were insensitive ( p = .337, BH(0, .25) = 0.39). 
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Table 3 
Correlations between IQ, CAARS subsets, and working memory scores 
 
  Pearson Correlations 
 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. IQ Gc 51.79 7.69 - 
       2. IQ Gf 47.77 8.83 0.131 - 
      3. Inattention 53.85 11.26 0.142 0.139 - 
     4. Hyperactivity 49.38 11.31 0.031 0.092 .653** - 
    5. Impulsivity 47.55 9.38 0.057 -0.07 .646** .737** - 
   6. Digit Span 8.83 2.23 0.081 .251* -.329** -0.101 -.204* - 
  7. Ospan 83.59 10.64 0.05 -0.09 -.217** -0.09 -0.12 .379** - 
 8. Corsi Blocks 9.02 1.9 -0.006 .491** -0.087 -0.059 -.204* 0.121 0.044 - 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 4 
 Summary of regression for IQ, hyperactivity, impulsivity, and inattention on Backward Digit Span scores. 
 
 
Variable b SEb β t R2 R2 change Semi-partial correlation 
Step 1 
     
0.051 .051*  
 
IQ 0.044 0.02 0.225 2.226* 
   Step 2 
     
0.066 0.015 
 
 
IQ 0.047 0.02 0.237 2.337* 
  
0.235 
 
Hyperactivity -0.024 0.02 -0.124 -1.222 
  
-0.123 
Step 3 
     
0.093 0.027 
 
 
IQ 0.043 0.02 0.216 2.139* 
  
0.214 
 
Hyperactivity 0.012 0.03 0.058 0.391 
  
0.039 
 
Impulsivity -0.058 0.035 -0.244 -1.641 
  
-0.164 
Step 4 
     
0.218 .125** 
 
 
IQ 0.058 0.019 0.293 3.036* 
  
0.283 
 
Hyperactivity 0.047 0.029 0.237 1.606 
  
0.15 
 
Impulsivity -0.012 0.035 -0.049 -0.328 
  
-0.031 
 
Inattention -0.1 0.026 -0.505 -3.793* 
  
-0.354 
*p < .05, **p < .001 
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Table 5 
 
Summary of regression for IQ, hyperactivity, impulsivity, and inattention on OSPAN 
 
 
Variable b SEb β t R2 R2 change 
Semi-
partial 
correlation 
Step 1 
 	 	 	 	
.001 .001  
 
IQ -.026 .098 -.027 -.263 
	 	 	
Step 2 
 	 	 	 	
.008 .008 
	
 
IQ -.018 .098 -.019 -.844 
	 	
-.019 
 
Hyperactivity -.083 .098 -.088 -1.222 
	 	
-.088 
Step 3 
 	 	 	 	
.015 .007 
	
 
IQ -.028 .099 -.029 -.279 
	 	
-.029 
 
Hyperactivity .004 .147 .004 .028 
	 	
.003 
 
Impulsivity -.141 .176 -.124 -.799 
	 	
-.083 
Step 4 
 	 	 	 	
.052 .037 
	
 
IQ .012 .100 .012 .117 
	 	
.012 
 
Hyperactivity .095 .153 .101 .624 
	 	
.064 
 
Impulsivity -.020 .185 -.017 -.106 
	 	
-.011 
 
Inattention -.259 .138 -.275 -1.875* 
	 	
-.192 
*B = substantial support for hypothesis 
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Table 6 
 Summary of regression for IQ, hyperactivity, impulsivity, and inattention on Corsi Blocks 
 
 
Variable b SEb β t R2 R2 change Semi-partial correlation 
Step 1 
     
0.129 .129**  
 
IQ 0.06 0.016 0.359 3.708** 
   Step 2 
     
0.138 0.009 
 
 
IQ 0.062 0.016 0.368 3.781** 
  
0.366 
 
Hyperactivity -0.016 0.016 -0.094 -0.966 
  
-0.094 
Step 3 
     
0.175 .038* 
 
 
IQ 0.058 0.016 0.344 3.566** 
  
0.34 
 
Hyperactivity 0.02 0.024 0.121 0.851 
  
0.081 
 
Impulsivity -0.058 0.029 -0.289 -2.035* 
  
-0.194 
Step 4 
     
0.179 0.004 
 
 
IQ 0.06 0.107 0.357 3.605** 
  
0.344 
 
Hyperactivity 0.025 0.025 0.151 1.001 
  
0.096 
 
Impulsivity -0.052 0.031 -0.256 -1.685 
  
-0.161 
 
Inattention -0.014 0.023 -0.085 -0.62 
  
-0.059 
*p < .05, **p < .001 
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Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to test the hypothesis that symptoms of inattention, but not 
hyperactivity-impulsivity, are associated with lower performance on verbal working 
memory measures, particularly a complex-span task, and that this relationship is evident in 
a community (non-clinical) sample. Findings provide partial support for this hypothesis; 
inattention predicted unique variance in performance on two measures of verbal WM; the 
backward digit span task, and the OSPAN task. However, only the latter is a complex span 
task indicating that the secondary processing element is not likely to be a factor 
determining this relationship. Findings regarding hyperactivity and verbal WM were 
mixed. For the BDS task, there is evidence to suggest hyperactivity makes no contribution 
to performance, however we cannot be confident of the same for the OSPAN task as the 
Bayes value suggests the data were insensitive. We are also unable to draw conclusions 
regarding impulsivity and verbal WM as Bayes values fell within the insensitive range for 
both tasks. Conversely, impulsivity significantly predicted performance on the Corsi 
blocks task, but we are unable to draw conclusions regarding inattention for this task as the 
Bayes value fell within the insensitive range. However, analysis suggests we can have 
confidence that hyperactivity does not contribute to performance on Corsi blocks. Since 
relationships were identified between the WM tasks and at least one ADHD symptom we 
can be sure there is sufficient power to detect such relationships. Overall, our data permit 
us to conclude that: 1) inattention is related to verbal working memory; 2) impulsivity is 
related to spatial working memory; 3) hyperactivity is not as likely to be related to the WM 
tasks employed in the present study. 
  The findings converge with previous work that has demonstrated a relationship 
between inattention, and performance on the backward digit span task in child (Lui & 
Tannock, 2007), and adult (Kim, 2004) general population samples. However, our findings 
do not support the idea that complex-span tasks are any better at elucidating the cognitive 
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problems experienced in PIT than simple-span tasks, as performance on both the OSPAN 
and BDS tasks was predicted by inattention. This finding contributes to the debate as to 
whether the secondary element must present new stimuli to be processed (as in OSPAN), 
or whether mental transformation of the target memory items (as in BDS) is enough to 
constitute a WM task.  
There is no doubt that the backward digit span task is more difficult than the 
forward version which requires only serial repetition of the numbers presented, but equally 
it is reasonable to consider the OSPAN task to be more difficult than the BDS task, not 
only because of its dual-processing element, but because of the mathematical demands the 
secondary part of the task poses. Research by Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, and Conway 
(1999) suggests that an interference component is a necessary element to a WM task. 
Using factor analysis they found the backward span task grouped with short-term memory, 
rather than complex-span WM tasks, suggesting that mental transformation of target 
information is not enough. However, Oberauer, Süß, Schulze, Wilhelm and Wittmann 
(2000) found no distinction between tasks involving simple transformation, and those 
falling into the complex span category. Further exploration suggested the ability to resist 
interference, or coordinate dual streams of information in complex-span tasks, does not 
necessarily reflect working memory capacity (Oberauer, Lange, & Engle, 2004). Our data 
suggest that in terms of inattention, a simple-span task is sufficiently demanding. This is 
even more important when considering that the present sample were not from a population 
with clinical diagnoses.   
Diamond (2005) suggests that verbal presentation of material to children with PIT 
should be avoided, as it places particularly high demand on WM. She also suggests that 
PIT is often associated with superior spatial skills in a trade-off with linguistic skills, 
although we are not aware of any empirical evidence for this. Some take the view that 
there is no distinction between the processes used in verbal and spatial WM (Conway et al. 
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2005; Jones, Farrand, Stuart, & Morriss, 1995; Kane et al. 2004). As previously 
mentioned, findings relating to ADHD and spatial working memory are mixed. Studies 
making use of the Corsi Blocks task as a spatial working memory measure with child 
participants have found no relationship between performance and inattention (Geurts, 
Verté, oosterlaan, Roeyers, & Sergeant, 2005; Scheres et al. 2004). However, it is worth 
noting that while these studies may have had non-significant p-values, without tests for the 
strength of evidence for the null (e.g. Bayes), a conclusion that there is no relationship is 
premature. Other research has observed a relationship between combined type or 
unspecified ADHD and spatial working memory using the Corsi Blocks and similar tasks 
(McInnes, Humprhies, Hogg-Johnson, and Tannock, 2003; Sowerby, Seal & Tripp, 2011; 
Westerberg, Hirvikoski, Forssberg, & Klingberg, 2004). Unfortunately, findings from the 
present study are not able to contribute to this debate with regard to inattention, as we 
cannot confidently comment on its role. However, our results do suggest that impulsivity is 
moderately correlated with Corsi blocks performance, and that it is a significant predictor 
of performance. Impulsivity is therefore a likely contributor, and potentially sole generator, 
of the relationship between ADHD and spatial working memory reported in the literature.  
Conclusions drawn from the present data should be considered in light of some 
potential methodological issues. Firstly, it should be noted that the Corsi blocks task is not 
always regarded as a measure of working memory. Since the task has no concurrent 
processing demands, it is regularly used as a measure of simple storage. This might be 
responsible for the inconclusive results found in the present work. The task was used to 
assess spatial working memory in this study on the grounds that when the sequence to be 
recalled becomes longer than 3 or 4 items, so that memory load increases, central 
executive resources are called upon (Vandierendonck, Kemps, Fastame, & Szmalec, 2004). 
Also, along with similar tasks, it has been widely used as a spatial working memory 
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measure in research on ADHD symptoms (see above). However, we concede that there 
may be better measures of SWM, and that these might be more sensitive to variation.  
Secondly, we note that participants in the current study found the mathematical 
component of the OSPAN task very difficult; more so than is usually observed in this task. 
Turner and Engle (1989) propose that the difficulty of the secondary task needs to be 
demanding enough to engage WM processes and reveal individual differences in task 
performance, but not be so difficult as to produce floor effects. Conway et al. (2005) 
recommend discarding data from participants who score less than 85% accuracy on the 
processing component of a task; accuracy is expected to be near ceiling. However, in the 
current study over 80% of participants failed to meet this criterion. The 5-second time limit 
to solve and answer the problem and read the word aloud should not have been an issue, as 
this was based on the average time to complete these operations found by Unsworth, Heitz, 
Schrock, and Engle (2005) in a sample of 296 students. The complexity of the equations 
themselves was no more difficult than standard versions of the task. Additionally, 
distribution of IQ scores in our sample was normal. Therefore, we can only speculate as to 
why this was, and say that further work on complex-span tasks and inattention is needed. 
   
Experiment 2 
The present study has so far provided support for the hypothesis that deficits in verbal WM 
are associated with inattention. The work also supports the idea that deficits associated 
with ADHD continue into adulthood, and that there are implications for un-diagnosed 
symptoms (regardless of DSM threshold) in the general population. Experiment 2 makes 
use of a novel task that in contrast to traditional measures of WM, focuses on the capacity 
to integrate aspects of instructions and avoid goal neglect. If as Diamond (2005) has 
suggested, inattention leads to difficulty with verbally presented material, it may not just 
be the verbal nature of the material that is relevant but the fact that instructions comprise 
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various components that need to be integrated. The letter-monitoring task described below 
requires the utilization of stored information and relies on representation integrity to guide 
behaviour. However, it is thought to tap a different form of attention than that assessed in 
traditional WM tasks (Duncan et al., 2008). 
 Duncan, Emslie, William, Johnson, and Freer (1996) describe a type of 
performance failure they call goal neglect. In goal neglect, participants are able to state a 
given rule, and yet behaviourally make no attempt to adhere to it. They developed a task 
sensitive to this failure, originally for use with frontal lobe damaged patients, but found the 
effect was also demonstrated in a normal population sample. On each trial of the task, a 
series of number-letter pairs are shown in quick succession in the centre of a computer 
screen. Participants are instructed to watch the characters on either the left or right side, 
and to read aloud the letters, but not the numbers they see on that side. An initial cue at the 
beginning of each trial directs participants to which side to read from; either “WATCH 
LEFT” or “WATCH RIGHT”, is written in the centre of the screen. Then, immediately 
preceding the last three character pairs, a second cue directs them to which side to watch. 
The second cue is either a + or – symbol flashed in the centre of the screen. Irrespective of 
what side the participant started watching, + indicates watch right, and – indicates watch 
left. This determines whether the participant continues reading letters on the side they 
started on, or switches to reading letters on the opposite side. The +/- cue is often 
neglected, despite the fact it is not forgotten; participants are asked during and at the end of 
the task to relay the +/- rule in order to confirm understanding of it. Duncan et al. 
concluded that while participants were perfectly capable of obeying the rule, they were 
simply not doing so. They suggest that information competition is a key factor in neglect, 
i.e. because the switch rule comes chronologically later than other task relevant 
information, the quality of its representation in WM is poorer. The rule would be more 
likely followed if other task demands were not present, and so whilst the rule is 
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represented it is not fully integrated into what Duncan et al. refer to as the Task Model. 
This is quite different to the secondary interference posed in complex-span tasks of 
working memory, which is designed to increase demand on resources. Duncan et al. (2008) 
conducted a series of experiments to determine what kind of attention or working memory 
limit underlies goal neglect, and found that level of neglect is determined not by processing 
demands during task execution, but by total complexity of the facts, rules, and 
requirements in the task model. They suggest a WM limit in constructing and maintaining 
the task model and that this underlies goal neglect. This WM limitation is different to those 
tested in traditional span tasks in several ways. Firstly, Duncan et al. (2008) argue that the 
quantity of information needed to be held in active storage for their task creates much 
greater demands on capacity than do the few items on typical span task lists. Secondly, in 
traditional span tasks, strings of information (digits, words etc.) are continually discarded 
and updated as the task goes on meaning it is not necessary to hold them in active storage 
for very long. The task model however, must be kept stable throughout the course of the 
task, and be ready to respond to appropriate triggers. Duncan et al. (2008) suggest that this 
is reflective of Baddeley’s (2000) episodic buffer. Baddeley describes this as a limited-
capacity temporary-storage system that is capable of integrating information from a variety 
of sources. Like the slave systems, it is controlled by the central executive, which is able to 
retrieve information from it for the purposes of reflection, manipulation and modification. 
The attention of the central executive is directed consciously, meaning that it influences 
the content of the buffer by determining what sources of information are in focus. Duncan 
et al. are not the only ones to make a connection between use of instructions and WM. 
Other work has shown a clear link between instruction guided behaviour and working 
memory, albeit in children (Jarowslawska, Gathercole, Logie, & Holmes, 2015; Yang, 
Allen, & Gathercole, 2015). 
 If goal neglect errors arise from attention control failures, this suggests the task 
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described by Duncan et al. will be a good measure of executive control. We would 
therefore expect performance on tasks assessing goal neglect to be related to inattention, 
but not hyperactivity or impulsivity. The existing literature on this is limited. There is 
evidence for an association between ADHD and goal neglect (Karatekin, 2006; van 
Lamblagen, van Kruistum, & Parigger, 2008; Kofman, Gidley Larson, & Mostofsky, 2008; 
Shue & Douglas, 1992; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996;), and findings from a study using 
tasks designed to tap the episodic buffer suggested that ADHD was associated with an 
impaired ability to utilise the information processed by the buffer (Alderson et al., 2014). 
In terms of inattention specifically, Whyte, Schuster, Polansky, Adams, and Coslett (2000) 
found patients with traumatic brain injury associated with impairments of attention, 
demonstrated increased off-task behaviour, which they suggested could reflect a reduction 
in task-goal maintenance.  
A second literature links goal neglect to mind wandering (Kane & McVay, 2012; 
McVay & Kane, 2009); the tendency to be distracted by thoughts unrelated to the task at 
hand. Mind wandering is also associated with ADHD (McVay et al. 2008; Shaw & 
Giambra, 1993), including non-clinical symptomology (Seli, Smallwood, Cheyne, & 
Smilek, 2015), and is reminiscent of the distraction and lack of sustained attention to tasks 
described in DSM criteria for inattention.  
In order to extend previous findings, the present experiment aims to test whether this novel 
assessment of construction of working memory representations, is predicted by inattention 
in a non-clinical sample of adults. Again, whilst not directly predicted by Diamond (2005), 
the notion strongly chimes with her contention that verbally presented material is 
particularly problematic for those with inattention, although it is not the verbal nature of 
the instructions that is key under present predictions, but the requirement to fully integrate 
and to sufficiently maintain different components of a task model. We predicted that goal 
neglect errors will increase with higher levels of inattention, but not be related to 
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impulsivity or hyperactivity.  
 
Method 
Participants 
The 95 participants from the previous study were invited back to complete an additional 
WM measure; 66 accepted (Men: N = 24, Women: N = 42, Mean age = 22.09, SD = 4.73).  
 
Materials 
 Letter monitoring task (Duncan et al. 1996). The task was administered as per 
Duncan et al. Each block began with the word “READY” presented in the centre of the 
screen. After the participant confirmed they were ready to proceed, the experimenter 
pressed a key and the word disappeared and was followed by a blank interval of 500ms 
before the instruction “WATCH LEFT/RIGHT” was presented in its place for 1 s. After a 
further blank interval of 1 s the stimuli sequence began. This was a series of stimulus pairs 
(numbers or letters) presented for 200ms and separated from the next by blank intervals of 
200ms. Ten pairs appeared in turn and after the tenth a + or – symbol was presented in the 
centre of the screen for 200ms. After a further blank interval of 200ms three more pairs 
were presented. Of the first ten pairs a randomly selected 5 were letter pairs, and the rest 
were numbers. Of the last three pairs, the first were always digits, and the second two were 
letters. On half the trials participants were to stay on the side of the initial instruction, and 
on the other half they were required to switch to the opposite side. For each trial digits 
were selected randomly and independently from the set 1-8, and letters were selected 
randomly without replacement from the alphabet but excluding D, I, O, V, and W. For 
each trial a perfectly correct report would consist of five letters from the appropriate side 
from the first ten stimulus pairs, and two from the appropriate side for the last three. A 
prepared sheet was use to record responses for later scoring. Figure 1 shows an example of 
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stimuli for one trial. Each participant received the same instructions which described the 
three basic task requirements: a) to read aloud letters and ignore numbers, b) to begin on 
the side as instructed on screen, c) and to use the +/-symbols to guide responses for the 
final part of each trial. To ensure that the +/- rule would be remembered, pieces of paper 
were placed on the appropriate sides of the testing desk with either “PLUS” or “MINUS” 
written on them.  
 
 
Figure 1. An example of stimuli for one trial as per Duncan et al. 1996. Time runs from top to bottom. 
“WATCH RIGHT” is presented for 1 second, each proceeding stimulus is presented for 200ms separated by 
a blank interval of 200ms. 
 
 Participants were given at least one practice trial. Practice was repeated until at 
least one letter was reported (not necessarily from the correct side), and the +/- rule was 
described correctly.  
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 The experiment consisted of three blocks of 12 trials. Each block contained four 
sub-blocks arranged so that one of each trial type (WATCH RIGHT followed by +, 
WATCH RIGHT followed by -, WATCH LEFT followed by -, and WATCH LEFT 
followed by +) appeared once per sub-block in random order (equating to two “switch” 
trials, and two “stay” trials per sub-block). Participants were asked to repeat the rule again 
between each block. Verbal prompts from the experimenter were controlled in the same 
manor as in Duncan et al.  
 Scores were awarded for the number of passed sub-blocks, meaning out of the four 
trials within each sub-block, participants had to correctly respond to one “switch” trial, and 
one “stay” trial to score a point. A correct trial response amounted to correctly reading at 
least three pre-+/- cue letters, and at least one post-+/- cue letter.  
 
Results 
The mean score on the letter-monitoring task was 7.02 (SD = 2.50, Range = 1-9). 
Correlations (see table 7) showed that, neither aspect of IQ was related to performance on 
the letter monitoring task (ps > .05). Performances on the three traditional tests of working 
memory (backward digit span, OSPAN, and Corsi blocks) were all significantly positively 
correlated with performance on the letter monitoring task (ps < .01). As expected, the 
ADHD symptom inattention was significantly negatively correlated with letter monitoring 
performance (p = .032), while there was no significant relationship between hyperactivity 
or impulsivity and the task (ps > .05).  
Regression was used in the same manner as in Experiment 1, to assess the 
predictive value of inattention on letter monitoring task performance when the other 
symptoms of ADHD were accounted for (see table 8). As before, IQ was included as a 
covariate along with hyperactivity and impulsivity. Bayes Factors were used as per 
Experiment 1. Results suggest that data for IQ were insensitive (p = .126, BH(0, .25) = 0)
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Table 7 
Correlations between IQ, CAARS subsets, and working memory scores 
      Pearson Correlations 
 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. IQ gC 51.86 0.05 - 
        2. IQ gF 48.67 9.47 0.139 - 
       3. Inattention 54.58 10.81 0.006 0.126 - 
      4. Hyperactivity 50.27 10.73 -0.109 0.08 .567** - 
     5. Impulsivity 47.97 8.9 -0.048 -0.039 .597** .658** - 
    6. Digit Span 8.77 2.13 0.208 .306** -.411** -0.14 -.257* - 
   7. OSPAN 83.45 9.63 0.091 -0.15 -.344** -0.081 -0.182 .305** - 
  8. Corsi Blocks 9.12 1.86 0.084 .593** -0.089 -0.04 -0.184 0.194 0.124 - 
 9. Letter-Monitoring 7.02 2.5 0.152 0.17 -.229* 0.057 -0.017 .296** .352** .313** -	
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 8 
 Summary of regression for IQ, hyperactivity, impulsivity, and inattention on Letter-Monitoring scores. 
  Variable b SEb β t R2 R2 change Semi-partial correlation 
Step 1 
     
0.036 0.036  
 
IQ 0.039 0.025 0.19 1.551 
  
0.19 
Step 2 
     
0.04 0.003 
 
 
IQ 0.039 0.026 0.19 1.542 
  
0.19 
 
Hyperactivity 0.013 0.029 0.057 0.464 
  
0.057 
Step 3 
     
0.043 0.003 
 
 
IQ 0.038 0.026 0.186 1.49 
  
0.185 
 
Hyperactivity 0.025 0.038 0.108 0.654 
  
0.081 
 
Impulsivity -0.022 0.046 -0.077 -0.466 
  
-0.058 
Step 4 
     
0.158 .116* 
 
 
IQ 0.048 0.025 0.232 1.95 
  
0.229 
 
Hyperactivity 0.056 0.038 0.242 1.485 
  
0.174 
 
Impulsivity 0.029 0.047 0.104 0.62 
  
0.073 
 
Inattention -0.103 0.036 -0.447 -2.894* 
  
-0.34 
*p < .01 
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and that neither hyperactivity nor impulsivity contributed to variance in letter-monitoring 
scores (p = .431, BH(0, .25)  = 0.16; p = .968, BH(0, .25)  = 0.27 respectively). Inattention 
explained a significant amount of unique variance even after all other variables had been 
accounted for (p = .005). 
 
Discussion 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to build on the findings of Experiment 1, and show that 
symptoms of inattention but not hyperactivity or impulsivity are related to WM using a 
novel paradigm quite different to that used in traditional tests. Our findings support this; 
performance on the letter-monitoring task was predicted by inattention, but not by other 
symptoms of ADHD. This is the first study to show that inattention is a good predictor of 
goal neglect.  
This has implications for our understanding of the way in which WM is deficient in 
inattention. Our findings suggest that inattention relates to the ability to integrate a task 
model thought to reflect the episodic buffer component of WM. While there appeared to be 
no problems in construction of this knowledge base (all participants were able to repeat 
task rules between blocks), it seems that in inattention, the quality of it was not sufficient 
in order to utilise the information while concurrently undertaking the task itself. This 
supports previous work linking attention problems to the episodic buffer (Alderson et al. 
2014) and difficulties with task-goal maintenance (Whyte, et al. 2000). We suggest that 
this apparent difficulty with task model integration may explain why verbal presentation of 
information is particularly problematic for those with inattention, as highlighted by 
Diamond (2005).  
 
Research has shown that construction and maintenance of the task model is strongly 
related to fluid intelligence (Duncan et al., 1996, 2008, 2012). The present work did not 
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find a significant correlation between either aspect of IQ and performance on the letter-
monitoring task. However, Bayes values for the regression were insensitive meaning that 
our data does not rule out a relationship. Although our distribution for IQ was normal, we 
note that Duncan and colleagues have often sampled from both young and old populations 
to ensure enough variability in IQ in their samples, which could account for our 
inconclusive results. Notably, our results show that inattention predicts goal neglect 
independently of IQ and as such our results have implications for understanding goal 
neglect more generally. 
 
General Discussion 
The present research presents several important insights regarding the WM problems 
associated with inattention. Neither the mode (visual vs. spatial) nor the format (simple vs. 
complex) of presentation appears to be the factor determining the relationship between 
WM and inattention. Of the three ADHD symptoms, we can only be confident that 
inattention is associated with verbal WM deficits, which is broadly supportive of 
Diamond’s hypothesis. However, only the goal neglect task clearly differentiated 
inattention from the other two core ADHD symptoms. Results for hyperactivity provided 
evidence for no contribution to the backward digit span and letter-monitoring verbal WM 
tasks, but were inconclusive for the Ospan verbal WM task. For impulsivity, the results 
provided evidence for no contribution to letter-monitoring, but were inconclusive for 
backward digit span and Ospan. 
Both experiments suggest that use of a complex-span task (involving storage plus a 
secondary processing element) is unnecessary to show the WM deficit associated with 
inattention. Performance on a simple-span task was predicted by inattention in Experiment 
1, and in Experiment 2 it predicted goal neglect errors, which Duncan et al. (2008) showed 
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are not affected by processing demands during task execution. However, as noted above, 
only the goal neglect task clearly differentiated the three core ADHD symptoms 
 Instead, construction of complex representations sufficient enough in quality to enable 
use of all represented information might be the key factor differentiating WM deficits 
associated with inattention from those associated with the other two core ADHD 
symptoms. This could explain why cumulatively, research has not found a distinction 
between verbal and spatial WM in ADHD using traditional tasks. Nevertheless, since the 
goal neglect task utilised in the present study was a verbal task, future research will need to 
be directed to investigating this possibility.  Moreover, whilst task model complexity was 
shown to be related to inattention in Experiment 2, it cannot be the sole factor determining 
working memory deficits in those with inattention since the BDS task does not require the 
construction of a complex task model.  Again though, our data do not allow us to 
differentiate between inattention and impulsivity in predicting performance on the BDS.  
Finally, we provide evidence that symptoms of inattention experienced by adults from a 
community sample are associated with similar cognitive deficits as those seen in the 
childhood literature. It also shows that there is sufficient variation in symptomology within 
the general population to produce these effects. If we accept a dimensional view of ADHD 
and it’s symptoms, our findings have relevance to understanding them in clinical groups. 
Awareness of the WM deficit associated with inattention even in a non-clinical sample 
may be of use in developing interventions for adults experiencing difficulties.  
 
An important theoretical issue that should be noted with relation to our findings is that 
of direction of causation. We use regression to analyse data for both experiments with the 
primary purpose of looking at inattention independently from hyperactivity and 
impulsivity, a by-product of which is an imposition of direction on the data. However, we 
mean to make no judgement on whether inattention produces the problems seen in WM, or 
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whether WM underpins inattention. Either of these directions is reasonable. Holmes et al. 
(2014) suggest that high levels of inattentive and distractible behaviour may arise in part 
from a failure to maintain task goals in WM. Such a view proposes that inattention is the 
behaviour i.e. the final consequence that results from a cognitive deficit pathway. This 
seems to be the most common view in the literature, but then much of the research in the 
field of ADHD is pre-geared towards developing causal models for the disorder. 
Alternatively, it is possible that inattention leads to poor WM, as by its very nature it limits 
the information, or quality of information coming into the system through lack of focus. It 
is also likely that there are multiple pathways to poor working memory. In this work, 
inattention only explained a small portion of impaired WM performance. There might be 
another impaired process influencing performance. For example, Hofmann, Schmeichel, 
and Baddeley (2012) recently proposed that self-regulation (broadly defined as goal-
directed behaviour) is connected to all three core executive functions, and is seen as 
facilitating WM in several ways; primarily through top-down control of attention toward 
goal-relevant stimuli, and away from irrelevant stimuli. It is possible that components of 
self-regulation may be driving the relationship between inattention and working memory, 
and that inattention may be better explained by a self-regulatory rather than specific 
executive function deficit. This has not been considered specifically in relation to 
inattention, but Shiels and Hawk (2010) suggest that ADHD may involve deficits in self-
monitoring and adaptive control components of self-regulation, and the cognitive-energetic 
model of ADHD (Sergeant, 2000) comes closest to representing this theoretically. Both the 
second and third levels of the model (the energetic pools and the management/evaluation 
mechanism) involve self-regulatory functions that would play a role in constructing and 
utilising working memory representations. Shiels and Hawk suggest that such regulatory 
deficit models combine cognitive and motivational theories to offer a plausible alternative 
to core cognitive models that do not seem to fit with the heterogeneous nature of ADHD. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
Our research used self-report measures to assess inattention and the other symptoms of 
ADHD, but we note that it may be useful for future work to utilise objective measures. 
While no such measures address DSM defined inattention per se, there are tasks that tap 
various aspects of attention, for example the Attention Network Test (ANT; Fan, 
McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002), which purports to tap three networks of 
attention. Redick and Engle (2006) found that WM was related to the executive control 
network (involved in resolving action conflict), and conclude that the ability to control 
attention is influenced by individual differences in WM capacity. It would be useful to 
understand whether and how the ANT relates to subjective estimates of inattention. 
It is worth noting that there is evidence to suggest there may be gender differences in 
ADHD; both in presentation and diagnosis. Historically males have been more likely to 
receive a diagnosis than females, although some have blamed this on the propensity of 
females to have internalising symptoms without the more blatant externalising symptoms 
(Gershon & Gershon, 2002), or clinician gender bias (Bruchmuller, Margraf, & Schneider, 
2012). However, data collected from university students suggested that males had a greater 
prevalence of both inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity (Elisa & Parris, under 
review). The gender split in the current research was uneven. However, it was not the aim 
of the work to assess gender differences, but to establish a relationship between inattention 
and working memory. Future work may wish to take this further by looking at whether this 
relationship is mediated by gender and ensuring equal numbers in each group.  
 
In summary, we have presented evidence that working memory is related to ADHD 
symptoms in adults without a clinical diagnosis of ADHD. However, results from both 
experiments suggest that inattention is the key symptom implicated in WM deficits. Whilst 
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inconclusive for spatial WM, inattention predicted performance on both simple and 
complex-span traditional verbal tasks, as well as a novel task assessing WM for task rules.
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Chapter 5: The Relationship Between Self-Regulation of “Cool” Cognitive Effort, 
Executive Functions and Inattention in a Community Sample  
Continuing with the working memory and cognitive effort line of investigation, this 
chapter builds on the findings of chapters 3-4 to look at various components of the model 
and how they interact with each other. A number Stroop was chosen for its ability to tap 
cognitive effort with more stringent control than the CRT, whilst also measuring cognitive 
control variables. 
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Abstract 
Previous work has demonstrated a relationship between inattention and working memory 
(WM). Based on this and work theorising a link between working memory and self-
regulation, we predicted a relationship between inattention and cognitive effort. 120 
ADHD diagnosis free adults (aged 18-35) completed a self-report measure designed to 
assess ADHD symptoms, two measures of cognitive effort, a measure of inhibitory control 
and a measure of WM. Bayes analysis was used to evaluate the evidence in favour of the 
null hypothesis when p was above .05. We report strong evidence for no relationship 
between inattention and one measure of effort. Our results also provide strong evidence for 
no relationship between WM and cognitive effort or inhibitory control. The results are 
discussed in terms of current theory linking self-regulatory processes such as cognitive 
effort to core executive functions and in terms of their implications for understanding the 
role of self-regulatory processes in inattention and ADHD more generally.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 98 
The Relationship Between Self-Regulation of “Cool” Cognitive Effort, Executive 
Functions and Inattention in a Community Sample 
Inattention is one of the three core symptoms of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD). It is characterized by an inability to maintain task focus, distractibility, 
forgetfulness and difficulties with organisation and planning. The remaining two 
symptoms, hyperactivity and impulsivity, are characterized by excessive energy and 
restlessness, disruptive and often inappropriate behaviour, and a lack of regard for social 
rules. DSM-5 states that adults must rate positively for 5 out the 9 items listed on either or 
both of the inattention or hyperactivity-impulsivity lists to meet criteria for one of three 
diagnoses; the combined type (ADHD-C), the predominantly inattentive type (PIT) and the 
predominantly hyperactive-impulsive type (ADHD-HI). However, a shift in opinion has 
led many researchers to believe that this categorical approach is not the best fit for the data 
on ADHD, a notion supported by taxometric (Frazier, Youngstrom, & Naugle, 2007 
Haslam, Williams, Prior, Haslam, Gratetz, & Sawyer, 2006; Marcus & Barry, 2011) and 
genetic (Crosbie, Arnold, Paterson, Swanson, Dupuis, & Li et al., 2013; Hudziak, Heath, 
Madden, Reich, Bucholz, & Slutske et al. 1998; Nikolas & Burt, 2010) research. The 
above description of inattentive symptoms is something many of us without an ADHD 
diagnosis can relate to, and in fact it is now suggested that ADHD and its symptoms are 
best viewed as dimensional as oppose to categorical, meaning clinical examples can be 
regarded as being at the extreme end of normal expression. Using a reduced threshold of 
DSM-5 criteria, we have shown that up to a third of the general population report 
symptoms of inattention (Elisa & Parris, under review, see Chapter 2).  
While historically ADHD is most commonly associated with children, evidence 
suggests symptoms persist into adulthood in around 60% of cases (Elliott, 2002). In adults 
symptoms of hyperactivity-impulsivity appear to diminish, while symptoms of inattention 
persist to become the main characterisation of the disorder (Biederman, Mick, & Faraone, 
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2002; Millstein, Wilen, Biederman, & Spencer, 1997) meaning that it is difficult to 
generalise findings from research with children, to adults.  
The focus of this research is on inattention in adults across the full spectrum of 
symptomology by using general population samples. 
 
Executive Functions, Self-Regulation and ADHD 
A primary deficit in executive functions (EFs) is one of the most prominent theories of 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). It is generally agreed that there are three 
core separable but related EFs; working memory (WM), inhibitory control, and cognitive 
flexibility (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wager, 2000). These three 
core EFs are generally regarded as “cool” cognitive processes, as opposed to “hot” 
cognitive processes that involve emotion, motivation, and affect. Self-regulation refers 
broadly to ensuring behaviour is goal directed and overlaps with that of the “cool” general 
EFs. However, self-regulation refers to a collection of processes including the control 
processes of the EFs, cognitive effort and judgements based on utility, with the latter two 
involving emotion, motivation and affect.  This means that self-regulation depends on both 
“cool” and “hot” aspects of cognition.  However, there are contrasting opinions as to how 
self-regulatory and EF processes interact. Hofmann, Schmeichel and Baddeley (2012) 
suggest that the three core EFs facilitate self-regulatory processes of both “temperatures”. 
For example, cognitive flexibility is required to enable switching between different means 
of sub-serving the same goal, as well as balancing multiple goals. Inhibitory control is 
required to avoid automatic unwanted responses that may conflict with a goal. However, 
the principal EF required for successful self-regulation according to Hofmann et al., seems 
to be WM. They suggest this is required to hold active representations of goals, control 
attention toward goal relevant stimuli and, away from goal irrelevant stimuli, shield goals 
from interference, suppress ruminative thoughts and regulate unwanted affect, desires and 
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cravings. Diamond (2013) shares the view that general EFs and self-regulatory processes 
are related but proposes that inhibitory control is the key EF in this relationship. Given 
these contrasting opinions, they make differential predictions as to which symptom of 
ADHD would result in an impairment in self-regulation.  
 
In a meta-analysis Willcutt, Doyle, Nigg, Faraone and Pennington (2005) found 
that although EF deficits did not fully explain ADHD symptoms they were certainly an 
important component of the disorder. However, much of this has focused on the role of 
inhibitory control and is most relevant to sub-types of ADHD that include hyperactivity-
impulsivity (i.e. Barkley, 1997). Diamond (2005) proposes that inattention is underpinned 
by a core deficit in WM, which does not apply to the other symptoms of ADHD and will 
be most obvious in PIT. Literature tends to support this view (Lui & Tannock, 2007; 
Martinussen & Tannock, 2006) and in our own work we have shown that WM deficits 
associated with inattention are present in a general population sample of adults (Elisa, 
Balaguer-Ballester, & Parris, 2016, see Chapter 4).  If self-regulation is mainly supported 
by the EF of inhibition as per Diamond, we would expect to observe impaired self-
regulation associated with hyperactivity-impulsivity only. If on the other hand, self-
regulation is mainly supported by the EF of working memory, as per Hoffman et al., we 
would expect a self-regulation impairment to be associated with working memory. With 
regard to the “hot” / “cool” EFs distinction and ADHD symptoms, it has been suggested 
that there is a hot-hyperactive-impulsive/cold-inattentive distinction (Castellanos, Sonuga-
Barke, Milham, & Tannock, 2006) but given that both “temperatures” are involved in self-
regulation this particular suggestion does not help derive predictions in either direction. 
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Cognitive Effort and the Core Symptoms of ADHD 
In the current work we focus on the cognitive effort aspect of self-regulation and its 
relationship to the symptoms of ADHD. Cognitive effort relates to the proportion of 
limited cognitive resources allocated to a task or decision and also to the tendency to apply 
such resources. As suggested by the name, this allocation of resources is effortful to the 
point that negative affect increases in line with level of effort (Garbarino & Edell, 1997). 
Thus the amount of cognitive effort required to perform a task or make a decision has an 
impact on the strategy used to do so (Bettman, Johnson, & Payne, 1990), producing 
individual differences in performance based on how willing or able individuals are to exert 
such effort to reach their goals. A detailed model of cognitive effort suggests that it is 
influenced by both “hot” and “cool” cognitive factors such as motivation, curiosity, 
memory and knowledge (Longo & Barrett, 2010). The multi-faceted nature of cognitive 
effort means it has been difficult to measure empirically. Attempts have included using 
physiological measures to assess workload (i.e. heart rate, blood pressure etc.), tasks to 
assess quality and quantity of performance and self-report measures to assess subjectively 
rated levels of effort.  
The Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) has been shown to reliably expose variation 
in cognitive effort and has merit in its ease of administration and ready availability. 
Whether the CRT assesses “cool” or “hot” aspects of cognitive effort is unclear; we 
suggest there is an argument for both. The task requires shielding or inhibition of a 
heuristic response i.e. “cool” cognition. However, the nature of the task could be argued to 
elicit an affective response (i.e. “hot”), as participants are often aware they have been 
presented with a “trick” question, which may motivate them to try harder.  Research by 
Stupple, Gale, and Richmond (2013) concluded that performance on the CRT is better 
explained by variation in WM than cognitive effort. However, it is equally plausible given 
Hofmann et al.’s view, that working memory is a key mechanism in the application of 
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cognitive effort perhaps sustaining the motivation for effort. Our own work utilising the 
CRT has shown that inattentive symptoms in a community sample were uniquely 
predictive of task performance (Elisa & Parris, 2015, see Chapter 3). We employ the CRT 
in the present work to replicate our previous finding and to assess its relationship to our 
other measure of cognitive effort described below.  
Another measure that has been used to measure cognitive effort, a variation on the 
number Stroop task (Robertson, Hiebert, Seergobin, Owen, & MacDonald, 2015), was 
designed to examine the effect of cognitive effort on reaction times (RTs) and error rates, 
and has the additional benefit of independently manipulating cognitive control. The 
repetitive lab based nature of the task means it is unlikely to elicit an affective response, 
and the processes required for accurate responding are primarily “cool” meaning it is 
useful for investigating inattention. The task presents a pair of single-digit integers on each 
trial and participants are asked to indicate which of the pair is physically larger (i.e. the 
largest font size). The numbers could differ in both physical size and numerical value and 
when these two dimensions are incongruent (i.e. the physically larger number is 
numerically smaller and vice versa), this provides the means for investigating cognitive 
control as in standard colour-word Stroop tasks. Congruent trials consist of number pairs 
where both physical and numerical dimensions agree (i.e. the physically larger number was 
also numerically larger and vice versa). Trials where numbers differ only in physical size 
and not numerical magnitude constitute a control condition. Varying the magnitude of the 
physical size difference between number pairs, allows investigation of cognitive effort. 
Robertson et al. cite research showing that longer RT’s and increased error rates result 
from having to select between integers that are closer versus more distant in physical size 
(Kadosh, Henik, Rubinsten, Mohr, Dori & van de Ven et al., 2005; Kaufmann, 
Koppelstaetter, Delazer, Siedentopf, Rhomberg, & Golaszewski et al., 2005).  They 
suggest that manipulation of congruency puts stress on cognitive control processes as well 
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as increasing cognitive effort demands, while differences in physical size magnitude 
increases cognitive effort but does not require additional cognitive control. 
 In summary the present work investigated the relationship between the self-
regulatory process of cognitive effort and the core symptoms of ADHD using two 
measures of cognitive effort. Based on Hoffman et al.’s model and our previous work, we 
hypothesised a relationship between cognitive effort and inattention, which we also 
predicted would not be present for hyperactivity and impulsivity. Also included was a 
measure of working memory capacity and a measure of inhibition (the cognitive control 
component of the Stroop task) to test the conflicting proposals of Hofmann et al., (2012) 
and Diamond (2013) regarding the relationship between self-regulation and EFs. A 
relationship between WM and cognitive effort would be predicted by Hoffman et al., 
whilst a relationship between cognitive control and cognitive effort would be predicted by 
Diamond.  
 
Method 
Participants 
120 individuals (105 females, 15 males) aged 18-35 (M = 20.64, SD = 3.39) participated in 
the experiment. Participants were recruited mainly from the Bournemouth University 
Psychology Undergraduate Participation Scheme whereby students receive course credits 
in return for participation. All participants were free from ADHD diagnosis. Participants 
gave full written, informed consent to take part. Ethical approval for the experiment was 
obtained from Bournemouth University ethics committee. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
ADHD symptoms. Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scale–Self-Report: Short Version 
(CAARS-S:S; Conners et al.1999). This is a 26 item self-report measure designed to assess 
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current ADHD symptoms in adults. Items are rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale, where 0 
= not at all and 3 = very much. The measure contains 4 factor-derived subscales; A: 
inattention/memory problems, B: hyperactivity/restlessness, C: impulsivity/emotional 
lability, D: problems with self-concept, as well as E: an ADHD index comprised of items 
from the other subscales. For each subscale, a T-Score is derived. Guidelines suggest that a 
T-score of 45-55 is average for adults (using data from a normative sample). Scores range 
from 29-90. A T-score of above 65 is considered to be indicative of clinically elevated 
symptoms. 
Working memory/goal neglect. Letter monitoring task (Duncan, Emslie, 
Williams, Johnson, & Freer,. 1996). The task was administered as per Duncan et al. (see 
Chapter 4 for a full description).  
Intelligence quotient (IQ).  A shortened version of the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence (WASI-II) was administered. This consisted of vocabulary and matrix 
reasoning subsets. From this measure a t-score for each relevant subscale (Gf & Gc) is 
calculated, and an approximate overall IQ score is obtained from an age-matched set of 
scores.   
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005). The test is composed of three 
items as follows: 
(a) A bat and ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost?  
(b) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets?  
(c) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover 
half the lake?   
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 In order to answer correctly it is necessary to suppress and/or evaluate the quick 
intuitive answer that immediately comes to mind (Frederick, 2005). The solution to the bat 
and ball problem is 5 pence, to the widget problem is 5 minutes and to the lily pad problem 
is 47 days.  
Number Stroop task (Robertson, Hiebert, Seergobin, Own, & MacDonald, 
2015). In each trial two numbers (from the set: 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9) appear on screen side by 
side in font Ariel. Font size (i.e. physical size) varied between 40, 55, 70, and 85. The task 
was to select the number that was the physically largest of the pair. Numerical magnitude 
served as an irrelevant/distracting dimension as responses were never made based on this 
information. 
 The experiment consisted of a single block of 132 randomly ordered trials that 
included 48 congruent (where physical size and numerical value are consistent), 48 
incongruent (where physical size and numerical value are inconsistent) and 36 control 
(where the numbers differ in physical size but not numerical value) trials. For physical 
size, trials were considered to be “close” when the font size difference was 15 points and 
“far” when the difference was 45 points (as per Robertson et al. we also included in the 
experiment trials with an “intermediate” size difference of 30 points, but did not include 
theses the analyses). For numerical magnitude, trials were considered “close” when the 
difference between the number pair was 1 or 2 and as “far” when the difference was 6 or 7. 
Both physical and numerical dimensions were orthogonal and fully crossed with 
congruency to allow dissociation of their effects. For physical size there were 44 close, 
intermediate and far trials. For numerical magnitude there were 48 close and 48 far trials. 
The close-far variable on both the physical and numerical dimensions was fully balanced 
so there was an equal number of physical close – numerical close, physical close – 
numerical far, physical far – numerical close, and physical far – numerical far pairings.  
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 Figure 1 shows the sequence of a single trial. Each trial began with a fixation cross 
displayed in the center of the screen for 500 milliseconds (ms), this is followed by a blank 
screen lasting 250 ms. The number pair is then presented, one on the left and one on the 
right. This screen lasted until the participant made their response, indicating by key press 
whether the physically larger number was on the left or the right. After selection had been 
made, a further blank screen was presented which lasted 525-7000 ms (mean = 2500 ms) 
before the fixation cross appeared again.  
 Participants were instructed to respond to the physically larger of the numbers as 
quickly and accurately as possible while ignoring the numerical values.  
Each participant was individually administered for each test item. They were alone 
in a quiet testing room. Test administration order was counterbalanced.  
  
 
Figure 1. Stimuli order for one trial of the number Stroop as per Robertson, Hiebert, Seergobin, Owen, & 
MacDonald (2015) 
 
Data Analysis 
Initially, a full analysis in relation to the number Stroop task was carried out similarly to 
Robertson et al. to enable comparison and to affirm the efficacy of the task as a measure of 
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cognitive effort. Secondly, to address research questions, analysis was conducted on the 
relationships between ADHD symptoms, working memory and Stroop dependent 
measures. Two interference contrasts provided measures of cognitive control (incongruent 
– control, incongruent – congruent) and the physical size contrast (close – far) provided the 
measure of cognitive effort. 
 Bayes factors were calculated using the procedures outlined in Dienes (2014), for 
all p values greater than .05, to assess the strength of evidence in support of hypotheses. 
Proposed cut-offs for acceptance of a hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1998), states a B above 3 as 
providing substantial support for the alternative hypothesis, whilst below 1/3 provides 
substantial support for the null hypothesis. A B that falls between 1/3 and 3 deems the data 
insensitive as to whether the alternative or null hypothesis should be accepted. We 
modelled the predictions of the theory of an absence of evidence for a relationship with a 
half-normal whose mean and standard deviation values reflected what could reasonably be 
expected in the circumstance of a significant result. For example Bayes factors for non-
significant correlations concerning ADHD symptom variables were calculated using the 
figures from the relationship between inattention and letter-monitoring performance 
(previously identified as a significant relationship as per Elisa et al., 2016). BH(0, X) refers to 
the Bayes Factors testing each hypothesis, where ‘H’ indicates a half-normal distribution, 
and ‘X’ the predicted standard deviation of this half-normal, against a null hypothesis of no 
difference. Where p values and Bayes factors conflict, the Bayes factor is taken as 
conclusive. A p value of > .05 does not necessarily indicate that there is no effect, simply 
that one was not found in the current data set. The use of Bayes factors increases 
researcher confidence in concluding that there is no effect.  
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Results 
Number Stroop Task Analysis 
Analyses of the number stroop task data deliberately mirrored those of Robertson et al. to 
enable comparison. Table 1 shows mean RT’s and error rates sorted by congruency, 
physical size, and numerical magnitude. One sample t-tests showed significant RT slowing 
for all contrasts (see Table 2).  
 
Table 1 
      Mean RT's and error rates for trials sorted by congruency, physical size, and numerical size. 
Congruency Physical Size 
Numerical 
Magnitude RT                 RT SEM Error     Error SEM 
Incongruent - - 537.15 8.54 1.19 0.21 
 
Close - 622.71 10.80 2.95 0.51 
 
Intermediate - 520.59 8.97 0.47 0.21 
 
Far - 472.63 7.46 0.16 0.09 
 
- Close  521.46 8.63 0.98 0.20 
 
- Far 552.77 8.84 1.41 0.28 
 
Close Close 599.29 11.46 2.63 0.52 
 
Close Far 645.62 11.13 3.29 0.71 
 
Intermediate Close  500.60 8.88 0.31 0.23 
 
Intermediate Far 540.65 9.84 0.64 0.30 
 
Far Close 467.23 7.66 0.00 0.00 
 
Far Far 477.86 7.96 0.33 0.19 
Congruent - - 488.63 7.63 0.23 0.06 
 
Close - 536.61 9.79 0.26 0.11 
 
Intermediate - 471.21 6.93 0.10 0.07 
 
Far - 459.60 7.67 0.31 0.12 
 
- Close 494.75 7.96 0.24 0.09 
 
- Far 482.43 7.56 0.21 0.08 
 
Close Close 558.18 10.76 0.31 0.18 
 
Close Far 514.91 10.00 0.21 0.15 
 
Intermediate Close  471.32 7.40 0.21 0.15 
 
Intermediate Far 471.08 7.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Far Close 456.83 8.03 0.21 0.15 
 
Far Far 462.35 7.87 0.42 0.21 
Control - - 493.50 7.39 0.26 0.08 
 
Close - 549.51 9.70 0.38 0.20 
 
Intermediate  - 477.38 7.62 0.21 0.12 
 
Far - 455.66 6.56 0.21 0.12 
- Close - 570.73 9.60 1.29 0.21 
- Intermediate - 490.71 7.50 0.27 0.09 
- Far - 463.26 7.03 0.23 0.07 
- - Close  508.05 8.12 0.61 0.12 
- - Far 517.28 7.94 0.81 0.15 
 
Effects of interference and facilitation can be seen in figure 2 and effects of 
physical size and numerical magnitude can be seen in figure 3. Significant response 
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slowing was seen in both the interference contrasts and significantly increased response 
times were seen in the congruent – control contrast. 
 
Table 2. 
  One sample t-tests (theoretical mean 0) for all contrasts 
Contrast t  p  
Incongruent - Control 19.259 < .001  
Incongruent - Congruent 16.907 < .001  
Congruent - Control -2.144 0.034 
Physical Close - Physical Far 25.623 < .001  
Numerical Close - Numerical Far -3.792 < .001  
 
A one-way ANOVA showed significant differences in magnitude of response 
slowing between interference and close-far contrasts (F(2.35, 279.32) = 295.37, p < .001). 
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests show the greatest cognitive effort was required for 
physical size differences, followed by incongruent – control and incongruent – congruent. 
The least cognitive effort was required for numerical magnitude (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3, 
 	 	 	Bonferroni corrected post-hoc t-tests for differences in magnitude between interference and 
close-far contrasts 
Contrasts Mean Difference  t  p 
incongruent-control incongruent-congruent 28.74 8.94 < .001  
   phycial close - far -30.21 -9.021 < .001  
   numerical close - far 86.49 18.29 < .001  
incongruent-congruent phycial close - far -58.95 -13.964 < .001  
   numerical close - far 57.75 15.46 < .001  
phycial close - far numerical close - far 116.7 23.485 < .001  
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Figure 2. Average RT differences for number Stroop contrasts. One-sample t-tests showed significant 
differences for all three. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Average RT differences for physical and numerical close – far contrasts. One-sample t-tests showed 
significant differences for both.  
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A 3 x 2 ANOVA determined the effect of congruency and physical size differences 
on RT’s. Significant main effects for congruency (F(2, 238) = 148.19, p < .001) and physical 
size (F(1,119) = 634.03, p < .001) were found. We also found a significant interaction 
between these variables (F(2, 238) = 74.39, p < .001). 
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc t-tests showed participants were slower during 
incongruent than congruent (t(119) = 16.91, p < .001), and control trials (t(119) = 15.86, p < 
.001). Control trials were also significantly slower than congruent trials (t(119) = -2.14, p = 
.034). Investigation of the interaction showed that physical size produced significant 
differences in magnitude of slowing across all three levels of congruency (incongruent 
t(119) = 26.94, p < .001; congruent t(119) = 14.42, p < .001; control t(119) = 16.12, p < .001), 
with close trials slower than far trials. There was a significantly larger effect of physical 
size seen in incongruent relative to congruent (t(119) = 11.74, p < .001), and control (t(119) = -
2.849, p < .015).  
Analogous analysis was performed for numerical magnitude. A 2 x 2 ANOVA 
showed main effects for congruency (F(1,119) = 283.27, p < .001) and numerical magnitude 
(F(1,119) 8.75, p < .001) trials. A significant interaction was also found (F(1,119) = 92.77, p < 
.001). The effect of the difference of numerical magnitude on response time was 
significant for both incongruent (t(119) = -8.52, p < .001) and congruent (t(119) = 4.21, p 
<.001) trials but was significantly greater for incongruent trials (t(119) = -9.63, p < .001). 
Interestingly effects for incongruent and congruent trials were in the opposite direction; for 
incongruent trials far discriminations were slowest and for congruent trials close 
discriminations were slowest.  
We next investigated the effects of our variables on error rates. A 3 x 2 ANOVA 
with congruency and physical size as within-subjects variables showed main effects of 
congruency (F(1.35, 160.99) = 18.10, p < .001), and physical size (F(1,119) = 23.64, p < .001). 
We also observed an interaction between the two (F(1.39,165.59) = 22.45, p < .001). 
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Bonferroni corrected post-hoc t-tests showed participants made more errors during 
incongruent than congruent (t(119) = 5.38, p < .001), and control (t(99) = 4.924, p < .001) 
trials. However, there was no significant difference in error rates between congruent and 
control trials (t(119) = -.803, p = .423, BH(0,5.8) = .09). Investigation of the interaction showed 
that physical size only produced a significant effect on error rates for incongruent trials 
(t(119) = 5.50, p < .001). There was no difference between close and far for congruent (t(119) 
= -.30, p = .764, BH(0,5.56) = .04), or control (t(119) = .728, p = .468, BH(0,5.56) = .08) trials. The 
effect of physical size was significantly greater for incongruent trials relative to congruent 
(t(119) = 5.38, p < .001), and control (t(119) = 4.69, p < .001) trials. There was no difference 
between congruent and control trials (t(119) = -.80, p = .423, BH(0,5.8) = .09). 
Analogous analysis was performed for numerical magnitude. A main effect for 
congruency (F(1,119) = 21.90, p < .001) was found,  and results for numerical magnitude 
showed no effect (F(1,119) = 1.88, p = .173, BsH(0,40.27) < .33). There was no significant 
interaction between congruency and numerical magnitude (F(1,119) = 2.67, p = .108, 
BH(0,49.62) = .03). This suggests error rate was not significantly affected by the difference in 
numerical value of the number pairs.  
Results regarding the variable “numerical magnitude” for both this work and that of 
Roberston et al. (who found no main effect of numerical magnitude on RTs) contradict 
what is predicted in the literature i.e. that number pairs that are numerically closer will be 
more difficult (Moyer & Landauer, 1967). Results from this work and Robertson et al. also 
conflict. This raises concerns about the usefulness of numerical magnitude difference as a 
measure of effort. Therefore no further analysis is reported on this variable and focus will 
be on the physical size differences as a measure of effort. 
 
 Tables 4 and 5 show correlations between ADHD symptoms, working memory 
scores, and variables from the Stroop task for RT’s and error.
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Table 4. 
           Pearson Correlations between all variables (Stroop RT's) 
  Gf c A c B c C c E L-M  I-Control  I-C pClose-Far nClose-Far CRT 
Gf  - 0.016 -0.108 -0.119 -0.025 0.149 -0.121 -0.094 -0.156 0.05 .254* 
Inattention 
 
- .310* .483* .696* -.367* 0.094 -0.011 0.158 0.043 0.083 
Hyperactivity 
  
- .364* .508* -0.096 -0.009 0.008 -0.011 0.058 0.131 
Impulsivity 
   
- .622* -.248* 0.074 -0.042 0.157 0.107 -0.106 
ADHD 
composite 
    
- -.257* 0.029 -0.007 0.076 0.02 0.087 
Letter-
Monitoring 
     
- 0.022 -0.046 -0.027 -0.068 -0.026 
 Incong – 
Cont(stroop) 
      
- .608* .668* -0.018 -0.116 
Incong - 
Cong 
       
- .333* 0.015 -0.029 
Physical 
Close-Far 
        
- -0.058 -0.15 
Numerical 
Close-Far 
         
- 0.003 
CRT                     - 
* p < .01 
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Table 5. 
           Pearson Correlations between all variables (Stroop error rate) 
  Gf  c A c B c C c E L-M  I-Control  I-C pClose-Far nClose-Far CRT 
Gf  - 0.016 -0.108 -0.119 -0.025 0.149 -0.064 -0.09 -0.049 0.024 .254** 
Inattention 
 
- .310** .483** .696** -.367** -0.073 -0.131 -0.156 .228* 0.083 
Hyperactivity 
  
- .364** .508** -0.096 -0.017 -0.006 0.132 0.072 0.131 
Impulsivity 
   
- .622** -.248** -0.14 -0.17*** -0.147 -0.014 -0.106 
ADHD 
composite 
    
- -.257** -0.144 -0.17 -0.158 0.122 0.087 
Letter-
Monitoring 
     
- 0.067 0.102 0.001 -.239** -0.026 
Incong-
Cont(stroop) 
      
- .843** .585** -.322** -0.047 
Incong-Cong 
       
- .631** -.226* -0.057 
Physical 
Close-Far 
        
- -0.077 -0.002 
Numerical 
Close-Far 
         
- 0.104 
CRT                     - 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** B > 3 
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Working Memory, Cognitive Effort, and Cognitive Control 
Our data was insensitive with regards to the relationship between working memory and 
cognitive effort as assessed by the CRT (p = .779, BH(0,0.8) = 1.17). For the physical close-
far measure of effort and working memory our data provides strong evidence for no 
relationship for both RTs and error rates (ps < .05, BsH(0,0.8) < .33). Results relating to 
working memory and cognitive control (both interference contrasts) also suggested strong 
evidence for no relationship for both RTs and error rates (ps < .05, BsH(0,0.8)  < .33). 
Cognitive control was unrelated to cognitive effort as measured by the CRT for RTs (ps > 
.05 . BsH(0,0.8) < .33) and data for error rates was insensitive (ps > .05 , BsH(0,0.8) > .33 - < 3). 
We also provide strong evidence that our two measures of effort (physical size contrast and 
the CRT) were not correlated (p = .102, BH(0,0.8) = .31) suggesting either that they assess 
different aspects of cognitive effort, that one of them may not be a good measure of effort, 
or indeed that neither of them is a good measure of effort. 
 
Analysis Relating to ADHD Symptoms 
On the CAARS questionnaire 17.5% of participants had elevated symptoms (i.e. a t-score 
of 60 or above) on the composite subscale for ADHD. For individual symptoms; 30% of 
participants had elevated scores for inattention, 5.83% had elevated scores for 
hyperactivity, and 6.67% had elevated scores for impulsivity. 
 Working memory. In line with our previous work and a “cool” description of 
inattention, we see a correlation between working memory and inattention (p < .001). 
Unexpectedly and inconsistent with a “hot” description of the other ADHD symptoms, this 
was also true for impulsivity (p = .006).  
Cognitive effort. Contrary to our previous findings, we found evidence for no 
correlation between cognitive effort as assessed by the CRT and inattention (p = .366, 
BH(0,0.8) = .33). For RT’s and error rates, results relating to inattention and the Stroop 
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measure of cognitive effort (physical close-far) were inconclusive as Bayes suggested data 
were insensitive (ps  >.05, BsH(0,0.8) =  > .33 - < 3). Correlations between the other two 
ADHD symptoms and this measure of cognitive effort were also insensitive for both RT’s 
and error rates (ps < .05,  BsH(0,0.8) > .33 - < 3) and this was also the case for results relating 
to the CRT (ps < .05,  BsH(0,0.8) > .33 - < 3).. 
Cognitive control. Correlations between inattention and both interference contrasts 
were insensitive for both RTs and error rates (ps > .05, BsH(0,0.8)  > .33 - < 3). We saw 
strong evidence for no correlation between hyperactivity and both interference contrasts 
for RTs (ps > .05, BsH(0,0.8)  < .33) and errors (ps < .05, BsH(0,0.8)  > .33 - < 3). For 
impulsivity Bayes analysis yielded insensitive values for both contrasts (ps > .05, BsH(0,0.8)  
> .33 - < 3). For impulsivity and incongruent – control Bayes was insensitive (p < .05, 
BH(0,0.8)  > .33 - < 3). However, Bayes suggested that impulsivity was significantly 
correlated with incongruent-congruent for error rates (p =.063, BH(0,0.8) = 3.59). 
 
Discussion 
The present experiment investigated the relationship between the self-regulatory process of 
cognitive effort and the core symptoms of ADHD using two measures of cognitive effort. 
Based on Hofmann et al.’s model and our previous work, we hypothesised a relationship 
between cognitive effort and inattention, not hyperactivity or impulsivity. Also included 
was a measure of working memory capacity and a measure of inhibition (the cognitive 
control component of the numerical Stroop task) to test the conflicting proposals of 
Hofmann et al., (2012) and Diamond (2013) regarding the relationship between self-
regulation and EFs. A relationship between WM and cognitive effort would be predicted 
by Hofmann et al., whilst a relationship between cognitive control and cognitive effort 
would be predicted by Diamond. Results were not as expected. We observed strong 
evidence for no relationship between inattention and CRT performance; our other measure 
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of effort resulted in insensitive results. For results relating to cognitive control both 
inattention and hyperactivity were insensitive but there was some evidence to suggest a 
relationship with impulsivity.  Regarding Hofmann’s proposal, results showed strong 
evidence for no relationship between WM and cognitive effort as assessed by the Stroop; 
data relating to the CRT was insensitive. Regarding Diamond’s proposal, we found strong 
evidence for no relationship between inhibitory control and cognitive effort as measured 
by the CRT. Furthermore, results provide strong evidence for no relationship between WM 
and the cognitive control in the Stroop task..  
 
Comparison to Findings of Robertson et al. (2015) 
Our use of the number Stroop task employed by Robertson et al. gives us the opportunity 
to test the effectiveness of their paradigm on a larger sample of participants (their sample 
consisted of only 16) and confirm the dissociability of measures of cognitive control and 
cognitive effort. As in Robertson et al., participants had slower RT’s and higher error rates 
during incongruent relative to congruent and control trials and for close relative to far 
physical size differences. We also found an effect of numerical magnitude on RT’s (but not 
error rates), which was not found by Robertson et al. In fact this component of the task 
produced some curious results. The main effect was in the opposite direction to that which 
we would expect i.e. far trials elicited slower RT’s and investigation of the interaction 
between numerical magnitude and congruency for RT’s showed that this was being driven 
by incongruent trials; in congruent trials RT’s were in the expected direction with close 
slower than far. Attempting to discern the reason behind this puzzling result would be a 
departure from the aims of the research. Suffice to say we did not treat the numerical 
magnitude difference contrast as an important variable in our analysis relating to 
inattention and working memory. Robertson et al. describe research that has shown that 
RT’s and error rates were increased as a result of reducing the numerical difference 
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between integers (Moyer & Landauer, 1967) but indeed their own results did not support 
this. 
Also in contrast to the findings of Robertson et al., our results showed an 
interaction between congruency and physical size; the largest effect of physical size was 
during incongruent trials. However, as physical size affected RT’s across all levels of 
congruency we can still be confident in it’s serving as a measure of cognitive effort.  
 
Working Memory, Cognitive Effort, and Cognitive Control 
Results provided strong evidence for no relationship between cognitive effort as measured 
by the number Stroop and WM. This is a surprising result given the theory put forward by 
Hofmann et al. (2012), which makes a persuasive argument for WM’s role in self-
regulation, although we note that this is very general and may need to be refined with 
respect to different aspects of self-regulation, i.e. cognitive effort. Previous work has 
suggested that WM is strongly implicated in CRT performance (Stupple et al. 2013; 
Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011); insensitive results in the current work regarding these 
variables mean we are unable to add to this. The result that WM and cognitive control were 
not related, even modestly, is also somewhat surprising given their proposed relationship 
in EF models (Diamond, 2005; Hofmann et al., 2012; Miyake et al. 2000). Research 
looking at the relationship between WM and inhibitory control using the colour-word 
Stroop task clearly supports their relationship (Kane & Engle, 2003), however, the Stroop 
paradigm is not standard across experiments, and there is research to suggest the 
relationship may be dependent on the specific design (Long & Prat, 2002). Therefore it is 
possible that our results are a reflection of the number Stroop paradigm used in this work, 
which was designed foremost to enable independent manipulation and cognitive effort and 
cognitive control as per the aims of Robertson et al. 
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With regard to Diamond’s (2013) proposal that inhibitory control is the key 
facilitator of self-regulation, we provide strong evidence against it (RT’s). However, we 
only tested this in relation to the CRT, due to the overlap between the Stroop measures of 
control and effort. 
Performance on the CRT was not correlated with the measure of cognitive effort 
provided by the number Stroop task, suggesting either that they measure independent 
facets of cognitive effort, or that one or both of them is not a good measure of cognitive 
effort. This may not be surprising given the complexity of the concept and the numerous 
measures used in attempt to tap it in the past (Longo & Barrett, 2010) and as previously 
mentioned the hot/cool status of the CRT is unclear. 
 
ADHD Symptoms 
Working memory. The relationship between inattention and WM found in 
previous work (Elisa et al. 2016, see Chapter 4) proved to be robust, supporting a “cool” 
description of inattention. However, this was not unique to inattention; impulsivity was 
also significantly negatively correlated with WM performance. This does not support a 
“hot” description of hyperactivity-impulsivity and is inconsistent with Diamond’s (2005) 
theory that WM and inattention are exclusively related. 
Cognitive effort. We predicted that inattention but not hyperactivity or impulsivity 
would be related to cognitive effort as measured by both the Stroop and the CRT. Results 
relating to both hyperactivity and impulsivity were insensitive for both measures of effort. 
This was also the case for data relating to inattention, although for the CRT the Bayes 
factor indicates we have strong evidence for no effect. This means that findings from our 
previous work showing that performance on the CRT was predicted by inattention but not 
hyperactivity or impulsivity (Elisa & Parris, 2015, see Chapter 3) are not supported.  
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Cognitive control. For RTs results were insensitive for the relationship between 
impulsivity and both of the interference contrasts, however, for error rates Bayes suggested 
evidence for a relationship between this ADHD symptom and the contrast incongruent – 
congruent (results for incongruent – control were insensitive). Given Barkley’s (1997) 
theory of ADHD that puts behavioural inhibition as the primary cognitive deficit related to 
hyperactivity-impulsivity, the latter is what we would expect. These results therefore 
provide some support for Barkley’s theory. Data regarding hyperactivity for both RTs and 
error rates were insensitive for both interference contrasts. Regarding inattention, data for 
both RTs and error rates were also insensitive for both interference contrasts and thus no 
conclusions can be drawn. In contrast to Barkley’s theory, for a hot/cool – hyperactivity-
impulsivity/inattention distinction, we would expect to have seen a relationship between 
inattention and cognitive control that did not exist for hyperactivity-impulsivity. 
Unfortunately insensitive results mean that we are not able to add to the commentary on 
this. Results from the wider literature regarding ADHD and inhibitory control are also 
mixed; a meta-analysis of studies using Stroop colour-word paradigms concluded that 
interference control is consistently compromised in ADHD (Lansbergen, Kenemans, & 
Van Engeland, 2007), while another meta-analysis on the same task showed evidence to 
the contrary (Schwartz & Verhaeghen, 2008). In a study that used several different 
measures to assess cognitive control, results suggested inattention and hyperactivity-
impulsivity were negatively related to performance separate tasks (Polner, Aichert, 
Macare, Costa, & Ettinger, 2015). An explanation for our own findings may lie with our 
sample demographic. As previously noted symptoms of hyperactivity-impulsivity diminish 
with age past childhood and research suggests this is also the case for problems with 
cognitive control (Luna, Padmanabhan, & O’Hearn, 2010). Thus given that our sample 
consisted of adults we may be less likely to see evidence of a relationship between these 
two.   
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Summary and Conclusions  
A strength of the current work is the use of Bayes factors to allow confident acceptance of 
the null hypothesis. However, a number of insensitive results means that our data does not 
allow us to make firm conclusions regarding many of the relationships explored in this 
study. The relationship between inattention and cognitive effort as measured by the 
number Stroop task was a key motivator for the present study but an insensitive result 
means that we cannot draw any conclusions about it. However, the Bayes factor for the 
correlation between inattention and the CRT provides strong evidence for no relationship 
between these two variables suggesting inattention is not related to the self-regulation of 
cognitive effort. Nevertheless, given our previous finding is in direct contrast to this (Elisa 
& Parris, 2015, see Chapter 3), further work is needed on the CRT and inattention. This 
may involve using samples with clinical level symptom severity. However, if ADHD 
symptoms are on a continuum as the literature suggests, effects should still be observable 
in community samples. It might also require using a 7-item version of the CRT (Toplak, 
West, & Stanovich, 2014) to provide greater variation in performance to be accounted for 
by inattention than the 3-item version used here. The two very different methods of tapping 
cognitive effort used in this research were shown to be un-related to each other which 
attests to the difficulty of defining and measuring cognitive effort. Future work using 
different measures of effort might produce different results.  
Overall results make it difficult for us to comment with clarity on the “hot”/”cool” 
distinction proposed for ADHD symptoms. We reliably find that WM and inattention are 
related, which is inline with the theory, but there was no evidence for a relationship 
between inattention and cognitive control. Furthermore impulsivity (which should be 
related to “hot” cognition as per the theory) was shown to be negatively related to WM. 
Results relating to hyperactivity and impulsivity and both measures of effort were 
insensitive. Impulsivity was shown to be related to cognitive control, which refutes the 
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hot/cool – hyperactivity-impulsivity/inattention distinction and supports an inhibitory 
control explanation of this symptom as per Barkley (1997). Results relating to 
hyperactivity provided strong evidence for no relationship for RTs (and was insensitive for 
error).  
There was strong evidence against a relationship between WM and cognitive effort, 
as well as evidence for no relationship between cognitive control and cognitive effort). 
Overall these findings do not support a relationship between EFs and self-regulatory 
processes using the current measures, meaning neither Diamond’s (2013) nor Hofmann et 
al.’s (2012) models are supported, with the caveat that more research is needed on how 
effort is best measured and defined.  
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Chapter 6: Self-Regulatory Processes and ADHD Symptoms in a Community Sample 
of Adults: Evidence for a Hot/Cool Distinction 
The findings from Chapter 5 did little to clarify our understanding of the relationships 
between ADHD symptoms and self-regulatory processes. In Chapter 6 we approach the 
issue with a new task that allows us to look at several aspects of self-regulation, including 
locus-coeruleus norepinephrine system activity in response to the exploit/explore trade-off.  
A categorical rather than dimensional approach is taken in this study, although DSM 
thresholds are lowered to include symptomology representative of the general population. 
A dimensional approach was ruled out due to the necessarily small sample size (owing to 
time restraints resultant from the nature of the experiment) that was deemed inappropriate 
for analysis using regression. 
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Abstract 
Recent work has suggested that changes in pupil diameter relate directly to changes in 
locus-coeruleus norepinephrine (LC-NE) system activity (Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Aston-
Jones, 1993). Two modes of LC-NE firing are represented by different pupillary responses 
that promote either task engagement and “exploitation” (LC phasic mode), or task 
disengagement in favour of “exploration” (LC tonic mode). A relationship between 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms and “hot” self-regulatory 
processes modulated by norepinephrine activity has been predicted; specifically that there 
would be a tendency towards pupillary responses representing LC tonic mode. The nature 
of this possible relationship is investigated in the current work with consideration for a) 
theories relating to a hot/cool – hyperactivity-impulsivity/inattention distinction, and b) the 
relationship between executive functions and self-regulatory processes. 55 diagnosis free 
adults were screened for ADHD-type symptoms using DSM-5 criteria and comprised three 
groups; predominantly inattentive (N = 15), combined (N = 17), and control (N = 23). 
Pupils were tracked during a task that enables behavioural disengagement when the utility 
of continuing is diminished. Results provided strong evidence against a relationship 
between LC-NE activity and any of the ADHD symptoms. However, we show behavioural 
evidence for dysfunction of “hot” self-regulatory processes related to utility judgements 
related to hyperactivity-impulsivity. Results are discussed in relation to theories of 
executive function in ADHD, and findings from wider literature.  
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Self-Regulatory Processes and ADHD Symptoms in a Community Sample of Adults: 
Evidence for a Hot/Cool Distinction 
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a childhood-onset developmental 
disorder with three core symptoms; inattention, hyperactivity and impulsivity. Inattention 
is characterised by an inability to focus on tasks, difficulty with planning and organisation, 
forgetfulness, and high levels of distractibility. Hyperactivity and impulsivity (often 
grouped together as in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual [DSM]) are characterised by 
excessive energy levels, impatience, and disruptive, often inappropriate behaviour, with a 
lack of regard for social rules. Symptoms often persist into adulthood (Elliott, 2002, 
Wender et al. 2001), although hyperactivity-impulsivity tends to diminish leaving 
inattention as the most prominent (Biederman, Mick, & Faraone, 2000). Recent work has 
established the prevalence of ADHD symptoms, particularly inattention, in community 
samples of adults (Alloway, Elliott, & Holmes, 2010; Faraone & Biederman, 2005), which 
fits with the now commonly accepted notion of symptoms as existing along a continuum 
(Barkley & Murphy, 2006). The present study was designed based on the notion that the 
key causal impairments associated with the clinical expression of ADHD are detectable in 
community samples (Elisa & Parris, 2015; 2016 see Chapters 3 & 4).  
A prominent theory of ADHD symptoms suggests a role for catecholamines such 
as dopamine (DA), epinephrine, and norepinephrine (NE) in the modulation of attention 
and impulse control (Mercugliano, 1995; Oades et al. 2005; Pliszka, McCracken, & Maas, 
1996). In rats, low levels of stimulants such as methylphenidate and amphetamine produce 
increases in NE and DA in the pre-frontal cortex (PFC) resulting in improved focus and 
executive function (Berridge et al. 2006). Both DA and NE contribute towards maintaining 
alertness, attention, focus, arousal, effort, and motivation, and are structurally quite similar. 
However, each has distinct origins and projections in the brain, and selective alterations 
have different behavioural effects, suggesting discrete complimentary roles for these 
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neurotransmitters. Both NE and DA have marked effects on the function of the PFC, with 
optimum levels of each required for proper control of behaviour and attention (Arnsten, 
1998, 2005). Rosseti & Carboni (2005) conclude that while DA is associated with reward 
expectancy, NE is involved in the active maintenance of task information. Evidence for the 
involvement of catecholamines in ADHD comes primarily from drug studies where many 
of the medications used successfully to treat symptoms of ADHD alter catecholamine 
transmission (Arnsten, 2006; Oades et al. 2005; Mercugliano, 1995). More work is needed 
however to identify whether there is an association between DA, NE and the ADHD 
subtypes. Research suggests that DA may be less relevant to ADHD in adults given the 
prominent symptom in this age group is inattention. For example, issues associated with 
the dopamine transporter gene DAT1 have been specifically linked with hyperactive-
impulsive symptoms of ADHD but not with inattention (Gizer et al. 2008; Waldman et al. 
1997). DAT1 is abundant in the striatum, an area that Diamond (2005) suggests is the 
primary site for neurobiological dysfunction in ADHD-combined type. The present 
research will focus on exploring the role of NE in ADHD and its subtypes with particular 
interest in its role as an attention modulator. Although it is unlikely that a single 
neurotransmitter can explain all symptoms of ADHD fully, a review article by Biederman 
and Spencer (1999) suggests that neurobiological and pharmacological research provides 
compelling support for a noradrenergic explanation of ADHD.  
 
The Locus-Coeruleus Norepinephrine System  
NE is synthesised and projected from the locus-coeruleus (LC), a small nucleus located 
near the pons in the brainstem. The wide and diffuse projection from the LC is known as 
the LC-NE system which has two modes of function; phasic and tonic, which affect online 
task attention. Phasic firing typically occurs in response to a stimulus event during 
moderate baseline LC activity. This mode of function indicates engagement with a task, 
 127 
and is associated with heightened task performance (Aston-Jones, Rajkowski, Kubiak, & 
Alexinsky, 1994). Elevated tonic mode firing occurs with increased baseline LC activity, 
and an absence of phasic responses. This mode of function indicates task disengagement, 
and is associated with poorer performance, and distractibility (Aston-Jones et al., 1994). 
There is an inverted-U relationship between LC activity and performance, meaning that 
performance is optimal with moderate levels of tonic activity, combined with stimulus-
evoked phasic activation. This can be thought of as the goldilocks level of activation; 
performance is worse with too little or too much arousal (see fig 1; Aston-Jones, 
Rajkowski, & Cohen, 1999).  
 
 
Figure 1. The inverted-U relationship between LC tonic activity and task performance as per Aston-Jones, 
Rajkowski, and Cohen, (1999). 
 
Recent research has suggested that changes in firing mode of the LC are indicative 
of control state. The adaptive gain theory (AGT; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005) explains 
how the LC-NE system regulates control state for engagement versus disengagement. This 
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is known as the exploit/explore trade-off and illustrates the balance between pursuing 
known sources of reward (exploitation), and exploring new ones (exploration). AGT 
proposes that the LC-NE system responds to changes in task utility by modulating the gain 
(responsivity) of processing in appropriate cortical circuits. It is suggested that the anterior 
cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex play a critical role in evaluating costs and rewards, and 
jointly provide the LC with on-going evaluations of task utility (Nieuwenhuis & Jepma, 
2011). The system then adjusts between firing modes in order to maximise utility (Aston-
Jones & Cohen, 2005). 
 
Executive Function and Self-regulation:  Links to LC-NE Activity, and ADHD 
Symptoms 
Self-regulation is a multifaceted concept, but can be broadly defined as sub-processes of 
general executive functions (EFs) that regulate emotional, motivational, and cognitive 
arousal, and ultimately behaviour towards a goal (Diamond, 2013). Research has identified 
several components of self-regulation including cognitive control, cognitive effort, and 
optimal goal directed behaviour. The last of these is of particular interest in relation to LC-
NE functioning, and refers to behaviours that maximise utility inline with goal 
representations. The exploit/explore trade-off is an example of this. A self-regulatory 
explanation of LC-NE function is supported in the literature; norepinephrine is thought to 
enable adaptive control based on utility, and it has been shown that phasic responses reflect 
error processing and facilitate the phenomenon of post-error slowing (Nieuwenhuis, Aston-
Jones, & Cohen, 2005; Shiels & Hawk, 2010). 
A link has already been made between ADHD symptoms and self-regulatory 
processes. Most notably the cognitive-energetic model of Sergeant (2000) proposes that 
inhibitory control deficits can be explained by energetic and state factors. The models’ 
energetic pools “arousal” and “activation”, reflect tonic and phasic responses to task 
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demands and stimuli, while “effort” is related to the cognitive demands of a task. Whilst 
the research on self-regulation in ADHD has produced mixed results (Schachar, Mota, 
Logan, Tannock, & Klim, 2000; Scheres et al. 2003; Schwartz & Verhaeghen, 2008; 
Vaidya et al. 1998), the theories of Barkley (1997) and Sergeant (2000) suggest that 
specific cognitive control deficits may be related to hyperactivity-impulsivity. Despite this 
theoretical leaning, we note that much of the research in this area does not account for 
ADHD subtype.  
Several researchers have predicted that ADHD is associated with the 
explore/exploit component of self-regulation underpinned by dysfunctional LC-NE activity 
(Aston-Jones, Rajkowski, & Cohen, 2000; Howells, Stein, & Russell, 2012; Ressler & 
Nemeroff, 2001). More specifically, it has been suggested that ADHD would be 
characterised by a tendency towards overly tonic activity (exploration), and an absence of 
phasic bursts (exploitation). This is supported by the finding that the cognition enhancing 
effects of low doses of methylphenidate, probably involve modest alterations in LC 
discharge (Devilbiss & Berridge, 2006). However, this facet of self-regulation is yet to be 
investigated in the context of ADHD and its subtypes. Research has shown that adults with 
ADHD score higher on a novelty seeking scale than controls (Downey, Stelson, Pomerlau, 
& Giordani, 1997) suggesting a tendency for exploration, but this work did not look at 
differences between ADHD symptoms. The concept of exploration could fit with either or 
both the notion of distractibility and lack of focus associated with inattention, and the 
impulsive behaviour associated with hyperactivity-impulsivity.  
A separate but related body of literature argues for a dissociation between “hot” 
affective decision-making, and “cool” EF processes, and for their separable contributions 
to ADHD. The term “cool” cognition refers primarily to the three core EFs (working 
memory, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility; Miyake et al., 2000). “Hot” cognition 
refers to the type of EF processes required to make judgements in the face of emotional 
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and motivational factors. The distinction also applies to the self-regulatory sub-processes 
so that there are “hot” and “cool” aspects of self-regulation. For example, judgements 
based on utility towards optimal goal directed behaviour as described above, would be 
considered “hot”, while cognitive control aspects of self-regulation (i.e. shielding from or 
overriding irrelevant information) would be considered “cool”. It is proposed that 
inattention is associated with “cool” cognition, and hyperactivity-impulsivity with “hot” 
cognition (Castellanos, Sonuga-Barke, Milham, & Tannock, 2006; Toplak, Jain, & 
Tannock, 2005). This is supported by research suggesting that deficits in the “cool” EF 
working memory (WM) are unique to inattention (Diamond, 2005; Elisa & Parris, 2016, 
see Chapter 4). In research utilising a task designed to tap “hot” cognition Toplak et al. 
(2005) found that adolescents with ADHD performed less optimally than controls, and that 
WM ability did not influence performance. Importantly, they found that performance on 
the task was correlated with symptoms of hyperactivity-impulsivity, and not with 
inattention. 
A possible conflict with the idea of a distinction between ADHD symptoms and the 
“temperature” of their underlying cognition arises depending on the theoretical leaning 
towards the direction of the relationship between general EFs, particularly WM, and self-
regulatory processes. There is evidence to suggest that “cool” EFs facilitate both 
“temperatures” of self-regulatory processes (Diamond, 2013; Hofmann Schmeichel, and 
Baddeley, 2012). If the relationship were in this direction then a distinction between “hot” 
and “cool” cognition in ADHD would still fit theoretically. However, it is suggested that 
LC-NE activity (which we associate with “hot” self-regulation) influences WM function 
through modulation in the PFC (Arnsten & Li, 2005; Oades et al. 2005; Rosseti & Carboni, 
2005), which would mean inattention (assuming its relationship with WM as previously 
evidenced) should be related to this “hot” cognition. Findings from studies using NE drugs 
to look at the effects on WM are mixed, but a link between the two has been reported 
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(Chamberlain, Muller, Blackwell, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2006).  This potential relationship 
would support the relationship between executive functions as proposed by Hofmann et al. 
since they propose a role for working memory in self-regulation. In contrast, Diamond 
(2013) restricts this relationship to the executive function process of inhibition, eschewing 
a role of working memory in self-regulation.  
 
Measuring LC-NE Activity 
Seminal work in the 1960’s showed that task evoked pupillary responses reflected changes 
in cognition related to task difficulty and corresponding mental effort (Hess & Polt, 1964, 
Kahneman & Beatty, 1966). However, until more recently pupillometry was not widely 
employed in the field of psychology due to its lack of face validity as a measure of brain 
function (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000). It has now been shown that changes in pupil 
diameter directly relate to changes in LC-NE activity. Rajkowski, Kubiak, and Aston-
Jones (1993) published an abstract suggesting that baseline pupil diameter closely tracked 
NE activity from direct LC neuronal recordings in monkeys while they performed a target 
detection task. Larger baseline pupil diameters reflected LC tonic mode and task 
disengagement, while smaller baseline pupil diameters reflected LC phasic mode and 
engagement with the task. This finding was confirmed and extended by Joshi, Li, Kalwani, 
and Gold (2016) who concluded that changes in pupil diameter accurately reflect neural 
activity in the LC, and that LC-mediated arousal may coordinate activity throughout the 
brain. Task evoked pupillary dilations are thought to be indicative of an LC phasic 
response to salient stimulus (Einhauser, Stout, Koch, & Carter, 2008). Gilzenrat, 
Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, and Cohen (2010) tested human participants using a similar target 
detection task to that used with monkeys, and found that in line with LC-NE-pupillary-
response theory, small baseline pupils coupled with larger task evoked dilations were 
associated with improved task performance. Large baseline pupils were associated with 
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poorer task performance and smaller task evoked dilations. They also investigated the 
relationship between pupil diameter and control state, and found evidence in support of 
AGT. In their diminishing utility task (DUT) participants were able to make a behavioural 
indication of change in control state by actively disengaging (electing to escape) from the 
task if the perceived utility of maintaining engagement began to decline. Pupil data 
accurately tracked decline of task engagement preceding escape, and building again post-
escape. Specifically increasing baseline pupils and diminished stimulus evoked dilations 
were seen in trials leading up to escape. This parallels the relationship between patterns of 
LC activity and control state predicted by AGT (an inverted-U shape).  
There is very little research looking at the pupillary response in ADHD. Karatekin, 
Bingham, and White (2009, 2010) found evidence suggesting there may be group 
differences between ADHD children and controls in ability to apply effort (as measured by 
pupillary response) when needed. However, Kara, Turkbay, Urdem, Congologlu, and Ilhan 
(2012) found no differences in pupil diameter between ADHD children and controls.  
 
The Present Research 
The DUT has several practical applications for use in ADHD symptom research. It can be 
used to tap into two aspects of self-regulatory processes; cognitive effort (the allocation of 
resources to a task or decision), and optimal goal directed behaviour via adaptive control, 
as well as measuring LC-NE activity by proxy of pupil diameter while participants 
complete a task requiring assessment of utility. We set out to look at whether groups with 
ADHD-type symptoms (predominantly inattentive, and combined) differed from controls 
on measures derived from the DUT. Specifically we were interested in whether there 
would be any differences in the pattern of pupil responses between adults with and without 
ADHD-type symptoms.  
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Regarding behavioural variables measuring self-regulatory processes, we were 
interested in whether there were any differences between groups in explore/exploit 
behaviour (“hot”) that might show ADHD-symptoms to be related to impairments in 
judgements based on utility. Optimal goal directed behaviour would be to exploit known 
sources of reward until utility is diminished. It was expected that participants with ADHD 
symptoms would be more inclined to explore, even if this is not the optimum behaviour. 
This tendency towards exploration would also be indexed by completing trials with easier 
tone discriminations, suggesting an avoidance of trials requiring increased cognitive effort. 
Cognitive effort is influenced by both “hot” and “cool” cognitive factors (Longo & Barrett, 
2010), so could apply to both of our ADHD-type groups. Previous work looking at “cool” 
aspects of cognitive effort and ADHD symptoms has produced mixed findings (Elisa & 
Parris, 2015; Elisa & Parris, in preparation, see Chapters 3 & 5). We might also expect to 
see slower reaction times in the trials leading up to an escape in our ADHD-type groups 
compared to controls, as the requirement for cognitive effort increases. In both ADHD 
groups and a control group behavioural disengagement should be reflected by pupillary 
responses indicating elevated tonic mode firing, replicating Gilzenrat et al. (2010). 
However, it was expected that ADHD groups will have larger baseline pupils, and smaller 
stimulus evoked dilatations relative to controls both over the course of the task and 
particularly in the trials surrounding a behavioural escape. This finding would support 
Aston-Jones and Gold’s (1999) suggestion that ADHD symptoms are associated with 
elevated tonic activity and an absence of phasic LC activation.  It is assumed that any 
differences between the ADHD groups will be attributable to hyperactivity-impulsivity-
related impairments.  
The study was designed to enable us to assess the relationships between “hot” and 
“cool” cognitive processes and the different ADHD symptoms. On the one hand we have 
evidence for a relationship between self-regulatory processes (both “hot” and “cool”) and 
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“cool” WM, which is consistent with Hofmann et al.’s proposal, and on the other we have 
the notion of separable contributions for each temperature of cognition to ADHD 
symptoms; “hot” to hyperactivity-impulsivity, and “cool” to inattention. If the former were 
true we might expect (depending on the direction of the relationship) self-regulatory 
deficits associated with LC-NE activity to be related to inattentive symptoms (given the 
evidence for a relationship between inattention and WM) and thus be present in both our 
ADHD-type groups. If the latter were true we would expect such deficits to be present only 
in the group with hyperactive-impulsive symptoms, a finding that would also support 
Diamond’s notion that self-regulation is primarily supported by inhibition.  
 
Method 
Materials  and Tasks 
ADHD screening. Screening for ADHD symptoms was completed using a 
questionnaire based on the Adult ADHD Rating Scale-IV (Barkley, 2011), but adapted to 
reflect DSM-5 criteria. The scale contains the 18 items (9 for inattention, 9 for 
hyperactivity-impulsivity) from the DSM-5 criteria for ADHD with each item answered on 
a 4-point scale (from 0-3; not at all, sometimes, often and very often). As per DSM criteria, 
items were taken to be indicative of a symptom if they were rated often or very often; this 
is referred to as a positive rating. Participants were asked to read each question carefully 
and consider to what extent they had experienced each item description over the last 6 
months. They completed the questionnaire either in paper or electronic format. 
The DSM threshold is 5 positively rated items on either or both the inattention and 
hyperactivity-impulsivity subscales. For this research the threshold was lowered to 4 to 
include a wider range of symptomology reflective of the general population. A score of 2 
or less positively rated items on either of the subsets suggests the symptom is not present. 
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Participants who scored three on either subsets were considered sub-threshold and 
therefore not included in the research.  
Working memory. The letter-monitoring task (Duncan et al., 1996) assesses task 
integration through measuring goal-neglect, is thought to tap the episodic buffer 
component of WM, and correlates strongly with traditional measures of WM (Elisa & 
Parris, 2016).  This task was chosen for its demonstrated relationship with inattention.  
Intelligence quotient (IQ). A shortened version of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI-II) was included. From this measure a t-score for each relevant 
subscale (Gf & Gc) is calculated, and an overall IQ score is obtained from an age-matched 
set of scores.   
Diminishing utility task (Gilzenrat et al. 2010, see fig 2). Participants performed a 
number of pitch discriminations, for which points were earned for correct judgement. On 
each trial, participants first heard a reference tone, followed shortly by a comparison tone. 
They were instructed to make a speeded response to whether the comparison tone was 
higher or lower in pitch than the reference tone, using buttons on a gamepad. For correct 
responses, the value of that trial was added to the participant’s total score, the proceeding 
trial’s value increased by 5 points, and the difficulty of the pitch discrimination was 
increased. For incorrect responses, participants earned no points, the value of the 
subsequent trial was reduced by 10 points (with a floor of 0 points), and difficulty 
remained the same. In order to measure behavioural disengagement, participants were 
given the option to escape from the current block of discriminations without penalty at the 
beginning of each trial, moving to a new block of trials reset to the easiest level of 
difficulty. Participants were instructed to try and earn as many points as possible over the 
30-minute duration of the task.  
On the first trial of each block, the difference in pitch between the reference and 
comparison tones was 64 Hz (50/50 higher and lower). For each block the reference tone 
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stayed the same, and the difference between this and the comparison tone was halved 
following a correct response. If participants correctly discriminated a 0.25 Hz difference, 
tones became impossible to discriminate on the subsequent trial (i.e. 0 Hz difference). This 
means there were 9 discriminable tones for each block, with the tenth set impossible to 
discriminate between. For these indiscriminable trials there was a 50/50 chance of earning 
points. Indiscriminable trials continued until participants elected to escape. After an 
escape, a new block was chosen randomly without replacement from a set of four reference 
tones (400, 550, 700, and 850 Hz), which was replenished once all tones had been 
exhausted.  
At the start of each trial participants were shown a score/value screen that displayed the 
total number of points earned so far, and the points value of the proceeding trial. 
Participants then indicated whether they wanted to accept or escape the trial using the 
gamepad. If a participant chose to accept, a 250-msec reference tone followed after a 5-sec 
delay. This was followed by an interval of 4-secs, and a 250-msec comparison tone. 
Participants then indicated as quickly and accurately as possible whether the comparison 
tone was higher or lower in pitch than the reference tone. 3-secs post response a 250-msec 
feedback (for accuracy) sound was played. After a delay of 4-secs, a score/value screen for 
the next trial was shown. If participants elected to escape, a 250-msec escape sound was 
played, and a score/value screen for the first trial of the new block was shown. 
Participants were seated 60cm from the display monitor displaying a blank medium 
grey field. They were instructed to hold their gaze within a central fixation circle 
delineated by a thick black border subtending 4° of visual angle. Trials did not proceed 
unless gaze was maintained within this circle. Participants were also asked to limit 
blinking throughout each trial, and were encouraged to blink in-between trials at the 
score/value screen before pressing to accept/escape. Participants completed several 
practice trials to familiarise themselves with the format before the experiment started. 
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Practice was repeated until participants indicated that they were comfortable with the task. 
Stimuli were played through speakers either side of the monitor. 
 
 
Figure 2. An example of play for one trial of the DUT. 
 
Stimuli were programmed and are delivered using Experiment Builder (SR Research). 
Pupil diameter was recorded using the head-mounted EyeLink 1000 eyetracker (SR 
Research). Eye images were sampled by infrared camera at 1000 Hz. The dominant eye of 
each participant (determined before recording, and tested during practice trials) was 
recorded throughout the experiment.  
Baseline pupil diameter was recorded before every trial, and is defined as the average 
diameter during the 1-sec interval prior to the onset of the score/value screen (note that 
these are pre-trial baselines not pre-experimental baselines). Peak dilations of the pupil 
were measured as the maximal deviation from this baseline in the 2.5 secs following onset 
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of the comparison tone. As in Gilzenrat et al., in order to look at pupil data relative to 
behavioural disengagement, trials were averaged as a function of their position relative to 
escape events. Gilzenrat et al. only considered escape events preceded and followed by at 
least four accepted trials to ensure sufficient levels of task engagement. In the current 
research we reduced this to three as we found that restricting it to four greatly reduced the 
number of trials eligible to be included in the analysis.  
As our analysis included investigation of group differences, we took a closer look at the 
behavioural dependent variables from the DUT. A description of each of these and their 
relation to either “hot” or “cool” self-regulatory processes can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. 
Descriptions of behavioural dependent variables for the diminishing utility task 
Dependent Variable Description 
Reaction time (RT): "Cool" self-
regulatory processes 
The time in ms taken to respond (higher or lower) to the 
comparison tone. Indiscriminable trials included. Reaction times 
are expected to slow in response to trial difficulty thus reflecting 
"cool" processes of cognitive effort.  
% Escapes: "Hot" self-regulatory 
processes 
The percentage of times a participant elected to escape across all 
trials in the task. An escape represents making a decision to 
"explore" rather than "exploit" thus reflecting "hot" optimal goal 
directed behaviour. 
% Indiscriminable trials: "Hot" self-
regulatory processes 
The percentage of indiscriminable trials played over the task. 
This measure gives an indication of participants' perseverance 
with tones that were impossible to discriminate between and 
relates to "hot" optimal goal directed behaviour. 
% Zero point trials: "Hot" self-regulatory 
processes 
The percentage of trials played for where no points could be 
won. This measure gives an indication of participants' 
perseverance with a block even if some trials had no worth, and 
relates to "hot" optimal goal directed behaviour. 
Frequency difference: "Hot" self-
regulatory processes 
The average frequency difference between the reference and 
comparison tones. This is a measure of the average difficulty of 
the trials played over the task, and should reflect choices 
regarding "hot" cognitive effort based on utility.  
Expected Value: "Hot" self-regulatory 
processes 
This was computed to estimate the probability that participants 
would get trials of each difficulty level correct. Looking at this 
variable in conjunction with behavioural disengagements gives a 
measure of "hot" optimal goal directed behaviour.  
Total score The total score from the 30 minute playing time. Indiscriminable 
trials not included. 
Average points played for The average number of points played for on each trial. 
Average points won The average number of points won on each trial. Indiscriminable 
trials not included. 
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Two variables measure cognitive effort (frequency difference and reaction time), and 
three tap into our assessment of optimal goal directed behaviour (percentage of escapes, 
percentage of indiscriminable trials, and percentage of zero point trials). As in Gilzenrat et 
al. we also computed an estimate of expected value for each of the 6 trials surrounding an 
escape and the escape trial itself. This was calculated for each participant by multiplying 
the potential value of a trial by the expected accuracy on a trial of that difficulty for that 
participant. This was determined by averaging the accuracy of all trials with the same 
frequency difference, resulting in the probability the participant would get a trial of that 
difficulty correct. The measure of expected value allowed us to look at whether 
participant’s behaviour was optimal and based on on-going assessments of task utility.  
 
Data Analysis 
Bayes Factors (B) were used to assess the strength of evidence in support of hypotheses 
where the p value indicated no significant result. These were calculated using the 
procedures outlined in Dienes (2014). Proposed cut-offs for acceptance of a hypothesis 
(Jeffreys, 1998), states a B above 3 as providing substantial support for the alternative 
hypothesis, whilst below 1/3 provides substantial support for the null hypothesis. A B that 
falls between 1/3 and 3 deems the data insensitive as to whether the alternative or null 
hypothesis should be accepted. We modelled the predictions of the theory of an absence of 
evidence for a relationship with a half-normal whose mean and standard deviation values 
reflected what could reasonably be expected in the circumstance of a significant result. For 
example Bayes factors for non-significant behavioural dependent variables were calculated 
using the mean difference and standard deviation from a significant behavioural dependent 
variable. BH(0, X) refers to the Bayes Factors testing each hypothesis, where ‘H’ indicates a 
half-normal distribution, and ‘X’ the predicted standard deviation of this half-normal, 
against a null hypothesis of no difference. Where p values and Bayes factors conflict, the 
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Bayes factor is taken as conclusive. A p value of > .05 does not necessarily indicate that 
there is no effect, simply that one was not found in the current data set. The use of Bayes 
factors increases researcher confidence in concluding that there is no effect.  
 
Participants 
Participants were identified through prior screening as part of a wider research programme. 
A total of 55 male (N = 17) and female (N = 38) participants aged 18-35 participated in the 
research. Participants were allocated to one of three groups based on their ADHD 
screening scores. A primarily inattentive-type group (N = 15) consisted of participants who 
scored four or more positively rated items on the inattention subset, and 2 or less on the 
hyperactivity-impulsivity subset; and a combined-type group (N = 17) consisted of 
participants who scored 4 or more on both the hyperactivity-impulsivity subset and the 
inattention subset. Finally a control group (N = 23) consisted of participants who scored 2 
or less on both subsets. Groups differed significantly on inattention scores [F(2.52) = 172.53, 
p < .00, see Table 2] with the control group being significantly lower than both the 
combined-type (p < .00) and inattentive-type groups (p < .00) and the combined-type 
group reporting higher scores on inattention than the inattentive-type group (p < .00). 
There were also significant group differences in hyperactivity-impulsivity scores [F(2.52) = 
113.239, p < .00] with the control and inattentive-type groups being significantly lower 
than the combined-type group (ps < .000), but with no difference between the control and 
inattentive-type groups (p < .131). Participants were reimbursed £8 for their time.  
 
Procedure 
Participants complete all tasks individually in a quiet room. The order of tasks is counter-
balanced, but participants complete either the DUT followed by IQ and WM tasks, or the 
other way around.  
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Ethical approval for this research was obtained from Bournemouth University ethics 
committee. 
 
Table 2. 
   DSM scores for inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity across groups 
Group DSM subset Mean SD 
Control Inattention 0.48 0.67 
 
Hyperactivity-
impulsivity 0.65 0.78 
Combined-type Inattention 6.41 1.54 
 
Hyperactivity-
impulsivity 5.47 1.33 
Inattentive-type Inattention 4.87 0.83 
  
Hyperactivity-
impulsivity 1.33 1.05 
 
 
Results 
Results are split into two sections. Firstly we looked at data pertaining to the whole sample 
and replicated the analysis conducted by Gilzenrat et al. (2010). Secondly we conducted 
analysis between our ADHD-type groups.  
 Average t-scores for fluid and crystallised intelligence along with letter-monitoring 
scores can be seen in Table 3. In the diminishing utility task participants completed on 
average 74.58 trials (range 59-96), and elected to escape 6.64 times (range 0-21) over the 
course of the 30-minute playing time. The average epoch contained 7.64 trials. The 
average game score was 633.18 (range 130-1270). The average point value played for on a 
single trial was 16.74, and the average point value attained was 10.91. The average 
frequency difference between the reference and comparison tones was 15.31. 
 We now look at measures as observed leading up to and following an escape. 
Figure 3 shows average RTs and accuracy for trials surrounding escapes. As in Gilzenrat et 
al., on average RTs were slower [2382.68 vs. 1442.38 msec; F(1,48) = 49.353, p = .00] and 
performance less accurate [13.01% vs. 87.57%; F(1,48) = 254.116, p = .00] prior to an 
escape than afterwards. However, unlike Gilzenrat we only see a trending increase in RT 
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across trials immediately post-escape [F(1,48) = .817, p =.430, comparisons: ps > .05, 
BsH(0,.17) > .33 - < 3], and in the trials leading up to an escape [F(1,48) = 1.848, p = .163, 
comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,.17) > .33 - < 3], although RT peaked on the trial immediately 
prior to escape. 
 
Table 3. 
	 	Means and SD's for crystallised and fluid intelligence t-scores, 
and letter monitoring scores 
Dependent Variable Mean SD 
Gc 52.6364 7.47431 
Gf 48.7091 7.522 
Letter-Monitoring 7.9273 1.46382 
  
   
 
Figure 3. RTs and accuracy for trials surrounding escapes. 
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BH(0,.17)  = .26, positions -2 vs. -1; BH(0,.17) > .33 - < 3], but a significant decrease in the 
trials leading up to the escape [F(1,48) = 3.995, p = .00].  
 Figure 4 shows pupil measures (BPD & SED) for trials surrounding escapes. As in 
Gilzenrat et al., BPD significantly increased across the trials leading up to an escape as 
revealed by linear trend analysis [F(1,48) = 6.914, p = .011], and significantly decreased 
over the trials immediately post-escape as participants started a new epoch [F(1,48) = 
24.743, p = .00]. We also replicated the overall inverted-U shaped trend centered on the 
escape trial which was significant as indicated by quadratic trend analysis [F(1,48) = 12.780, 
p = .001]. 
 As expected by Gilzenrat et al., we saw a significant decrease in SED across the 
trials leading up to an escape [F(1,48) = 8.390, p = .006], as well as a significant increase 
over the trials immediately post-escape as a new epoch was started [F(1,48) = 26.607, p = 
.00]. 
 
 
Figure 4. BPD and SED over trials surrounding escapes. 
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Figure 5 shows expected value across the trials surrounding escapes. As in 
Gilzenrat et al., participants on average elected to escape when expected value was at a 
minimum. We also see the same significant quadratic trend centered on the escape that 
mirrors the pattern observed in BPD [F(1,48) = 130.654, p = .00, see fig 6]. However, our 
results diverge from Gilzenrat et al. in our regression analyses for predictors of pupil 
diameter (both BPD and SED). When we regressed our four performance metrics 
(expected value, actual value, expected accuracy, and actual accuracy) onto BPD, all were 
insensitive (expected value: r2 = .046, p = .141, BH(0,.17) = 2.44; actual value: r2 = .033, p = 
.213, BH(0,.17)  = 1.74; expected accuracy: r2 = .025, p = .282, BH(0,.17)  = 1.42; actual value: 
r2 = .001, p = .863, BH(0,.17)  = 1.34), although we note that expected value was closest to 
the threshold. When these variables were regressed onto SED expected value and actual 
value showed evidence for no effect (r2 = .0001, p = .952, BH(0,.17)  = .24; r2 = .001, p = 
.806, BH(0,.17)  = .20 respectively), and expected accuracy and actual accuracy were 
insensitive (r2 = .0001, p = .957, BH(0,.17)  = 1.32; r2 = .001, p = .820, BH(0,.17)  = 1.35 
respectively). We also regressed our measures of effort onto BPD and SED. Neither RT 
nor frequency difference were good predictors of either pupil measure (BPD: r2 = .013 p = 
.433, BH(0,.17)  = .99, SED r2 = .002, p = .771, BH(0,.17)  = .27, BPD: r2 = .012, p = .451, 
BH(0,.17)  = .01, SED: r2 = .000, p = .890, BH(0,.17)  = .01 respectively). 
Finally we also regressed our fluid intelligence and working memory measures 
onto pupil diameter. Neither fluid intelligence nor working memory predicted BPD (r2 = 
.003, p = .687, BH(0,1.60) = .059; r2 = .002, p = .754, BH(0,1.60) = 1.32 respectively) or SED (r2 
= .005, p = .594, BH(0,1.60) = .019; r2 = .008, p = .513, BH(0,1.60) = 1.06 respectively), with 
Bayes values being either at the low end of insensitive or providing evidence for no effect. 
Table 4 shows correlations between letter-monitoring performance, and self-
regulation variables from the DUT. Results show clear evidence for no relationship 
between WM and any of the aspects of self-regulation as measured behaviourally (ps > 
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.05, BsH(0,.50) < .33). Results for both BPD and SED were insensitive ps > .05, .33 < 
BsH(0,.50) < 3).  
  
Figure 5. Expected value and actual value across trials surrounding escapes. 
 
Figure 6. BPD and expected value across trials surrounding escapes. 
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ADHD-Type Group Differences 
Table 5 shows means and SD for our IQ and WM measures across groups. ANOVA’s 
showed significant group differences in both crystallised [F(2.52) = 3.174, p = .05], and fluid 
intelligence[F(2.52) = 6.655, p = .006]. In both cases this was driven by the combined-type 
group having a significantly lower score than both the control and inattentive-type groups 
(comparisons: Gc control vs. combined; p = .082, BH(0,14.04) = 3.51, control vs. inattentive; 
p = .970, BH(0,14.04) = .20, combined vs. inattentive; p = .081, BH(0,14.04) = 3.93, Gf control 
vs. combined ; p =.019, control vs. inattentive; p = .855, BH(0,14.04) = .26, combined vs. 
inattentive; p = .010). There were also significant group differences on our working 
memory measure, the letter-monitoring task [F(2.52) = 8.693, p = .001]. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that as expected performance by the inattentive-type group was 
significantly lower than controls (p < .001). The data for the control and combined-type 
groups, and the combined-type and inattentive-type groups was insensitive (p = .364, 
BH(0,14.04) = .33; p = .127, BH(0,14.04) = .59 respectively). 
Table 6 shows means and SD for each of our DUT dependent variables averaged 
across all trials. 
Cognitive effort. Results for RTs across all trials played were insensitive [F(2.52) = 
1.498, p = .233, comparisons: ps > .05, control vs. combined; BH(0,25.41) = 1.35, control vs. 
inattentive; BH(0,25.41) = 1.58, combined vs. inattentive; BH(0,25.41) = 1.61], while results for 
frequency difference, which represents the difficulty of the trials played, provided clear 
evidence for no group differences [F(2.52) = .004, p = .996, comparisons: ps > .05, control 
vs. combined; BH(0,25.41) = .09, control vs. inattentive; BH(0,25.41) = .11, combined vs. 
inattentive; BH(0,25.41) = .10]. 
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Table 4 
      	 	Correlations between working memory and measures of self-regulation 
	 	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Working Memory - -0.105 0.151 0.183 -0.028 0.18 -0.043 -0.09 
2.% Escapes 
 
- -.869** -.379** .759** -0.16 -.296* -0.064 
3. % Indiscriminable Trials 
  
- .402** -.633** 0.166 .332** 0.033 
4. % Zero Point Trials 
   
- -0.113 .367** .532** 0.009 
5.  Frequency Difference 
    
- -0.114 -0.125 -0.041 
6. Reaction Time 
     
- .264* 0.011 
7. BPD 
      
- .273* 
8. SED               - 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
	 	 
Table 5. 
	 	 	 	 	 	Means and SD's for crystallised and fluid intelligence t-scores, and letter monitoring scores across ADHD-type groups 
Dependent Variable ADHD-type group Mean SD 
	 	 	Gc 
	
  
	 	 	 1 Control 54.04 8.85 
	 	 	 2 Combined 49 4.57 
	 	 	 3 Inattentive 54.6 6.73 
	 	 	Gf 
	
  
	 	 	 1 50.3 8.13 
	 	 	 2 44.06 6.37 
	 	 	 3 51.53 5.4 
	 	 	Letter-Monitoring 
	
  
	 	 	 1 8.65 0.65 
	 	 	 2 7.88 1.22 
	 	 	  3 6.6 1.84 
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Table 6. 
   Averages for DUT behavioural variables across groups   
Dependent Variable ADHD-type group Mean SD 
RT  
  
 1 Control 2096.83 833.86 
 2 Combined 2100.81 645.63 
 3 Inattentive 1733.48 482.96 
Frequency Difference 
 
  
 1 15.26 9.19 
 2 15.26 7.57 
 3 15.31 6.29 
% Escapes    
 1 7.43 5.3 
 2 8.1 5.35 
 3 10.55 5.44 
% Indiscriminables 
 
  
 1 29.02 24.09 
 2 22.14 25.97 
 3 16.8 17.72 
% Zero point trials 
 
  
 1 10.34 13.44 
 2 15.86 15.8 
 3 3.91 5.28 
Total Score    
 1 618.48 286.45 
 2 592.65 264.72 
 3 701.67 188.68 
Points Played for 
 
  
 1 17.7 8.07 
 2 14.69 5.83 
 3 17.59 4.34 
Points Won 
 
  
 1 11.43 5.16 
 2 9.77 4.37 
  3 11.39 2.99 
 
Results also showed a significant interaction between RT and group [F(4,92) = 4.203, 
p = .004] on the trials surrounding an escape. Further exploration of this suggested that 
there were significant group differences (as indicated by Bayes factors) at two of the three 
positions: position -3 [F(2,45) = 2.551, p = .089; comparisons: control vs. combined; p = 
.106, BH(0,1958.85) = 3.49, control vs. inattentive; p = 1.00, BH(0,1958.85) = .17, combined vs. 
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inattentive; p = .231, BH(0,1958.85) = 1.77]; position -1 [F(2,45) = 4.377, p = .018; comparisons: 
control vs. combined; p = .075, BH(0,1958.85) = 5.26, control vs. inattentive; p = 1.00, 
BH(0,1958.85) = .36, combined vs. inattentive; p = .018, see fig7) with the combined-type 
group being significantly slower than the control group suggesting greater cognitive effort 
was required for a response.  
 
 
Figure 7. Average RTs across groups over the three trials leading up to an escape. 
 
There were no differences (or there was insensitivity) at position -2 [F(2,45) = .644, p = 
.530; comparisons: control vs. combined; p = 1.00, BH(0,1958.85) = .29, control vs. 
inattentive; p = .807, BH(0,1958.85) = .52, combined vs. inattentive; p = 1.00, BH(0,1958.85) = 
.26]. 
There was strong evidence for no difference between groups across trials post-
escape  [F(2,46) = .344, p = .710, comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,1958.85) < .33], and no 
0 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
3000 
3500 
-3 -2 -1 
R
T 
(m
s)
 
control 
combined 
inattentive 
 150 
interaction between RT position and group [F(4.92) = .302, p = .876, comparisons: ps > .05, 
BsH(0,1958.85) < .33]. 
Optimal goal directed behaviour. Results for percentage of behavioural escapes 
over all trials were mixed but leaning towards evidence for no effect [F(2.52) = 1.590, p = 
.214, comparisons: ps > .05, control vs. combined; BH(0,25.41) = .09, control vs. inattentive; 
BH(0,25.41) = .29, combined vs. inattentive; BH(0,25.41) = .58]. Results for percentage of 
indiscriminable trials played for were insensitive [F(2.52) = 1.307, p = .279, comparisons: 
ps > .05, control vs. combined; BH(0,25.41) = .72, control vs. inattentive; BH(0,25.41) = .57, 
combined vs. inattentive; BH(0,25.41) = 1.95]. The only dependent variable in this category 
for which there were significant group differences was the percentage of zero points trials 
played for [F(2.52) = 3.541, p = .036] with the combined-type group playing more of these 
trials than the inattentive-type group, and differences between the other groups being 
insensitive (control vs. combined; p = .369, BH(0,25.41) = .71, control vs. inattentive; p = .286 
BH(0,25.41) = .97, combined vs. inattentive; p = .027).  
Other variables included in the analysis were; total score for which results were 
insensitive [F(2.52) = .784, p = .462, comparisons: ps > .05, control vs. combined; BH(0,25.41) 
= 1.37, control vs. inattentive; BH(0,25.41) = 1.59, combined vs. inattentive; BH(0,25.41) = 1.60], 
number of points played for in a given trial which were mixed but leaning towards no 
effect [F(2.52) = 1.203, p = .309, comparisons: ps > .05, control vs. combined; BH(0,25.41) = 
.40, control vs. inattentive; BH(0,25.41) = .34, combined vs. inattentive; BH(0,25.41) = .08], and 
number of points won in any given trial for which results showed clear evidence for no 
group differences [F(2.52) = .810, p = .451, comparisons: ps > .05, control vs. combined; 
BH(0,25.41) = .18, control vs. inattentive; BH(0,25.41) = .17, combined vs. inattentive; BH(0,25.41) 
= .06].  
There was strong evidence for no group differences on any of our other behavioural 
dependent variables for trials leading up to or post-escape [accuracy pre-escape: F(2.46) = 
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.174, p = .841, comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,1958.85) < .33, accuracy post-escape: F(2.46) = 
.718, p > = .493, comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,1958.85)  < .33, expected accuracy pre-escape: 
F(2.46) = .084, p = .920, comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,1958.85)  < .33, expected accuracy post-
escape: F(2.46) = .628, p = .538, comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,1958.85)  < .33, trial worth pre-
escape: F(2.46) = .817, p = .448, comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,1958.85)  < .33, trial worth post-
escape: F(2.46) = .225, p = .799, comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,1958.85) < .33, expected value 
pre-escape: F(2.46) = .512, p = .603, comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,1958.85)  < .33, expected 
value post-escape: F(2.46) = .157, p = .855, comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,1958.85)  < .33]. 
Pupillometry variables. Analysis for pupil measures also showed strong evidence 
for no group differences for either BPD [F(2.52) = 1.509, p = .231, comparisons: ps > .05, 
BsH(0,25.41) < .33], or SED [F(2.52) = .497, p = .611, comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,25.41) < .33] 
across all trials. We also saw strong evidence for no group differences in pupil dilation pre 
or post-escape for either BPD [pre-escape: F(2.46) = .253, p = .778, comparisons: ps > .05, 
BsH(0,1958.85)  < .33, post-escape: F(2.46) = .295, p = .746, comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,1958.85)  
< .33] or SED [pre-escape: F(2.46) = .462, p = .633, comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,1958.85)  < 
.33, accuracy post-escape: F(2.46) = .020, p = .980, comparisons: ps > .05, BsH(0,1958.85)  < 
.33]. 
Discussion 
This research used the diminishing utility task (DUT; Gilzenrat et al. 2010), to assess self-
regulatory processes (both “hot” and “cool”), and specifically the modulation of control 
state and the exploit/explore trade-off in a community sample of adults reporting either 
purely inattentive, both inattentive and hyperactive, or no ADHD symptoms. Principally 
our aim was to investigate whether and which ADHD-type symptoms were associated with 
atypical patterns of norepinephrine (NE) activity and/or atypical self-regulatory 
explore/exploit behaviour. Overall, our data provide strong evidence for no difference 
between the ADHD groups and controls in terms of pupillometric/NE measures despite 
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reporting differences in the experience of ADHD symptomatology and in working 
memory. However, we did observe behavioural differences associated with hyperactive-
impulsive-type symptoms suggesting a “hot” self-regulatory deficit. 
 
Control State, NE and Pupillometry in the DUT 
Before considering the results as they related to ADHD symptoms in detail it is important 
to note that our results pertaining to the whole sample largely mirror the findings of 
Gilzenrat et al. (2010). Behavioural measures pre and post-escape reflect the level of 
difficulty (i.e. frequency difference between reference and comparison tones) of those 
trials; accuracy dipped in the trials leading up to an escape and was significantly higher 
post-escape, and RTs trend towards slowing in the trials leading up to an escape and 
increasing in the trials post-escape, with the peak immediately before escape. The patterns 
observed in the pupil data reflect these behavioural patterns reinforcing evidence for the 
relationship between pupillary response and control state. Like Gilzenrat we also observed 
increasing baseline pupil diameters (BPD) in the trials leading up to an escape with the 
peak BPD at the escape, coupled with diminished stimulus evoked dilations (SED). On 
post-escape trials we observed a decrease in BPD coupled with an increase in SED. The 
pattern of BPD was an inverted-U as predicted by AGT. Taken together these results 
parallel LC tonic mode in the trials leading up to an escape, and LC phasic mode in the 
trials immediately post escape reflecting levels of task engagement and providing further 
support for the link between pupil diameter and LC-NE activity.  
 AGT suggests that decisions on whether task engagement or disengagement is most 
adaptive are aided by online assessments of utility that drive control state. As in Gilzenrat 
et al. we computed a measure of expected value to test whether this was reflected in 
pupillary responses. Participants demonstrated optimal decision making behaviour on the 
whole; escaping when the expected value of the trials began to decline. When plotted 
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across trial position relative to escape, expected value mirrored the U-shape of BPD 
suggesting that evaluations of trial worth were related to engagement. When Gilzenrat et 
al. regressed expected value onto BPD they found a significant effect, however our own 
results, while close to the threshold for Bayes to indicate evidence for an effect, were 
insensitive. Indeed when expected value was regressed onto SED we found evidence for 
no effect, in direct contrast to previous findings. Gilzenrat et al. do concede that the metric 
of expected value has some flaws; it assumes unrealistically that participants have 
knowledge of both future and past trials, and it does not take into account perceptual 
differences between tones with the same frequency differences (between reference and 
comparison) but different frequencies (i.e. a reference tone of 400 Hz vs. a reference tone 
of 850 Hz). In spite of these things, they still found expected value to be a reliable 
predictor of both BPD and SED, and this is key in their conclusion that pupillary 
responses, and by inference LC activity, track utility. Unfortunately our data cannot 
provide support for this.  
In an effort to establish what task factors were influencing pupil size, we also 
regressed frequency difference and RT (our metrics of effort) onto BPD & SED, along 
with letter-monitoring task performance (working memory), and fluid intelligence. None 
were good predictors of either pupil measure. In fact Bayes values provided clear evidence 
that effort was not related to task-evoked dilations, which is a stark contradiction of 
findings from previous work. Beatty (1982) concludes that the task-evoked pupillary 
response accurately reflects all aspects of variations in processing demands. It is therefore 
more likely that our finding is due to limitations in design rather than that there is no 
relationship between pupil dilation and effort. Our pupil dilations follow the pattern we 
would expect to reflect changes in effort (decreasing in the trials preceding an escape as 
trials get more difficult, and increasing at the start of a new epoch), however it may be that 
variation in difficulty is not sufficient across the 3 trials pre and post-escape to elucidate an 
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effect. Ideally we would have more trials both pre and post escape included in the analysis, 
however the nature of the task, in that it was participant driven, negated this.  
Further analysis looked at the relationship between fluid intelligence and working 
memory, and pupil size. Unfortunately we are unable to draw firm conclusions as Bayes 
values were largely insensitive. Research reviewed by Solanto (1998) showed that the 
noradrenergic effects of stimulants were useful in enhancing working memory 
performance, so we would reasonably expect a relationship with pupil size. Tsukahara, 
Harrison, & Engle (2016) provide evidence showing a strong relationship between pupil 
size and both working memory capacity and fluid intelligence, although this was found 
using pre-experimental baseline measures of pupil size which may explain why we did not 
find such an effect.  
 
 
 
Working Memory and Self-regulation 
Contrary to the proposal of Hofmann et al. (2012) we found clear evidence for no 
relationship between WM and self-regulation as measured behaviourally with the DUT. 
However, results for WM and pupil measures were insensitive meaning we cannot rule out 
a relationship between WM and LC-NE activity. 
  
ADHD-Type Group Differences 
We first tested whether we had group differences in IQ so this could be considered in the 
proceeding analysis. We found significant group differences for both crystallised and fluid 
intelligence, with the combined-type group scoring lower than both controls and the 
inattentive-type group. There was no difference between the control group and the 
inattentive-type group. The association between ADHD symptomology and IQ is well 
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evidenced in the literature for both clinical (Crosbie & Schachar, 2001; Mariani & Barkley, 
1997; Rucklidge & Tannock, 2001) and community (Fergusson, Horwood, & Lynskey, 
1993; Goodman, Simonoff, & Stevenson, 1995; Rapport, Scanlan, & Denney, 1999) 
samples (although we note that this is not accepted  c.f. Schuck & Crinella, 2005), and it is 
suggested that there is a genetic origin to this (Kuntsi et al. 2004). Our results support this 
notion but only in cases where hyperactivity-impulsivity is present.  
As expected we observed significant group differences in performance on our 
working memory (WM) measure, the letter-monitoring task, which were independent of 
IQ. Participants in the inattentive-type group scored significantly lower than controls. This 
corroborates previous work suggesting that WM impairments in ADHD are specific to 
symptoms of inattention (Diamond, 2005; Elisa & Parris, 2016). However, given that our 
combined-type group was just as inattentive as our inattentive-type group, we would 
reasonably have expected them to also have significantly poorer performance than 
controls; Bayes values indicated data was insensitive so we are unable to conclude whether 
there was or was not an impairment in this group.  
Self-regulatory processes. Findings from previous work looking at ADHD 
symptoms and cognitive effort have been mixed (Elisa & Parris, 2015; Elisa & Parris, in 
preparation). In the current work we used two measures from the DUT to index effort: RTs 
(“cool”; reflecting slowing due to increased effort) and trial difficulty (the frequency 
difference between the reference and comparison tones reflecting the choice to engage in 
effort; “hot”). Contrary to what was expected, results suggested there were no differences 
between groups in the difficulty of trials played suggesting that participants with ADHD-
type symptoms were no more inclined to play trials which required less cognitive effort 
that controls. For RT, we observed significant group differences at two of the three 
positions prior to an escape with the combined-type group being significantly slower than 
the control group.  
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Results suggested neither of our ADHD-type groups elected to escape any more 
frequently than the controls meaning our hypothesis that ADHD-type symptoms would 
lead to differences in control state, i.e. a greater tendency to “explore” rather than 
“exploit”, was not supported. Two of our dependent variables indexed poor game strategy; 
playing an indiscriminable trial or a trial that was worth no points represents the opposite 
of a decision based on utility. Results regarding indiscriminable trials were insensitive, but 
we saw significant group differences in the percentage of zero point trials played over the 
course of the game, with the combined-type group playing more of these trial types than 
the inattentive-type group. However, we note that without IQ-matched groups we cannot 
rule out that the group differences observed in IQ may account for the result.  
Taken together our findings on self-regulatory processes suggest that hyperactivity-
impulsivity symptoms were associated with heightened expenditure of effort in trials with 
the same level of difficulty as those played by controls, who did not experience the same 
level of effort expenditure. It could therefore be argued that their assessment of utility is 
not optimal, (i.e. that “hot” goal directed behaviour is not optimal) as the most sensible 
strategy of behaviour in this scenario would be more frequent behavioural disengagements 
coupled with an associated reduction in overall trial difficulty; which we do not see. This 
interpretation supports the notion that hyperactive-impulsive symptoms are associated with 
modified “hot” EF processes. 
Pupil measures. Pupillometry was used as a proxy for LC-NE activity. Drug 
studies and genetic research have suggested a link between norepinephrine and ADHD 
(Biederman & Spencer, 1999; Bymaster et al. 2002; Comings et al. 2000; Kako et al. 
2007), and this seemed an ideal way to investigate any differences between those with 
ADHD-type symptoms and those without. We predicted ADHD-type symptoms would 
lead to an increase in tonic mode activity, and an accompanied decrease in phasic activity 
represented by larger pre-trial baselines and smaller SEDs, and indicating lower task 
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engagement. The analysis provided strong support for the null hypothesis of no group 
differences. Over all trials we observed no group differences in either BPD or SED, with 
Bayes values clearly showing evidence for no effect. This was also the case when we 
considered only trials surrounding an escape, suggesting that under strategic gameplay 
conditions (i.e. requiring assessment of task utility and with an escape option) ADHD-type 
symptoms did not affect (or were not affected by) LC-NE activity. This is not hugely 
surprising in light of our finding that ADHD-type symptoms did not lead to an increase in 
exploratory behaviour, which is what we would expect to accompany elevated tonic LC 
firing and it’s associated pupil reactions.  
 
Before concluding we must consider whether our ADHD-type groups, which were drawn 
from a community, not a clinical, population, are sufficient to elucidate any differences in 
LC-NE activity related to ADHD symptoms. As indicated by our results, our experimental 
groups were significantly higher than controls in ADHD symptomology, although this 
almost certainly would not have reached clinical levels. Importantly, we did see a 
significant difference between groups in performance on a working memory measure, and 
in response slowing pre escape, suggesting that if group differences on any other measure 
existed, our data would have revealed it. Moreover, if the clinical disorder is best described 
as being on a continuum, as ADHD is, any effect observed in a community sample would 
confirm the importance of the mechanisms causing the effect in the clinical population. 
That is, if an effect is present even in the community sample then it is likely to be key in 
the associated clinical disorder. Likewise, if an effect is not present in a community 
sample, it is unlikely to be of import at the clinical level unless it is assumed that the causal 
mechanisms at the clinical level are different, but this would violate the assumptions 
inherent in defining the disorder as being continuum based. Therefore, whilst we cannot 
draw conclusions from results where Bayes values were within the insensitive range, we 
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can draw conclusions both where significant differences and strong evidence for no 
difference are reported  (i.e. pupillometric measures, measures of effort, total game score, 
accuracy, and number of points played for and won).  
 
Conclusion  
The most prominent findings of this work were strong evidence for no differences between 
ADHD-type groups and controls in pupil/NE measures (despite significant group 
differences in symptoms and working memory) and evidence for slowed response times 
pre-escape associated with hyperactive-impulsive symptoms suggesting a deficit “hot” 
self-regulatory processes, namely goal directed behaviour. If we accept the link between 
changes in pupil diameter and LC-NE activity (which our data supports) then our findings 
suggest that ADHD symptoms are not related to activation of norepinephrine. However, 
we note that while this is evidence against a noradrenergic explanation of ADHD, this does 
not rule out a role for norepinephrine; it is still feasible that there is a relationship but that 
LC-NE activity is not the mechanism for it. For example, it is thought that the mechanism 
by which drugs used to treat ADHD (such as stimulants and antidepressants) work is by 
blocking the reuptake of catecholamines into the presynaptic neuron, thereby increasing 
levels of these monoamines in the extraneuronal space. This is not necessarily connected to 
the activity of the relevant neuronal circuits. This mechanistic explanation is also relevant 
to the potential relationship between WM and NE, which our data do not support. Indeed 
our findings relating to response times pre-escape are more consistent with developmental 
models that assert separable contributions of “hot” and “cool” executive function processes 
to ADHD manifestation (Sonuga-Barke, 2002; Sonuga-Barke, Dalen, and Remington, 
2003) with modified “hot” control mechanisms associated with hyperactive-impulsive 
symptoms. This also supports the direction of the relationship between EFs and self-
regulation being as Diamond (2013) and Hofmann et al. (2012) suggest, which is bolstered 
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by our results showing clear evidence for no relationship between inattention and “hot” 
LC-NE activity. 
With regard to methodology, we note that there is an argument that while the DUT 
gives the options of exploit or disengage, it does not actually give participants an “explore” 
option in the true sense. Further work may wish to look at exploration behaviour in relation 
to ADHD symptoms more closely using a task such as that developed by Jepma & 
Nieuwenhius (2011), who address this limitation; we may yet find greater differences in 
tendency to explore using a more sensitive task.
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Chapter 7: Thesis Discussion 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to investigate the cognitive underpinnings of the 
symptom inattention as defined in the DSM under criteria for attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). This necessitated looking at the other two core symptoms 
of ADHD (hyperactivity and impulsivity), in order to establish whether differences existed 
between them. Inattention was identified as a worthwhile area of investigation due to its 
under-representation in ADHD literature and it’s relevance to adults, who as a population 
are also under-represented in the literature. Based on the latest evidence (see Chapter 1), 
this work took the approach that ADHD symptoms exist along a continuum, with the high 
end of severity representing those appropriate for clinical diagnosis and treatment. On the 
whole this thesis took a dimensional approach to investigating ADHD symptoms, by 
utilizing a self-report measure (Connor’s adult ADHD rating scale) and regression 
techniques in analysis. In contrast, the final experimental chapter (Chapter 6) of the thesis 
categorizes participants into DSM ADHD-type groups, but lowers the threshold for criteria 
in order to maintain a sample representative of the general population. The study in 
Chapter 2 represents a break from the overall aims in order to validate the approach 
proposed in the thesis. Chapters 3-6 focus on addressing the relationships between ADHD 
symptoms and various components of an executive function (EF) model based on an 
interpretation of the literature in this area.  
 
Theoretical Context 
Five key theoretical approaches drove the work in this thesis. Firstly, that of the three core 
EFs (working memory, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility); the one theorized to 
be principally and uniquely related to inattention is working memory (WM; Diamond, 
2005). The literature is generally (but not definitively) supportive of this claim, although 
there are several issues that make it difficult to apply findings to our population of interest 
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(adults from a community population), including samples disproportionately of children, 
and a primarily categorical approach with low regard for ADHD subtypes. There is also an 
argument for the role of inhibitory control in hyperactivity-impulsivity (Barkley, 1997), as 
well as a substantial body of literature that links all three of the core EFs to ADHD 
symptoms generally, which may or may not be relevant to inattention (depending on the 
research design), but which is related to the second theoretical point; the proposal that EFs 
are related to self-regulatory processes. The work of Diamond (2013), and Hofmann, 
Schmeichel, and Baddeley (2012) is most influential here. Both theories suggest that all 
three core EFs (by nature of their own relationships) facilitate successful self-regulation, 
but differ in which they see as being most important. Diamond argues that inhibitory 
control overlaps considerably with self-regulation, but provides little in the way of an 
argument or evidence for this view. In Hofmann et al.’s far more comprehensive review, 
WM is identified as being most important in self-regulation, although a role for all three 
core EFs is acknowledged. If we accept the first theoretical approach, both of these views 
support the third; the potential for a relationship between ADHD symptoms and self-
regulatory processes. However, before a review of relevant literature could take place it 
was necessary to define what is meant by “self-regulatory processes”. This was 
complicated by a fourth literature on distinctions between “hot” and “cool” cognition. A 
definitive model of “hot” and “cool” cognition does not exist, but it is generally accepted 
that “cool” cognition refers to the three core EFs, and that “hot” cognition refers to 
processes involving reward, motivation, and emotion etc. Based on our interpretation of 
the literature this thesis took the stance that “hot” cognition reflects “hot” self-regulatory 
processes, “cool” cognition refers to both the three core EFs and “cool” self-regulatory 
processes, and that both “temperatures” of self-regulation are facilitated by the three core 
EFs (see model in Chapter 1 p 34). By these definitions, there is evidence in the literature 
to support a relationship between ADHD symptoms and both “hot” and “cool” self-
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regulatory processes. However, the fifth literature key to this thesis, which suggests a 
hot/cool – hyperactivity-impulsivity/inattention distinction, further complicates this. 
Assuming our interpretation of the literature on EFs and self-regulatory processes is 
correct, this would mean only inattention would be related to any of the three core EFs, 
which refutes the well-established literature linking hyperactivity-impulsivity to inhibitory 
control.  
Based on these five approaches the aim of this thesis was primarily to look at the 
relationships between components of the model (hot/cool, EFs, self-regulatory processes) 
with ADHD symptoms, while simultaneously attempting to clarify the relationships 
between the facets of cognition themselves.   
 
Summary of Main Findings 
Chapter 2. Symptom prevalence. The research in this chapter was a partial 
replication and extension of previous work by Faraone and Biederman (2005). Our sample 
was deliberately specific; a community sample of university students, as it was our 
intention to recruit mainly from this population in future work (however note that findings 
from previous work suggest such data from university students is generalizable to non-
academic populations). We conducted a comprehensive analysis that looked at ADHD 
symptom prevalence both dimensionally and categorically, and found that inattention was 
the most prevalent symptom in the sample. The findings from this research clearly 
supported the work of Faraone and Biederman, as well as validating the approach and 
methodology used throughout the thesis. 
 Chapter 3. ADHD symptoms and performance on the CRT. This chapter 
reflects the starting point for addressing the main aim of the thesis. The cognitive reflection 
test (CRT) was used to assess a self-regulatory component believed to be facilitated by the 
three core EFs: cognitive effort. This easy to administer task was used to generate data 
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quickly in order to inform the direction of the thesis. Results showed that all three ADHD 
symptoms were negatively correlated with CRT performance, but inattention uniquely 
accounted for variance in a regression model.    
Chapter 4. ADHD symptoms and working memory. At the end of Chapter 3 we 
noted evidence suggesting that CRT performance may well be explained by variance in 
WM, which would fit with Hofmann et al.’s theory on WM’s relationship to self-
regulatory processes. The aim of Chapter 4 therefore was to rigorously test Diamond’s 
(2005) theory on inattention and WM. This was done using three traditional WM tasks; 
two verbal (one simple one complex-span) and one spatial-span task in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 utilized the letter-monitoring task (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & 
Freer, 1996) that assesses goal-neglect and is purportedly related to the episodic buffer 
component of WM. Results from Experiment 1 showed that inattention uniquely predicted 
performance on both the simple and complex-span verbal tasks (results for hyperactivity 
and impulsivity were inconclusive), refuting the hypothesis made by Diamond (2005) that 
only complex-span tasks would be sufficient to uncover variance in inattention. Results 
relating to spatial WM and inattention were inconclusive, leaving us unable to confirm or 
refute its relationship, however impulsivity was a good predictor of performance on this 
task. Results from Experiment 2 suggested that the performance on the letter-monitoring 
task was uniquely predicted by inattention and that this task clearly differentiated 
inattention from the other two ADHD symptoms. Overall findings from both experiments 
broadly support Diamond’s hypothesis of a unique relationship between inattention and 
WM.  
Chapter 5. ADHD symptoms, cognitive effort, and working memory. The work 
in this chapter represents a reflection on the findings from Chapters 3 and 4, with a view to 
tightening the methodology and refining our understanding of the relationships already 
established. A task that enables independent manipulation of cognitive effort and cognitive 
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control was utilized allowing us to look at both of these “cool” processes in relation to 
ADHD symptoms. The letter-monitoring task from Chapter 4 was used to assess WM due 
to its unique relationship with inattention. The CRT from Chapter 2 was also used to 
enable comparison between the two quite different measures of cognitive effort. 
Unfortunately results were largely inconclusive and we were unable to support a 
relationship between cognitive effort and either inattention (refuting a “cool” description of 
inattention) or WM (refuting Hofmann et al., 2012). Results suggested a relationship 
between impulsivity and cognitive control, which supports Barkley’s (1997) theory. 
However, the finding was not consistent across both stroop interference contrasts or both 
RTs and errors (i.e. some were insensitive), did not apply to hyperactivity, and should be 
considered in light of the additional finding that impulsivity was also related to WM. 
Overall this makes it difficult to comment on the “temperature” best used to describe these 
symptoms. 
 Chapter 6. ADHD symptoms and LC-NE activity. The inconclusive results from 
Chapter 5 prompted us to take a change of approach in our assessment of self-regulatory 
processes. Indeed the concept of self-regulation is so vast that a conclusion on its 
relationship to any variable would require using measures to test various facets of it. In this 
chapter we looked at the exploit/explore trade-off in relation to locus coeruleus 
norepinephrine (LC-NE) activity, considered to be a “hot” component of self-regulation. 
We utilized a task that enabled participants to make a behavioural disengagement (i.e. to 
explore) when the utility of continuing was diminished. Using eye-tracking technology, we 
were able get a proximate measure of LC-NE activity through changes in pupil diameter 
evoked by task stimuli. Along with this the task allowed measurement of a number of 
behavioural variables relating to “hot” and “cool” self-regulatory processes of cognitive 
effort, and optimal goal directed behaviour. Contrary to predictions results provided strong 
evidence against a relationship between LC-NE activity and any of the ADHD symptoms. 
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However, there was behavioural evidence for dysfunction of “hot” self-regulatory 
processes related to utility judgement related to hyperactivity-impulsivity. Both findings 
are in line with a hot/cool – hyperactivity-impulsivity/inattention distinction.  
 
Implications for Theory 
Findings from the research in chapters 3-6 of this thesis are now reviewed collectively in 
an attempt to assimilate them into the theory outlined above.    
 The relationship between inattention and working memory. Our investigation 
of this relationship was mainly motivated by Diamond’s (2005) predictions. While 
primarily addressed in Chapter 4, the main finding of a significant relationship was 
replicated in Chapters 5 and 6. Diamond predicted that complex-span tasks specifically 
would be particularly sensitive to inattention. Our findings do not support this; the 
relationship between performance on a simple-span task (the backward digit span) and 
inattention was just as strong as for a complex-span task (the operation span). As noted in 
Chapter 4, this finding adds to debate in the literature on what constitutes a WM task, and 
whether the secondary element of the task needs to include new stimuli (as in operation 
span), or whether mental transformation of target items is sufficient; our work supports the 
latter. Secondly, Diamond suggests that verbal presentation of material places a 
particularly high demand on WM. Based on this it was predicted that a spatial-span task 
would not necessarily be related to inattention. Unfortunately results were inconclusive, 
although we note there are methodological issues with the task used (the Corsi blocks) that 
may not make it ideal for use in this context (see Chapter 4). However, we did find that the 
letter-monitoring task (which is heavily reliant on the assimilation and amalgamation of 
complex verbal material) was best at differentiating inattention from the other two ADHD 
symptoms, which lends support to Diamond’s theory.  
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 Overall our findings on inattention and WM support conclusions made in the wider 
literature using child and adult samples, from clinical and non-clinical populations 
(Gansler et al. 1998; Gathercole et al. 2008; Klingberg et al. 2005; Kim, 2004; Martinussen 
& Tannock, 2006). The fact that the relationship observed in community samples was 
robust across studies in this thesis further highlights the relevance of the finding to clinical 
populations.  
The relationship between general executive functions and self-regulatory 
processes. Chapters 5 and 6 addressed Diamond’s (2013) and Hofmann et al.’s (2012) 
proposals regarding which EF(s) facilitate self-regulatory processes. Results provided clear 
evidence that WM was not related to cognitive effort as assessed by the number Stroop 
task, or by behavioural measures from the diminishing utility task (DUT). Wider literature 
supports a relationship between WM and CRT performance (Stupple, Gale, & Richmond, 
2013; Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011), however our own results were insensitive 
meaning we are unable to add to the commentary. Results regarding WM and LC-NE 
activity (as measured with pupillometry) were also insensitive meaning we neither support 
nor rule out a relationship. WM was not related to interference contrasts in the number 
Stroop task, however distinguishing between whether this represents inhibitory control as 
one of the three core EFs, or as cognitive control as a facet of self-regulation is difficult as 
they are most likely synonymous in this context. Regardless, results also clearly showed 
that this variable was not related to cognitive effort as measured by the CRT.  
Although inconclusive, results from both chapters tend to refute (but not 
conclusively rule out) both Diamond and Hofmann in that no compelling evidence for any 
relationship between either WM or inhibitory control, and self-regulatory processes was 
found (reflecting a mixture of strong evidence against and insensitive results). Although 
testing relationships between these variables was not the primary aim of the thesis, we do 
concede that methodology could be refined, particularly with respect to inhibitory control. 
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Indeed, in their work on the CRT Toplak et al. (2011) note the importance of 
comprehensive measurement of inhibition.  
Self-regulatory processes and ADHD symptoms. Based on the EF model 
outlined in Chapter 1, we tested the relationship between ADHD symptoms and various 
facets of self-regulation with consideration for theory suggesting a hot/cool – 
hyperactivity-impulsivity/inattention distinction. Based on this we expected to see 
symptoms of hyperactivity-impulsivity related only to “hot” self-regulatory processes, and 
inattention related only to “cool” self-regulatory processes. However, if “cool” inhibitory 
control deficits were key to hyperactivity-impulsivity as suggested (Barkley, 1997), we 
might also see hyperactivity-impulsivity related to “cool” self-regulatory processes, 
particularly if Diamond’s view of inhibitory control facilitating self-regulation were true. 
In Chapter 2 we show evidence that all three ADHD symptoms were negatively correlated 
with performance on the CRT, but that only inattention was a significant predictor of 
variance. This finding could be taken as support for self-regulatory deficits in ADHD 
generally but with an emphasis on inattention. As we note in Chapter 2, the “temperature” 
of the CRT as a self-regulatory task is unclear and perhaps mixed; which indeed could 
explain why all three symptoms of ADHD were related. However, although there was not 
strong evidence against them, these findings were not replicated in Chapter 5, where 
evidence for the relationship between ADHD symptoms and “cool” cognitive effort was 
inconclusive. Findings from Chapter 6 partially support the hot/cool – hyperactivity-
impulsivity/inattention distinction by showing evidence for hyperactivity-impulsivity’s 
relationship with deficits in “hot” self-regulatory processes, specifically that group-specific 
increases in effort were not responded to optimally. Results regarding other “hot” self-
regulatory variables were insensitive. Results for the relationship between inattention and 
“cool” cognitive effort as measured by the number Stroop were also insensitive. In Chapter 
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3 we found that impulsivity was a good predictor of “cool” spatial WM, which goes 
directly against the hypothesis.  
While inconsistent, collectively these results provide partial support for a 
relationship between ADHD symptoms and self-regulatory processes generally. With 
consideration for our findings relating to WM and inattention, results also provide support 
for a hot/cool – hyperactivity-impulsivity/inattention distinction as suggested by 
Castellanos, Sonuga-Barke, Milham, and Tannock (2006).   
 
Relevance to the General Population 
Findings from Chapter 2 fully support the existence of ADHD symptoms existing at less 
severe levels than those meriting clinical diagnosis in the general population. This means 
that cognitive issues identified to be related to ADHD symptoms in clinical groups will 
also be experienced in the general population; indeed findings from this thesis suggest this 
is the case. Given the high degree of heredity in ADHD (Faraone, & Doyle, 2001; Fliers, 
Franke, & Buitelaar, 2005) this could be particularly relevant to family members of those 
diagnosed with ADHD, who do not meet diagnostic threshold, but who still experience 
symptoms.  
 
Relevance to Clinical Groups 
Findings from Chapter 2 support a dimensional approach to ADHD symptoms, meaning 
that the findings from Chapters 3-6 are relevant to clinical groups that experience ADHD 
symptoms. We would expect that the decrease in symptom severity associated with a 
community sample means that effects found in this work would represent a minimum for 
clinical groups. For example, adults experiencing clinical levels of inattention will 
experience increased deficits in WM. Equally, where we found strong evidence for no 
relationships regarding EF components (i.e. self-regulatory processes related to LC-NE 
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activity), it is unlikely that these are relevant to clinical level expression of ADHD 
symptoms.  
 
Future Directions 
This thesis represents the first work to look at EFs and self-regulatory processes, within a 
model acknowledging “hot” and “cool” cognition distinctions, related to ADHD symptoms 
in a community sample of adults. The model included in Chapter 1 represented a best 
interpretation of the literature, and attempted to define and characterize aspects of 
cognition operationally in order to test them in relation to ADHD symptoms. Ideally a firm 
model of EF function would exist prior to testing in relation to symptomology. Future 
work should look at refining definitions and distinctions in the model. For example, this 
thesis accepted a premise that the three core EFs are predominantly “cool” in nature. 
However, it is possible that there is more overlap between “hot” and “cool” processes than 
models of cognition allow for. This would certainly complicate testing aspects of EF, as 
paradigms that isolate either “hot” or “cool” would be required. Indeed, it is likely that 
development of models of EF have been influenced by the use of laboratory-based tasks 
that are inherently devoid of “heat”. The model was also based heavily on the work of 
Diamond (2013) and Hofmann et al. (2012) suggesting that EFs facilitate self-regulatory 
processes, and the findings in this thesis do not support this. However, the thesis does not 
represent a comprehensive test of these theories and therefore does not rule them out. It 
would be highly useful to have clarification of the relationships between the concepts in 
the model before further work is carried out on how ADHD symptoms relate to them. As 
noted with regard to inhibitory control above, future work could consider extensive EF 
testing using multiple measures. Further work utilizing the letter-monitoring task as a 
measure of WM would be useful, in order to clarify what about it’s nature makes it unique 
in its relationship to inattention.   
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Conclusion 
The studies in this thesis set out to investigate the cognitive underpinnings of inattention, 
with a view to supporting research suggesting a qualitative distinction between this 
symptom and those of hyperactivity-impulsivity. Overall findings are very mixed, although 
some notable contributions to the literature have been made. The main finding from the 
work relates to the relationship between inattention and WM, which was shown to be 
robust and reliable across three studies, and differentiated inattention from hyperactivity-
impulsivity. An aspect of “hot” self-regulation was also found to be related uniquely to 
hyperactivity impulsivity. Findings relating to the relationships between core EFs and self-
regulatory processes do not on the whole support the positions of Diamond (2013) and 
Hofmann et al. (2012) that the three core EFs facilitate self-regulatory processes, although 
we are not in a position to rule them out. With regard to the hot/cool – hyperactivity-
impulsivity/inattention distinction we show evidence for a relationship between specific 
components of  “cool” cognition with inattention, and “hot” cognition with hyperactivity-
impulsivity. However, results relating to other aspects of both were inconclusive. 
.
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Connors Adult ADHD Rating Scale-Self-Report: Short Version 
(Connors, Edhardt & Sparrow, 1999) 
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Appendix B. DSM-5 Adult ADHD Rating Scale (based on Barkley, 2011) 
How often in the last 6 months Never Sometimes Often Very frequently 
have you failed to give close attention to details or 
made careless mistakes at work or in other 
activities? 
0 1 2 3 
have you had difficulty sustaining attention in tasks 
or recreational activities? 0 1 2 3 
have you had trouble keeping up with a 
conversation with someone, or with someone 
speaking to you directly? 
0 1 2 3 
have you failed to follow through on instructions or 
complete chores, duties in the 
workplace/assignments at college/university? 
0 1 2 3 
have you had difficulty organizing tasks and 
activities? 0 1 2 3 
have you avoided or disliked engaging in tasks that 
require sustained mental effort? i.e. 
college/university assignments, tasks at work 
0 1 2 3 
have you lost things necessary for tasks or activities 
at college/university/work? 0 1 2 3 
have you been distracted by activity or noise around 
you?  0 1 2 3 
have you lost things necessary for tasks or activities 
(e.g., work/college materials, tools, wallets, keys, 
paperwork, eyeglasses, mobile telephones). 
0 1 2 3 
have you fidgeted with hands or feet, or squirmed 
in your seat? 0 1 2 3 
have you left your seat in meetings or other 
situations where your are expected to remain 
seated? 
0 1 2 3 
have you felt restless inside, or expressed 
restlessness by behaving inappropriately? 0 1 2 3 
have you had difficulty unwinding, relaxing or 
engaging in leisure activities quietly? 0 1 2 3 
have you talked excessively? 0 1 2 3 
have you felt 'on the go' or as if 'driven by a motor'? 0 1 2 3 
have you had difficulty waiting your turn in 
situations where turn taking is required? 0 1 2 3 
have you found yourself finishing the sentences of 
people you are talking to before they can finish 
themselves, or blurted out the answers to questions 
before they have been completed? 
0 1 2 3 
have you interrupted or intruded on others when 
they are busy? 0 1 2 3 
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Appendix C. Table showing a summary of post-publication regression analysis for 
Chapter 3. Variables entered as in Chapter 4 (with inattention last rather than first). 
 
 	 	 	 	 	 	Summary of regression for IQ, hyperactivity, impulsivity and inattention on CRT 
scores. 
Variable b SEb β t R2 
F for 
change 
in R2 
Step 1     0.023 1.879 
WTAR IQ 0.013 0.009 0.151 1.437   
Step 2     0.051 2.781 
WTAR IQ 0.009 0.009 0.108 1.018   
Hyperactivity  -0.030 0.012 -0.262 -1.472   
Step 3     0.089 .573 
WTAR IQ 0.008 0.009 0.95 .886   
Hyperactivity -0.13 0.015 -.202 -.849   
Impulsivity -0.011 0.015 -0.102 -0.757   
Step 4     0.161 6.325** 
WTAR IQ 0.011 0.009 0.125 1.193   
Hyperactivity -0.006 0.016 -0.37 -0.258 
  Impulsivity -0.004 0.015 -0.033 -0.250 
  Inattention -0.031 0.012 -0.314 -2.515**     
**p < .01 
         
